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The increasing number of traffic accidents and the associated traffic congestion 
have prompted the development of innovative technologies to curb such problems. This 
dissertation introduces a novel Score-Based Traffic Law Enforcement and Network 
Management System (SLEM), which leverages connected vehicle (CV) and telematics 
technologies. SLEM assigns a score to each driver which reflects her/his driving 
performance and compliance with traffic laws over a predefined period of time. The 
proposed system adopts a rewarding mechanism that rewards high-performance drivers 
and penalizes low-performance drivers who fail to obey traffic laws. The reward 
mechanism is in the form of a route guidance strategy that restricts low-score drivers from 
accessing certain roadway sections and time periods that are strategically selected in order 
to shift the network traffic distribution pattern from the undesirable user equilibrium (UE) 
pattern to the system optimal (SO) pattern. Hence, it not only incentivizes drivers to 
improve their driving performance, but it also provides a mechanism to manage network 
congestion in which high-score drivers experience less congestion and a higher level of 




First, a nationwide survey study was conducted to measure public acceptance of the SLEM 
system. Another survey targeted a focused group of traffic operation and safety 
professionals. Based on the results of these surveys, a set of logistic regression models was 
developed to examine the sensitivity of public acceptance to policy and behavioral 
variables. The results showed that about 65 percent of the public and about 60.0 percent of 
professionals who participated in this study support the real-world implementation of 
SLEM. Second, we present a modeling framework for the optimal design of SLEM’s 
routing strategy, which is described in the form of a score threshold for each route. Under 
SLEM’s routing strategy, drivers are allowed to use a particular route only if their driving 
scores satisfy the score threshold assigned to that route. The problem is formulated as a bi-
level mathematical program in which the upper-level problem minimizes total network 
travel time, while the lower-level problem captures drivers’ route choice behavior under 
SLEM. An efficient solution methodology developed for the problem is presented. The 
solution methodology adopts a heuristic-based approach that determines the score 
thresholds that minimize the difference between the traffic distribution pattern under 
SLEM’s routing strategy and the SO pattern. The framework was applied to the network 
of the US-75 Corridor in Dallas, Texas, and a set of simulation-based experiments was 
conducted to evaluate the network performance given different driver populations, score 
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Chapter 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1-1. Background 
Traffic congestion and its associated adverse consequences have reached alarming 
levels in most urban areas, representing a major daily challenge for travelers, traffic 
network managers, the economy, and public health (Vickrey W. S., Congestion Theory and 
Transport Investment, 1969; Mohan Rao & Ramachandra Rao, 2012). In the U.S., for 
example, a recent study investigating the nation’s major social problems revealed that 
traffic ranked fourth among 13 major problems in both urban and suburban areas across 
the country, ahead of other serious issues such as crime, availability of jobs, education 
quality, and racism (Parker, et al., 2018).  
Several serious negative impacts are typically associated with traffic congestion. 
Economically, traffic congestion reduces workers’ productivity and limits the region’s 
opportunities for economic growth (Sweet, 2014). According to INRIX’s 2018 traffic 
scorecard, U.S. cities lost about $305 billion due to traffic congestion (Reed & Kidd, 2019). 
Environmentally, traffic congestion deteriorates air quality due to the increasing idling 
emissions (Rahman, et al., 2013). Cars and trucks traveling on the U.S. roadways are 
responsible for about 21.7 percent of total carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (EPA, 2019). 
In addition, there has been evidence of a strong correlation between chronic diseases, 
illness, and overall well-being, with long drive times and unpredictable travel times during
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daily commutes. ”Longer commute time-optional” lifestyles are typically not a choice for 
many, and reduces time available for family, friends, and health-promoting activities (e.g., 
exercise, sleep) thereby, increasing stress, blood pressure and obesity (Henschel, et al., 
2012; Levy, Buonocore, & Von Stackelberg, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 1-1: Traffic population statistics 
Traffic safety is another major problem facing urban and rural area. The annual 
traffic safety report shows a worsening traffic trend over the last several years which makes 
the 2018 stats no exception (NHTSA, 2018). For example, Figure 1-2 shows the trend in 
the number of traffic fatalities, which increased from 32,744 in 2014 to 35,485, 37,461, 
and 40,231 in 2015, 2016, and 2017, respectively. While many factors contribute to the 
occurrence of these accidents, human error and failure to obey traffic rules are among the 
top causes of the majority of most accidents (Singh, 2018). As shown in Figure 1-3, over 
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the influence (DUI), distraction, drowsiness, and speeding. 
 
Figure 1-2:Traffic related fatalities 
 


























Given the multi-dimensionality of the traffic safety problem, a comprehensive 
approach that integrates education programs, law enforcement, and engineering 
technologies (also known as the EEE approach) is widely practiced in many cities around 
the world (Evans, 2004). Efforts devoted to advancing engineering technologies for traffic 
safety applications can be generally classified into two categories: (a) driver-assisting 
technologies and (b) traffic monitoring and law-enforcing technologies (Smith, 2017). 
Driver-assisting technologies focus on reducing human errors that might contribute to 
accidents. For example, vehicles are increasingly equipped with bumper sensors that alert 
drivers so that they might avoid collisions with cars/objects in their blind spots. Law-
enforcing technologies aim to develop platforms for traffic monitoring and reporting traffic 
law violations. These systems reduce dependence on police officers for traffic law 
enforcement tasks, which are expensive and occasionally put the officers in dangerous 
situations. Speed radars and red-light cameras, which are capable of video-recording a 
violating vehicle and issuing tickets that are sent directly to the driver’s home/email 
addresses, are examples of automated law-enforcing technologies (Ahmed, Yaqub, Bouk, 
& Kim, 2016). 
1-2. Motivation 
The acceleration toward smarter cities and infrastructure and the recent revolution 
in both connectivity and computational capability has opened the door for developing more 
innovative transportation technologies to improve mobility, safety, and law enforcement 
conditions. For example, the emergence of connected vehicles (CV) technology is expected 
to revolutionize traffic safety and mobility applications (Smith, 2017).  
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Current research and development efforts focus on leveraging vehicle-to-vehicle 
(V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications to enhance traffic safety by 
providing better driving assistance capabilities. For example, dedicated short-range 
communication (DSRC) channels for vehicular communications have enabled the 
development of warning systems that keep drivers aware of their 360° surroundings. In 
addition, CV technology has been proposed to harmonize the traffic speed on freeways and 
to provide early warnings for drivers about building downstream queues from their current 
locations (Talebpour, Mahmassani, & Hamdar, 2013). It is generally estimated that CV 
technology could eliminate or mitigate up to 80 percent of minor crashes that take place at 
intersections, parking lots, or during lane changes by enabling drivers to receive warning 
messages through V2V and V2I communications (NHTSA, 2016). According to the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), this technology could have 
averted, on average, half a million crashes, a quarter of a million injuries, and the deaths of 
one thousand Americans in 2017 (NHTSA, 2017).  
Effort devoted to adopting CV technology for law enforcement applications is in 
its infancy. The idea is to integrate CV technologies in law-enforcement vehicles, as shown 
in Figure 1-3, to improve data gathering, processing, and tracking of surrounding vehicles, 
with the goal of easing and increasing the efficiency of police officers’ jobs (Microsoft , 





Figure 1-4: The Microsoft advanced patrol platform (Source: (Eichner, 2017; Surur, 2018) 
While the concerns about privacy invasion and lack of supporting legislation have 
slowed market readiness for these applications, there are strong indications that CV 
technology could benefit such applications. For example, automobile insurance companies 
have recently shown interest in using a CV to develop systems for monitoring and profiling 
drivers’ performance in terms of several driving aggressiveness measures (e.g., frequent 
lane changing, speeding, acceleration and deceleration rates, etc.). Obtaining this 
information enables insurance companies to design customized insurance policies with 
minimum loss risk (Händel, et al., 2014). In addition, there has been considerable debate 
over current traffic penalties for violators of traffic laws which include warnings, fines, 
driver’s license suspensions, and jail time and their effectiveness for curbing worsening 
trends in traffic law compliance. Intensive research in the last fifty years has concluded 
that improvements in future traffic conditions will depend on improving both driver 
performance and driver behavior (Lee, 2008). 
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1-3. Overall Approach  
In this context, this dissertation introduces a novel autonomous Score-Based Traffic 
Law Enforcement and Network Management System (SLEM) that leverages CV 
technology. The system assigns a real-time score for each driver that reflects her/his 
monitored driving performance and traffic law compliance. Different from current systems 
that issue tickets to violating drivers, the proposed system adopts a reward mechanism that 
rewards high-performance drivers who comply with the traffic laws and penalizes low-
performance drivers who fail to obey the laws.  
The proposed mechanism is in the form of a route guidance strategy that restricts 
low-score drivers from accessing certain roadway sections and strategically selected time 
periods. These restricted roadway sections and time periods would be selected such that 
high-score drivers would experience less congestion and a higher level of safety, while 
low-score drivers would be instructed to follow alternative routes. The level of restriction 
is designed to transform the traffic flow pattern in the network from an undesirable user 
equilibrium pattern to a system optimal pattern (Peeta & Mahmassani, 1995). As such, this 
system not only promotes safe driving but also reduces congestion in the network by 
achieving an efficient traffic distribution pattern in the network. 
While SLEM promotes safe driving due to its safety aspect, it also shares several 
similarities with different existing travel demand management strategies that adopt route 
restriction policies due to its mobility management aspect. For example, the congestion 
pricing strategy specifies a toll for roadway segments to restrict access only to drivers 
willing to pay the imposed tolls (de Palma & Lindsey, 2011). Similarly, single-occupancy 
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vehicles are restricted from traveling on high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes 
(Abdelghany, Abdelghany, Mahmassani, & Murray, 2000; Murray, Mahmassani, & 
Abdelghany, 2001). The road rationing strategy adopted in several cities is another 
example of route restriction strategy, where vehicles are restricted from accessing some 
roads based upon the last digits of the license plate number on certain established days 
during certain periods (Han, Yang, & Wang, 2010). In addition, the credit-based policy can 
be viewed as a restriction strategy, where each driver maintains a travel credit beyond 
which drivers are not allowed to travel in the network (Kockelman & Lemp, 2011). Finally, 
the incentive-based demand management strategy aims to reduce access to congested 
routes by providing incentives to drivers to avoid these routes (Ben-Elia & Ettema, 2011a). 
Although these strategies have shown to be effective in reducing traffic congestion, their 
justice and equity remain an issue of heated debate.   
1-4. Research Objectives and Contributions 
Because of the novelty of SLEM, this dissertation focused on two objectives. First, 
to understand both public acceptance and the opinion of traffic system 
experts/professionals regarding the adoption of SLEM in their regions. To obtain 
information on public acceptance, a national survey with a sample of 1,418 participants 
was designed and distributed across all 50 states and the District of Columbia (DC). The 
survey collected information on the participants’ socioeconomic characteristics, their 
driving performance history, and their level of acceptance of the new system. Using this 
sample data, a logistic regression model was developed to determine significant variables 
that affect public acceptance of SLEM and to predict its level of acceptance under different 
policy and operation scenarios. Another survey was implemented at smaller scale to gather 
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information on the views of traffic system experts/professionals of SLEM. The sample 
included experts from public agencies and consultants providing services to these agencies.  
 Second, to present a modeling framework for the optimal design of SLEM’s 
routing strategy, which is described in the form of a score threshold for each route. Under 
SLEM’s routing strategy, drivers are allowed to use a particular route only if their driving 
scores satisfy the score threshold assigned to that route. The problem is formulated as a bi-
level mathematical program in which the upper-level problem minimizes total network 
travel time, while the lower-level problem captures drivers’ route choice behavior under 
SLEM. An efficient solution methodology developed for the problem is presented. The 
solution methodology adopts a heuristic-based approach that determines the score 
thresholds that minimize the difference between the traffic distribution pattern under 
SLEM’s routing strategy and the SO pattern. The framework was applied to the network 
of the US-75 Corridor in Dallas, Texas, and a set of simulation-based experiments was 
conducted to evaluate the network performance given different driver populations, score 
class aggregation levels, recurrent and non-recurrent congestion scenarios, and driver 
compliance rates. 
This dissertation contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it introduces a 
score-based system that simultaneously aims to enhance traffic safety and reduce network 
congestion. Second, it is among the first attempts to develop a score-based traffic network 
management system that leverages CV technology. Third, this dissertation studies the 
public acceptance of (SLEM) as a demand management strategy that based on driver 
performance profiling and roadway access restrictions. Fourth, a modeling framework in 
the form of a logistic regression model was developed to examine main factors that 
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influence public acceptance of the real-world deployment of the system. Fifth, this 
dissertation presents a modeling framework consisting of a mathematical formulation and 
an efficient solution methodology to design SLEM’s optimal route guidance strategy. 
Finally, this dissertation quantifies the travel time savings associated with deploying SLEM 
in a real-world network. 
1-5. Dissertation Organization  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. The next chapter reviews 
different topics related to SLEM, including the history of performance-based driver 
profiling and the development of score-based systems. The survey design, methods, and 
the procedure of the data preparation is given in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the results of the 
surveys and discusses the data analysis and findings of the developed logistic regression 
model are presented. The problem definition and the set of assumptions are introduced in 
chapter 5 followed by the solution methodology in Chapter 6. The experimental results and 
analysis are presented in Chapter 7 of SLEM. Finally, the conclusion and future research 
is given in the final chapter, Chapter 8.  
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Chapter 2  
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2-1. Introduction 
Considering the multi-faceted nature of SLEM, the main objective of this chapter 
is to review two related topics in the literature: (I) recent advances in driver performance 
profiling using telematics technologies, and (II) travel demand management strategies that 
share similarity with SLEM. These two topics share several traffic safety and mobility 
policies and applications introduced in the literature. For traffic safety, this chapter reviews 
the major approaches proposed in the literature, which largely concern driver profiling and 
monitoring. Regarding traffic mobility, this chapter reviews the major traffic management 
policies proposed in the literature that focus on roadway access restriction.  
2-2. Driver Behavior Profiling and Monitoring  
Advances in telematics technology have focused considerable attention on the 
concept of monitoring and profiling drivers based on their driving performance for several 
applications, such as vehicle insurance and commercial/public transportation safety. For 
example, automobile insurance companies have recently introduced the Usage-Based 
Insurance (UBI) model, which issues insurance policies to drivers that reflect their vehicle 
usage and other known information concerning their driving performance.  
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In addition, several technology companies have proposed a scoring system that can 
be used by owners of commercial vehicles and public transportation agencies to evaluate 
the performance of their drivers. As proposed in (Händel, et al., 2014), these scores 
combine several metrics that are monitored in real-time (e.g., acceleration and braking, 
speeding, smoothness, swerving, etc.). For instance, the AXA Drive Coach application was 
developed to sense and analyze vehicle maneuvers, then assign scores to drivers based on 
these patterns (Tardy, 2015).  
Another driver scoring application, DriveSafe, applies pattern recognition 
techniques to detect driver distraction (Bergasa, Almería, Almazán, Yebes, & Arroyo, 
2014). Inspired by financial credit scores, the credit scoring services company FICO 
recently announced a new product called FICO® Safe Driving Score to establish a new 
driver characterization system that categorizes drivers based on their driving performance 
(FICO, 2018). 
Three main approaches are used to monitor driving performance: physiological, in-
vehicle sensing, and performance-based. The physiological-based approach is mainly used 
to evaluate the performance of commercial drivers. Sensors are physically attached to the 
drivers’ bodies to acquire different bio-measures that can be used to assess the drivers’ 
level of alertness or fatigue. Examples of these bio-measures include an 
electroencephalogram (EEG, brain activity), an electrooculogram (EOG, eye movement), 
and an electrocardiogram (ECG, heart rate) (Borghini, Astolfi, Vecchiato, Mattia, & 
Babiloni, 2014). However, this approach is not widely accepted because drivers feel 
uncomfortable with these sensors attached to their bodies, especially if they are driving for 
long distances.  
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The in-vehicle sensing approach aims to monitor drivers’ alertness and evaluate 
their ability to maintain safe driving by installing sensors in the vehicle rather than 
attaching them to the drivers’ bodies. For example, (Liang, Reyes, & Lee, 2007) developed 
a platform to detect distracted drivers by monitoring eye movement and driving 
performance in a simulation environment. (Cyganek & Gruszczyński, 2014) performed 
field experiments to detect drivers’ fatigue and drowsiness. (Mbouna, Kong, & Chun, 
2013) examined visual feature monitoring schemes that monitor a driver’s pupil and head 
position to detect drowsiness and distraction.  
Furthermore, a driver distraction detection experiment was conducted by (Vicente, 
et al., 2015),that monitored the driver’s head pose and gaze. In addition to distraction and 
drowsiness, detection of the driver’s emotional stress was also proposed by (Gao, Yüce, & 
Thiran, 2014), wherein facial recognition sensing was used to detect a driver’s 
psychological state. An artificial neural network model was developed by (Ye, Osman, 
Ishak, & Hashemi, 2017) to predict the driver’s involvement in secondary distracting tasks 
such as calling, texting, and passenger interaction. Driving performance is also inferred by 
analyzing acceleration and braking pedal operations (Wahab, Quek, Tan, & Takeda, 2009). 
The IntelliSafe system introduced by Volvo is an example of a driver alertness detection 
system deployed in the real world (VOLVO, 2018). 
Finally, performance-based approaches monitor the vehicle’s movements to assess 
driver performance. For example, vehicle movement data are used to infer information 
from the driver’s braking and acceleration (Pentland & Liu, 1999) as well as lane changing 
and maneuvering (Kuge, Yamamura, Shimoyama, & Liu, 2000). (Gonzalez, Wilby, Diaz, 
& Avila, 2014) developed a model that detects driver aggressiveness by monitoring lateral 
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and longitudinal accelerations and speed. Car following and headway distance data are also 
considered to measure driving aggressiveness (Miyajima, et al., 2007).  
The majority of the literature views the smartphone as the most affordable 
telematics tool for monitoring driver performance. Data on driving patterns could be 
acquired from the drivers’ smartphones (e.g., accelerometers, magnetometers, GPS) to 
detect their risky performance and aggressiveness (Eren, Makinist, Akin, & Yilmaz, 2012; 
Hong, Margines, & Dey, 2014). These data can also be used to reveal additional 
information regarding the alertness of the driver (Dai et al., 2010). Smartphone applications 
have been developed to detect the activities of drivers and provide real-time suggestions to 
enhance their performance (Araújo et al., 2012).  
Evaluating the accuracy of driving performance systems that use smartphone data 
is already underway. For example, Paefgen et al. (2012) conducted a field study to evaluate 
a smartphone application for the assessment of driving performance during critical driving 
events and found that smartphones tend to overestimate the measurements of critical 
driving events. Castignani et al. (2013) considered an application for UBI driving scores 
and found that more effort is required to improve the accuracy of data gathered by 
smartphones. This work was extended by Castignani et al. (2015), who explored the 
SenseFleet drivers’ profiling and scoring platform to detect risky driving events based on 
data that were collected independently from both a mobile device and the vehicle. 
Experimental results showed that SenseFleet was accurate in terms of differentiating 
between risky and calm driving. 
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More recently, CV technology has been looked at as a plausible technology for 
monitoring and profiling driving performance (Chen et al., 2018). Based on data collected 
from a simulated CV platform, a machine-learning algorithm was proposed to profile 
drivers in terms of driving aggressiveness and assign them performance scores. The results 
from the developed model suggest that low-score drivers should follow safe drivers in order 
to enhance highway safety and mobility conditions. 
2-3. Travel Demand Management 
Enormous efforts have been devoted to developing effective solutions to curb the 
worsening traffic congestion problem and its adverse consequences. Specifically, two main 
approaches are widely considered to manage traffic congestion in urban areas – namely, 
network capacity management (NCM) and travel demand management (TDM). For NCM, 
traffic congestion is tackled by enhancing the roadway network capacity. NCM strategies 
include, for example, dynamic signal timing (Teklu, Sumalee, & Watling, 2007), active 
ramp metering (Papageorgiou & Kotsialos, 2002; Cassidy & Rudjanakanoknad, 2005), 
variable speed limits (Talebpour, Mahmassani, & Hamdar, 2013; Khondaker & Kattan, 
2015), and hard shoulder utilization during incidents (Lemke, 2010). These strategies are 
usually deployed in the form of integrated traffic management schemes at the corridor and 
regional levels (Zhou, Mahmassani, & Zhang, 2008; Hashemi & Abdelghany, 2016).  
TDM, on the other hand, aims to change commuters’ behavior with the goal of 
achieving a better temporal and spatial traffic distribution in the network (Meyer, 1999). 
Travelers are encouraged to reduce dependence on their private cars, schedule their travel 
during off-peak periods, and travel on less congested routes. Examples of TDM strategies 
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include congestion and dynamic parking pricing (Tsekeris & Voß, 2009; de Palma & 
Lindsey, 2011), traveler information provision (Ben-Akiva, De Palma, & Isam, 1991; 
Mahmassani & Liu, 1999; Hashemi & Abdelghany, 2018), flexible working hours (Kim, 
Choo, & Mokhtarian, 2015), and incentives for carpooling and ridesharing (Daganzo & 
Cassidy, 2008), to name a few. A common tactic among most TDM strategies is to 
implicitly restrict, or inconvenient, a portion of the travelers for using their private cars 
along certain routes/facilities/zones during the peak periods in such a way that congestion 
is reduced. While the approach has shown to be effective in influencing traveler behavior 
and reducing traffic congestion, TDM strategies – especially those that are financial-based 
– have encountered public resistance due to travel equity concerns (Gärling & Schuitema, 
2007; Viard & Fu, 2015).  







(Gärling & Schuitema, 2007; Ge, et al., 2015; Bigazzi & Rouleau, 
2017; Ferguson, 2018)  
Congestion Pricing  
 (Emmerink, Nijkamp, & Rietveld, 1995; Ison & Rye, 2005; 
Tsekeris & Voß, 2009; de Palma & Lindsey, 2011)   
Managed Lanes  (Levinson, 2010) 
HOV/ Ridesharing  
(Hwang & Giuliano, 1990; Fuhs & Obenberger, 2002; Shewmake, 
2012; Chan & Shaheen, 2012) 
Parking Pricing  (Marsden, 2006; Kirschner & Lanzendorf, 2020) 
Traveler Information  
(van Essen, Thomas, Berkum, & Chorus, 2016; Ben-Elia & 
Avineri, 2015)  
Travel Credit  
(Fan & Jiang, 2013; Grant-Muller & Xu, 2014; Dogterom, Ettema, 
& Dijst, 2017) 
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Several articles have been dedicated to reviewing TDM strategies, as shown in 
Table 2-1. These articles either focus on the overall TDM concept or one of the individual 
strategies widely adopted in congested urban areas. This chapter extends these efforts by 
providing an updated review of the class of TDM strategies that adopt roadway access 
restriction to influence traveler behavior. The review provides a summary of economic and 
environmental benefits reported for these strategies, innovations in their theories and 
supporting technologies, and common issues/obstacles associated with adopting these 
strategies, such as equity concerns and public acceptance. Over 300 references were 
collected and reviewed. These references were identified using a rich collection of 
keywords. Figure 2-1 gives common keywords identified in these references as the result 
of text-mining their titles and abstracts, where the size of the word represents its popularity 
in the collected references. As shown in the figure, the words ‘congestion’, ‘pricing’ and 
‘lanes’ are highly mentioned, implying the popularity of congestion pricing and managed 
lanes TDM strategies. These references are grouped under six main categories with respect 
to the mechanism used to restrict roadway access. These main categories include financial-
, priority-, categorization-, incentive-, credit-, and performance-based. The references of 
three of these six categories are further classified into two or three classes resulting in a 
total of 10 categories.   
Figure 2-2 illustrates the 10 categories used for classifying the collected literature. 
The figure also gives the milestone references for each class, which are identified based on 
their average number of citations per year since publication using citation data from Google 
Scholar retrieved in February 2nd, 2020.  A branch in the figure indicates one category, 
while the circle leaves are the milestone references of that category. Ten leaves are 
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considered under each branch, representing the top ten highly cited references. The size of 
a leaf represents the number of citations of its reference, which ranges from 99 to 2 citations 
per year. This chapter is organized as follows: Sections 2 to 7 review each of the six main 
TDM strategies mentioned above, followed by Section 8 which provides a summary and 
concluding remarks.  
 
 




Figure 2-2: Different categories of state-of-the-art demand management strategies 
2-3-1. Congestion Pricing 
Financial restriction is when drivers must pay monetary fees to enter a congested 
area.  Road pricing has been widely investigated and could be traced back to (Buchanan, 
1952; Beckmann et al., 1956; Walters, 1961; Vickrey W. S., 1963). It was first officially 
introduced in London, UK in the early 1960s in a proposal report to the Ministry of 
Transport in the United Kingdom (Smeed, 1964). This dissertation introduced congestion 
pricing to enter the central London zone. That scheme was not accepted by policymakers, 
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who preferred another scheme that involved parking taxation within central London zone 
(Thomson, 1967).  In 1975, Singapore became the first country to implement a congestion 
pricing scheme using basic technology systems and in 1998, they introduced a fully 
automated charging system (FHWA, 2008). In 2003, London implemented a congestion 
charge downtown during peak hours to reduce congestion and traffic jams (Banister, 2003).  
Since the 1990s, researchers have investigated congestion pricing from multiple 
points of view. Intensive research has been conducted to evaluate the acceptability 
(Jakobsson et al., 2000; Schade & Schlag, 2003) and equity of congestion pricing 
(Levinson, 2011). Congestion pricing has different forms, including lane-based, highway 
(facility)-based, and, the most common type, the cordon (zone) based-pricing (FHWA, 
2018). The rise of congestion pricing prompted researchers to study different types and 
aspects of congestion pricing, including economic aspects, feasibility, environmental 
impact, and impact on driving behavior. 
 The first body of research considered precisely the economic aspects of the 
congestion pricing approach. Arnott & Small (1994) predicted that congestion cost would 
be tens of billions of dollars in large metropolitan regions. Small (1992) and Eliasson & 
Mattsson (2006) discussed how to use the revenue generated from the congestion pricing 
after implementation and suggested tax reduction, alternative transportation development, 
and infrastructure improvement. Calfee & Winston (1998) studied the amount commuters 
are willing to pay to save time-based on their income and found that the value is low and 
independent from traffic conditions. Eliasson (2016) discussed the fairness of congestion 
pricing from consumer and citizen perspectives using data from people with different 
income in four European cities. 
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The second body of research discussed the feasibility of congestion pricing from a 
political point of view. Since early 1990s, there have been debates about the future of 
congestion pricing. In her research, Genevieve Giuliano doubted the possibility of 
implementation of  congestion pricing in the United States, arguing “despite apparent 
policy imperatives, it is unlikely that congestion pricing will be implemented to any 
significant extent in the U.S.” (Giuliano, 1992, pp. 335). On the other hand, King, Manville 
& Shoup (2007) argued that congestion pricing is politically viable, especially when cities 
apply congestion pricing to urban freeways and gain revenue. Albalate & Bel (2009) 
proposed some examples of failure and successful congestion pricing from around the 
world that should be considered by policymakers.  
The third body of research discussed the environmental impact of congestion 
pricing. Daniel & Bekka (2000) assumed that congestion pricing can result in a reduction 
of vehicle emissions by up to 30% in highly congested areas. Beevers & Carslaw (2005) 
conducted a field analysis study comparing the impact of the congestion charge in London 
on air pollution in February 2003. They found that bus use increased by 25% and the 
number of cars and heavy vehicles was reduced by 29% and 11% respectively. In their 
study, Johansson et al., (2009) used the data from the ‘‘Stockholm Trial,” a 6-month trial 
implementation of congestion pricing in Stockholm, Sweden. During this period, they 
found congestion pricing reduced traffic congestion by 15% and, as a result, Nitrogen 
Oxides (NOX) and Particulate Matter (PM10) fell by 8.5% and 13%, respectively. 
The fourth body of research discussed the impact of congestion pricing on drivers’ 
behavior.  Some research suggested that congestion pricing has a positive impact on travel 
time (Yamamoto et al., 2000; Ubbels & Verhoef, 2005). In a survey of Dutch car owners, 
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Albert & Mahalel (2006) evaluated and compared peoples’ attitudes towards congestion 
pricing and found that it has a positive impact on driving behavior. Simićević et al., (2013) 
hypothesized that parking has an impact on driving behavior and they developed a model 
to predict the effect of changing parking price and time limits on drivers’ behavior. It 
showed that parking price affected car usage, while time limitations affected driver’s 
choice in terms of parking type (on-street or off-street parking). 
2-3-2. Parking Pricing 
Many other researchers have also investigated the effects of parking pricing (Glazer 
& Niskanen, 1992; Anderson & de Palma, 2004; Arnott & Inci, 2006; Inci, 2015). The first 
group of research investigated the impact of parking on congestion. Arnott et al., (1991) 
assessed relative efficiency of road tolls and parking pricing in a central business district 
(CBD) and found that parking was inefficient.  Other research suggested that parking fees 
can be a substitute for road pricing (Verhoef et al., 1995). The second group of research 
studied the effect of parking pricing on welfare.  (Glazer & Niskanen, 1992; Borger & 
Wuyts, 2009; Proost & Dender, 2008; Arnott & Inci, 2006). The third group of research 
assumed that cruising for parking is the main cause of congestion. Shoup (2004) found that 
the average time cruising to find a parking space was 3-14 minutes. Arnott & Rowse, 
(1999) estimated that 50% of cars driving in downtown in cities such as Boston and large 
European cities are cruising for parking. The fourth group discussed the economic loss of 
cruising for parking. In Amsterdam, Netherlands the cruising cost is estimated to be 1 Euro 
per day where the citizens are willing to pay 10 Euros daily for parking permit (Ommeren 
et al., 2011). Using a nationwide random sample of car trips, a Netherlands-based study 
showed that when parking pricing was implemented for both on-street and off-street 
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parking, the average cruising time was only 36 seconds (Ommeren & Derk Wentink, 2012). 
In San Francisco, CA, the SFpark project was launched in 2011 with a 60-80 percent target 
occupancy rate (SFMTA, 2014). Evaluation studies show that during the first two years 
(2011-2013), SFpark achieved its goal of 60-80 percent occupancy for metered parking 
(Millard-Ball et al., 2014; Chatman & Manville, 2014). Furthermore, the two-year 
evaluation of SFpark showed a 50% drop in cruising (Millard-Ball et al., 2014). 
Further research discussed other aspects of congestion pricing. For instance, Chen 
et al., (2016) proposed time of day congestion pricing based on vehicle mileage traveled 
(VMT) on freeways to tackle congestion and generate revenue. Considering  an 
autonomous vehicles (AV) environment, recent work by Simoni et al., (2019) examined 
the effect of different congestion pricing and tolling strategies scenarios on traffic 
congestion and welfare. 
2-4. Reservation (Priority)-Based Restriction 
2-4-1. High Occupancy Vehicles (HOV) 
Reservation or “priority” based traffic management is another main traffic 
restriction strategy which aims to manage traffic demand. The increase in the number of 
vehicles with single occupancy has resulted in an increase in traffic congestion and 
pollution (Caulfield, 2009). This has raised concern among policymakers and urged them 
to encourage drivers to carpool. The idea of High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes was 
developed initially from the bus-only lane on the Henry G. Shirley Memorial Highway (I-
395) in the Washington D.C. metropolitan area in 1969 (Turnbull, 1992). In 1973, the bus-
only lane became the first HOV lane for passenger cars (Leman et al., 1994). In 2012, the 
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number of HOV lanes in the U.S. was 126 in 27 metropolitan areas with a total length of 
over 1000 miles (Metro, n.d.).  The 2013 edition of the American Community Survey 
(ACS) conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau showed that about 76.4 percent of Americans 
drive alone (McKenzie, 2015). The same report also showed historic data about carpooling, 
which clearly demonstrated that the percentage of solo drivers has been increasing.  
Between 1980 and 2013, the total number of employees commuting by cars 
increased by only about 1.7 percent from 84.1 percent to 85.8 percent, while single-
occupancy vehicles increased by about 12 percent, from 64.4 percent to 76.4 percent 
(McKenzie, 2015). The same report also showed that carpoolers decreased dramatically 
during the same period, from 19.7 percent to 9.4 percent (McKenzie, 2015). The underuse 
of the HOV lanes led researchers to evaluate their effectiveness for mobility in the U.S. 
(Turnbull et al., 1991; Giuliano et al., 1990). Kwon & Varaiya (2008) conducted a 
California-based study showing that the goals of HOV lanes were not met. In addition, 
Poole & Balaker (2005) show that HOV 2+ lanes led to drivers to avoid vanpool, which 
originally established HOV lanes, and that these lanes benefitted mostly from family 
members who were already carpooling. Fielding & Klein (1993) concluded that about 43 
percent of carpoolers are members of the same household and therefore, HOV lanes need 
modification to be more effective. Furthermore, Orski (2001) showed that HOV lanes have 
not changed driving habits in the U.S.  Dahlgren (1998) also shows that in most cases, 
adding an additional general-purpose lane is more effective than constructing an HOV lane 
in terms of reducing travel delay. In terms of social welfare, Yang & Huang (1999) showed 
that current HOV practices do not maximize social welfare and incentives should be 
provided for HOV lane users.  
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Daganzo & Cassidy (2008) investigated the effect of HOV lanes on congestion, 
implemented a city-wide HOV lane network, and made recommendations to consider a 
city-wide bus lane system. From a safety point of view, Golob et al., (1989) conducted a 
14-month study on State Freeway Route 91 (State Route-91) in Riverside, California to 
compare the characteristics and frequencies of accidents with and without physical 
separation between general purpose and HOV lanes. Jang et al., (2009) also evaluated the 
safety of HOV lanes by comparing continuous and limited freeway access and found that 
limited access does not have safety advantages over continuous access HOV lanes.  
Researchers also evaluated the environmental impact of the HOV lanes. Johnston 
& Ceerla (1996) developed an evaluation of the travel and emission impact of new HOV 
lanes under the Federal Clean Air Act (CAA) and found that HOV lanes might increase 
both vehicles’ travel distance and emission. Boriboonsomsin & Barth (2007) compared 
HOV lanes and mixed flow lanes’ contribution to emissions and they found that HOV lanes 
produce less emission mass on a per-lane basis. In another study conducted in different 
parts of California, Boriboonsomsin & Barth (2008) also compared continuous and limited 
HOV access on freeways in terms of vehicle emission using a simulation approach and 
found that continuous access HOV lanes produce a lower level of pollutant emissions.  
2-4-2. High Occupancy Tolls (HOT)  
The underuse of the HOV lanes led many researchers to investigate other 
alternatives to improve the effectiveness of HOV lanes and traffic networks in general.  
Fielding & Klein (1993) proposed the idea of converting the current HOV lanes to High 
Occupancy Tolls (HOT). To utilize more of the lane’s capacity, Fielding & Klein (1993) 
suggested HOV 3+, while all other vehicles could have access if they paid the peak-hour 
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toll. The implementation of HOV 3+ lanes started in a 10-mile-long, four-lane segment in 
the median of the Riverside Freeway (State Route 91) located in Orange County, CA on 
December, 27 1995 (Sullivan, 2000). HOT lanes became a hot topic and promising solution 
to adopt for three main reasons: increased utility of underused HOV lanes, revenue 
generated, and political feasibility (Poole & Orski, 2000; Konishi & Mun, 2010).  
A mesoscopic simulation study using DYNASMART traffic simulation-
assignment model was conducted by Abdelghany, et al., (2000) to evaluate HOT lanes 
under different designs and operation schemes. Dahlgren (2002) constructed a model to 
determine the locations where HOV, HOT, and/or mixed flow would be most effective to 
reduce travel delay. A Washington, DC-based study implemented by Safirova et al., (2003) 
showed that HOT lanes are promising and would increase utilization of HOV lanes while 
generating revenue. Mastako et al., (1998) studied the change in commuters’ behavior after 
the implementation of HOT in State Route 91, finding that the HOV commuters increased 
from 20 percent to 29 percent. 
Another impact of switching to HOT that researchers examined was the welfare 
effect. Small et al., (2006) conducted a simulation-based study of the two-lane California 
State Route 91, performing a welfare analysis based on different toll, HOV, and HOT 
policies. They found that in case of one leaving one lane free, the HOT would result in best 
welfare gain, with a gain of $2.25  per person. In a case of two-lane strategy, the toll seem 
to be the best practice to increase welfare with a $2.99 gain. In addition, Konishi & Mun 
(2010) examined the welfare effect of HOV and HOT lanes and whether converting to 
HOT would improve efficiency of road use. Furthermore, Safirova, et al. (2004) conducted 
another Washington based study to compare the welfare effect of different pricing 
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strategies and found that HOT has a superior advantage over traditional pricing strategies 
in terms of welfare gain.  
The safety impact of HOT has also been examined by some researchers. Cao et al., 
(2012) studied the change in accident rate after converting HOV to HOT on the interstate 
I-349 and found that the conversion reduced the crash rate by 5.3 percent.  
2-4-3. Highway Inventory Booking 
Over the years, prioritizing “reserving” highways for certain drivers has been 
widely discussed and was improved and extended to include different traffic management 
strategies other than HOV and HOT lanes. Booking-based traffic demand management is 
a strategy that allows drivers to book a slot on the highway for their vehicle to access during 
their trips. it has been widely investigated and although potential advantages and feasible 
to implement exist, serious political and social acceptance can be a major obstacle 
(Buitelaar et al., 2007).  A highway booking system was first proposed in Akahane & 
Kuwahara (1996) as part of a survey study to measure the benefits of the trip reservation 
system to manage the highways during holiday seasons. Wong (1997) proposed a 
qualitative approach for a highway slot booking system and discussed the advantages of 
such systems. Koolstra (1999) conducted a theoretical study to estimate the potential 
benefits of a highway slot booking system by analyzing the difference between user-
equilibrium (UE) and system optimal (SO) in terms of departure time.  
To measure the effectiveness of the highway booking strategy, Feijter et al. (2004) 
conducted a simulation study which showed that trip booking has a positive impact on 
travel time. Teodorovic et al. (2005) proposed a model of the highway space inventory 
 
28 
control system (HSICS) where all users have to make a reservation in advance to enter the 
highway. Their system allows traffic operators to make real-time decisions to accept or 
reject reservation requests. In their model, they assume a constant average speed and did 
not consider traffic flow characteristics, which resulted in limitations to the model’s 
accuracy in terms of the number of vehicles on each link at every time interval. Edara & 
Teodorovic (2008) improved the accuracy of the original model proposed in Teodorovic et 
al. (2005) by replacing the average constant speed with a link-specific mean speed that is 
estimated using the Green-Shields speed-density relationship.  
Other research used the highway booking strategy as an area -or time-specific 
strategy. For example, Zhao et al., (2010) assumed an area-based booking system such that 
all vehicles willing to enter the downtown area are required to make reservations in 
advance. An integer programming formulation was modeled to obtain the optimal mix of 
vehicles based on different characteristics such as occupancy, departure time, and trip 
duration. Liu et al., (2015) assumed a time-based reservation system such that the system 
allocates the highway slots to potential users during different time intervals. Based on the 
highway capacity and the number of reservations made, the system will determine whether 
to accept or reject a request.  
Other reservation methodologies have also been proposed. A token-based highway 
reservation system was proposed by Liu et al. (2013) and concluded that the token system 
showed advantages in terms of traffic throughput, density, and speed. Teodorovićet al. 
(2008) proposed another methodology of highway booking called auction-based 
congestion pricing. The basic idea of auction-based congestion pricing is that drivers who 
want to enter the downtown area during a specific time period will need to participate in 
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an auction to reserve a space where the authorities will determine whether or not to accept 
their bids. 
2-5. Vehicle Characteristics-Based Restriction 
2-5-1. Truck Restriction 
The expansion in trade and e-commerce in the U.S. resulted in an increase in 
logistics and supply chain operations. In fact, the top 100 U.S. metro areas (~ 12 percent 
land area) hold 80 percent of trade, 75 percent of GDP, and 66 percent of the population 
(Tomer & Kane, 2014). The increased number of heavy trucks on highways has raised 
concerns among researchers and policymakers regarding their negative impact, especially 
their lower speeds. Slower vehicles in general have stimulated the interests of many 
researchers. Gazis & Herman, (1992) were the first to investigate the negative impact of 
slow vehicles and they proposed a model to measure the effect of a slower vehicle, calling 
this phenomenon a “moving bottleneck” as a queue is starting to form. Newell, (1993) and 
Newell, (1998) proposed a more complete model where they studied the effects of a single 
slow convoy or vehicle on a two-lane highway based on the Lighthill-Whitham-Richards 
(LWR) theory (Lighthill & Whitham, 1955; Richards, 1956). Newell introduced the 
kinematic wave theory of moving bottleneck (KW-MB) and studied its influence on a 
traffic system. Newell also investigated the consequences of trucks on steep grades. In this 
theory, Newell assumes that any vehicle that travels slower than the traffic stream is 
becoming an active moving bottleneck. A second complete model was proposed by 
Lebacque et al., (1998), who provided a simple model of the interaction between slower 
vehicles (buses) and the surrounding traffic flow based on the first-order macroscopic 
model of the (LWR) theory. A third complete model was proposed in Muñoz & Daganzo, 
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(2002) where they performed a freeway observational experiment and validation of 
Newell’s (KW-MB) theory. Leclercq et al., (2004) proposed a unified general framework 
for the moving-bottleneck models based on the Lighthill, Whitham and Richards theory. 
Additionally, Kerner & Klenov, (2010) provided an analysis of the moving bottleneck 
based on the three-phase traffic theory which was developed by (Kerner, 2009). 
In addition to the analytical models, numerical models have also been developed in 
order to solve the moving bottleneck issue. Building on their first model proposed in 
Lebacque et al., (1998), they developed another numerical model in 2002 (Giorgi et al., 
2002). In addition, Daganzo & Laval, (2005a) and Daganzo & Laval, (2005b) proposed a 
complete and accurate numerical model solution to the bottleneck problem which later 
contributed to different more accurate simulation models (Laval., 2005; Laval, Cassidy, & 
Daganzo, 2005; Laval & Daganzo, 2006). 
Beyond the moving bottleneck, researchers have also investigated mobility, safety, 
and environmental impacts of the interactions between heavy trucks and passenger 
vehicles. In order to capture such interactions, Peeta et al., (2005) developed a measurable 
definition of car-truck interactions on highways, developed a methodological framework 
to model such interactions, and evaluated different strategies in order to reduce negative 
side effects of these interactions. From the truck drivers’ point of view, Cherry & Adelakun 
(2012) conducted a survey study of 500 long-haul truck drivers showing that the negative 
behaviors they experience most on urban highways are aggressive drivers, congestion, car 
lane-changing behavior, and merging vehicles. 
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To overcome the problem of slow trucks and vehicles, researchers have been 
examining truck restriction as a solution. According to Mannering et al., (1993), there are 
four types of truck restriction: lane restriction, route restriction, time restriction, and speed 
restriction. Researchers and policymakers restrict vehicles mainly based on the truck’s 
dimension, weight, and number of axles (FHWA, 2015).  In their efforts to find the best 
restriction policy, researchers have primarily investigated different truck restriction 
strategies already implemented in the U.S. 
  First, there is truck lane restriction, which is the most popular strategy. Truck lane 
restriction prevents trucks from accessing certain lanes on highways, normally the left-
most lane(s). To attempt to capture the mobility impact of truck lane restriction, a five-
mile-long urban freeway section was simulated in Yang & Regan (2007). Two freeway 
cases were assumed: case 1, a four-lane freeway, and case 2, a five-lane freeway. Three 
restriction strategies scenarios were compared for each case: one where they did nothing, 
one where only one leftmost was restricted, and one where the two leftmost lanes were 
restricted. The results showed that leftmost lane restriction has a significant positive impact 
on average speed. Another simulation study was conducted by Hoel & Peek (1999) to test 
two types of restrictions, right lane truck restriction and left lane truck restriction. The 
simulation scenario analysis considered the following variables: traffic volume, percentage 
of trucks, percentage of total volume by lane, presence or absence of lane restrictions, and 
grade. Based on the results, the authors recommended restricting trucks from left lane when 
grades are 4 percent or greater. Gan & Jo (2003) also developed another simulation model 
using VISSIM to study the operation performance of truck lane restriction policies on 
freeways. Their model measured the impact of banning trucks from accessing the leftmost 
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lane on three, four, and five-lane highways. The study found that one left-most lane 
restriction is recommended on three-lane highways and two leftmost lane restriction is 
recommended on four and five-lane highways. In addition, Hanscom, (1990) conducted an 
observational study on three different interstate sections. Two test sites were three-lane 
interstates located in the urban areas outside of Chicago and the other test site was a two-
lane rural interstate located in Wisconsin.  This field study was conducted before and after 
the implementation of truck lane restriction. The results showed that truck lane restriction 
was beneficial on the three-lane interstate, and further investigation is needed to address 
safety issues on the two-lane rural interstate. Recently, Eisaeia et al., (2017) conducted a 
simulation study to test the effect of truck restriction on an urban highway in Melbourne, 
Australia. The results showed an improvement in terms of traffic performance. 
In addition to these operational benefits, the safety impact of truck lane restriction 
has also been examined by different researchers. Cate & Urbanik (2004) conducted a study 
using VISSIM microscopic traffic simulation. They examined the practice of prohibiting 
trucks from accessing the leftmost lane in highways with three or more lanes each direction 
and found that it has no negative effect on traffic safety and efficiency. Furthermore, Lord 
et al., (2005) conducted an exploratory analysis of crash data on different sections of the 
New Jersey Turnpike. These sections operate as dual-dual freeway facilities which are 
divided into inner and outer lanes. Inner lanes are for homogenous traffic flow (cars only) 
and the outer lanes are for mixed flow. They compared the two lanes in terms of crash 
experience between homogenous traffic and mixed traffic. The result showed outer mixed-
flow lanes experience more accidents, particularly truck-related accidents. Another study 
was conducted in Kobelo et al., (2008) on urban freeways in Florida to examine the safety 
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impact of truck lane restriction. The study showed that truck lane restriction may reduce 
the crash rate by 4%. In Moses et al., (2007), an 83-mile-long section of I-95 in South 
Florida with three lanes each direction was simulated using VISSIM. In their study, three 
types of truck restrictions were applied: left lane restriction, middle lane restriction, and 
right lane restriction. The results showed that restricting trucks from inside lanes in urban 
freeways significantly increases the safety and operational benefits during peak traffic flow 
period. Another analysis was conducted in Mannering et al., (1993) in Washington’s Puget 
Sound region where they considered a truck lane restriction strategy. They assumed the 
truck volume to be approximately 5 percent of total traffic. The study showed that lane 
restriction did not have a significant impact on safety and operation.  El-Tantawy et al., 
(2009) performed a simulation study to measure the impact of truck restriction lanes as 
well as truck dedication lanes in terms of lane changing, merging, and rear-end conflicts. 
The results showed that both strategies reduced lane changing conflicts, but increased 
merging conflicts. The results also showed that truck restriction is most effective when 
trucks comprise more than 15% of total traffic. 
Truck lane restriction has also been investigated by different researchers interested 
in the environmental impact of such policies. Rakha et al., (2005) conducted a simulation 
study using INTEGRATION software on one of the busiest sections of I-81 in Virginia. 
The study considered a separation of heavy trucks from light vehicles. The results showed 
significant efficiency, energy, and environmental benefits. The study also showed that 
restricting heavy trucks from accessing the leftmost lane is the second-best strategy. 
Besides mobility and safety, Samba et al., (2011) investigated the energy and emission 
impact of truck lane restriction, finding that left lane restriction during both peak and off-
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peak times is a very effective strategy in terms of both mobility and safety. The simulation 
study also showed that left lane restriction would decrease likelihood of crashes, especially 
those involving heavy trucks. The study also showed that left lane restriction reduced fuel 
consumption by 4% but increased CO2 emissions by 1.7%. 
Second, route restriction refers to restricting trucks from accessing certain 
highways and/or roads. This is often done in urban areas, especially in highly populated 
areas. Truck lane restriction exists in most states in the U.S., particularly New York, 
Virginia, and California. For example, truck route restrictions exist in the Ventura Freeway 
in Los Angeles, CA and all roads going through downtown Atlanta, GA (Fitzpatrick et al., 
1992). In New York, truck route restrictions exist in many different sections of the state’s 
freeways, such as I-81 from Exit 8 to NY 13A, I-81 from Exit 12 to US 20, NY 89 to NY 
414, NY 90 to NY 34, and others (NYSDOT, n.d.). In Virginia, truck route restrictions 
exist in many different parts of the state as seen in Figure 2-2 (VDOT, n.d.). In the city of 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, truck routes restrictions have already been implemented on 




Figure 2-3: Truck routes and restrictions in Virginia (VDOT, n.d.) 
Third, peak time restriction aims to ban trucks from accessing certain areas during 
the peak time period only. Currently, several U.S. states implement this strategy on 
different freeways to reduce traffic and increase travel speed (Mussa, 2004). Peak time 
restriction is mostly applied in highly populated areas, such as New York City and other 
large cities. A study undertaken for the California Department of Transportation concluded 
that off-peak shipping is recommended, and area-wide trucks bans have a modest effect, 
but that further research is needed to study truck bans during peak hours (Grenzeback et 
al., 1990). Another study conducted by Campbell (1995) examined the impact of the 
restriction of large truck during peak-hours in terms of emission and truck performance 
and found the emission of HC and CO is reduced and restriction benefits are more 




Figure 2-4: Map of truck routes and restrictions in Cambridge, MA (Kowalski, 2010) 
Different approaches were investigated to shift deliveries to off-peak time in order 
to mitigate urban congestion caused by freight deliveries such as carriers congestion 
pricing (Holguín-Veras, et al., 2006a; Holguín-Veras, 2011) and financial incentives 
(Holguín-Veras et al., 2006b). In order to reduce congestion caused by delivery trucks, the 
city of New York established a late hour delivery program in 2009 called Off-Hour 
Deliveries Program (OHD); delivery trucks shifted their trips to take place between 7:00 
PM and 6:00 AM (NYC, n.d.). The program was found to have positive economic impacts 
and improved both travel speed and service time (Holguín-Veras, et al., 2011; Holguín-
Veras, et al., 2018). The success of the OHD program motivated lawmakers in other large 
cities to adopt similar programs. For example, in 2013, Washington, DC announced a 
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similar program which they called the Off-hours Freight Delivery Project which launched 
in spring 2015 (DDOT , 2013). 
Fourth, speed restriction refers to where trucks are assigned a lower speed than 
passenger vehicles. Currently, fifteen states have adopted this law (U.S. DOT, 2012). In 
2016, the U.S. Department of Transportation announced that the Department’s NHTSA 
and Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) are proposing a new safety 
measure which requires trucks weighing more than 26,000 pounds to be equipped with 
devices limiting their speed (FMCSA, 2016). However, Wilmot & Khanal (1999) 
conducted a review to examine whether speed limit reduction resulted in safety 
enhancement and found that a differential speed limit among cars and trucks does not 
enhance road safety. 
2-5-2. Road Space Rationing-Based Restriction  
Passenger vehicles are also exposed to restriction in many cases. In crowded areas, 
such as Beijing, China or Delhi, India, vehicle restriction has become necessary to maintain 
both normal traffic conditions and acceptable air quality. One popular restriction strategy 
is based on the license plate number. This strategy is called Road Space Rationing and it 
aims to divide all vehicles into two or more groups based on the last digit of their license 
plate number.  
(1) China’s Case Study 
  When China hosted the Olympic Games in August 2008, the Chinese government 
needed to reduce the amount of traffic on the roads significantly. The restriction was 
applied in different phases from July 1 to September 20, 2008 as shown in Table 2-2. The 
goal of this strategy was to encourage drivers to change their travel mode and switch to 
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public transportation to reduce air pollution and to also improve air quality. During the 
Olympics phase (July, 20 – September, 20) it was estimated that about 45 percent of the 
total vehicles within the 5th ring area (the blue highway in Figure 2-4) were off of the streets 
which prompted further investigation of the long-term impact (Wang et al., 2010; Han et 
al., 2010) and the public acceptance and perception of this scheme (Jia et al., 2017). 
Table 2-2: The phases of road space rationing implementation in Beijing (Li & Guo, 2016) 
Phase  Period  Duration  Method 
Trial  
Aug. 17 – 20, 
2007 
 
6:00 AM - 
Midnight 
 Trial implementation within entire Beijing 
1  
July 1 – 19, 
2008  
 
3:00 AM - 
Midnight 
 
High emission vehicles (yellow label vehicles) are 
banned. Entire Beijing 
2  
July 20 – Aug. 
27, 2008 
 
3:00 AM - 
Midnight 
 
Traffic restriction within the city administrative 
areas. Entire Beijing 
3  
Aug. 28 – 
Sept. 20, 2008 
 
3:00 AM - 
Midnight 
 
Restriction was limited to the road network within the 
5th ring area.  
2-3  
July 20 – Sept. 
20, 2008 
 
3:00 AM - 
Midnight 
 
Olympics lane network were created for specific cars 
which reduced 70% of government cars and 50% of 




Figure 2-5: Map of major ring highways in Beijing, China 
After September 20, 2008, the Beijing lawmakers announced a new restriction 
strategy called the “one day a week scheme” to be enforced starting on October 11, 2008 
(see Table 2-3). Therefore, it implemented a traffic restriction strategy which separated the 
vehicles into two groups based on their license plate numbers. Vehicles which carried even 
or odd license plate numbers and were each allowed to drive during certain days of the 
week. The strategy aimed to further improve traffic mobility and air quality. They 
estimated that 930,000 vehicles were banned, almost 26% of the total 3.6 million vehicles 




Table 2-3: The one day a week driving scheme timeline (Wang et al., 2014) 






Oct, 11, 2008 – Apr. 10, 
2009 
















The rotation process consisted of five groups based on the last digit of the license 
plate (1&6, 2&7, 3&8, 4&9, and 5&0). If the last character is letter, then it was assumed 
to be zero (Beijing Municipal People's Government, 2017). Each group was assigned to a 
specific day of a week (Monday – Friday) for 13 weeks. Over the next 13 weeks, each 
group was assigned to a different day. Table 2-4 below is an example of the current 2017 
– 2018 rotation schedule: 
Table 2-4: The 2017-18 rotation schedule based on last digit of license plate (Beijing 
Municipal People's Government, 2017) 
Rotation Schedule  Monday  Tuesday  Wednesday  Thursday  Friday 
April 10, 2017-July 9, 2017  3 & 8  4 & 9  5 & 0  1 & 6  2 & 7 
July 10, 2017-Oct. 8, 2017  2 & 7  3 & 8  4 & 9  5 & 0  1 & 6 
Oct. 9, 2017-Jan. 7, 2018  1 & 6  2 & 7  3 & 8  4 & 9  5 & 0 
Jan. 8, 2018-April 8, 2018  5 & 0  1 & 6  2 & 7  3 & 8  4 & 9 
(2) India’s Case Study 
From 2011-2015, the megacity of Delhi, India was ranked as the most polluted city 
in the world in terms of particle pollution (PM10 and PM2.5) by the World Health 
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Organization (WHO, 2016). Consequently, as an emergency action, the government in 
Delhi, India implemented an odd-even traffic restriction from January 1st – 15th, 2016 and 
April 15th – 30th, 2016 between 8:00 AM – 8:00 PM Monday-Saturday such that vehicles 
with plate numbers ending with an odd number were restricted from driving on even dates 
and vice versa (Delhi Transport Department, 2015). The government also banned other 
types of vehicles, such as older diesel vehicles, from being operated inside the city of Delhi. 
As an attempt to evaluate the environmental impact of this odd-even restriction in Delhi, 
(Kumar et al., 2017) measured the level of PM10 and PM2.5 during the odd-even 
implementation period (1-15, JAN 2016, 15-30, APR 2016) in different areas of Delhi and 
compared this with data from the previous year during same period. The results showed 
that the scheme reduced both PM10 and PM2.5 by up to 74 percent during peak hours, but 
also increased their levels during the early morning hours due to overnight heavy vehicle 
operations. Another experimental study was conducted by Chowdhury, et al. (2017) to 
measure the level of PM2.5 during the odd-even implementation period (1-15, JAN 2016) 
and found that the odd-even policy reduced the PM2.5 levels by 4-6 percent in three 
different hotspots, which is not significant considering this was an emergency action. 
Similarly, Jain, Gupta, & Ahuja (2016) conducted a four-day experimental study where 
they chose three different time intervals to measure the air quality during morning rush 
hour (8-10 AM), sleeping hours (1-3 PM), and evening rush hours (6-8 PM). The four days 
included an odd day, even day, a Sunday, and a non-odd-even day. The result concluded 
that during the scheme, the air quality was worse as compared to the non-odd-even days. 
However, a 3-week landfill fire occurred during the experiment, which could have 
impacted the results. In their experiment, by comparing the first week of the scheme 
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(January 1-7, 2016) to the week before (December 25-31, 2015) Sehgal & Gautam (2016) 
concluded that the odd-even scheme experienced a significant increase in the PM 
concentration, with the average PM level increasing from 148.7 μg m−3 to 241.4 μg m−3. In 
addition to its impact on air quality, Mohan et al. (2017) conducted an observational 
experiment in 4 different locations in Delhi and concluded that odd-even restriction 
reduced traffic flow by more than 20%, but had no impact on reducing the PM2.5 levels. 
During the first odd-even implementation period (1-15, JAN 2016) in Delhi, (Rao et al., 
2017) conducted an experiment to measure its impact on traffic congestion. Their results 
showed that after the odd-even policy car speed was reduced up to 16 percent and travel 
time increased by up to 20 percent. Their results also showed that the policy increased 
demand for public transportation by up to 18%. 
2-6. Credit-Based Restriction 
The increasing number of vehicles in urban areas has played a major role in 
worsening congestion and increasing emission levels. To curb this trend, researchers have 
proposed a new credit-based traffic restriction (CBTR) policy which aims to reduce the 
average miles traveled within a network to help reduce both congestion and emission.  
CBTR policies are inspired by the cap-and-trade program proposed by (Crocker, 1966; 
Dales, 1968a, 1968b) as a way to tackle air and water pollution. Cap-and-trade programs 
are based on Coase (1960) who suggested that factories should be liable for the emission 
harms they cause to others. A growing body of literature has intensively reviewed cap-and-
trade programs (Tietenberg, 2003;  Paltsev, et al., 2008; Carl & Fedor, 2016). Cap-and-
trade (also known as tradable credit/permit) programs aim to help maintain a healthy 
environment and limit the level of carbon emitted in the air by generally following two 
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approaches, an upstream and downstream approach, in order to mitigate carbon dioxide 
emission. The upstream approach’s goal is to limit the amount of carbon emitted by 
factories by allocating a maximum gas emission credit allowed for each factory. At the 
same time, factories can trade their credit/permit among themselves to achieve an 
equilibrium such that factories with surplus credit can sell to those who experience a 
shortage. Increasing interest in this approach led researchers to further investigate the 
system and its policy instruments (Stavins, 2003, 2007). A mathematical formulation of 
the system design provided by Montgomery, (1972) showed potential benefits of the 
system in terms of cost-effectiveness. Other researchers investigated the system and its 
economic and environmental impact (Tietenberg, 1980, 1985; Atkinson & Tietenberg, 
1982; Hahn & Hester, 1989) as well as guidelines for successful implementation (Tripp & 
Dudek, 1989). The downstream approach, also known as personal carbon trading (PCT), 
aims to limit consumers’ emissions by adopting a similar process of credit allocation such 
that an equilibrium in energy credit trading will be achieved in the market among all energy 
consumers. PCT is in fact an umbrella term that includes different policies, such as the 
tradable energy quotas (TEQs), which was proposed by Fleming (1997), and the personal 
carbon allowance (PCA), which was proposed by (Hillman, 1998). Both PCA and TEQs 
require the consumer to surrender emission credit in exchange for equivalent energy or 
fuel, but the TEQs includes air travel emission as an additional factor in the emission credit 
(Fawcett, 2010). The environmental and economic impact of PCT has been intensively 
investigated (Fleming, 2005; Hillman, et al., 2008; Fleming & Chamberlin, 2011; Starkey 
& Anderson, 2005; Fawcett & Parag, 2010). A study conducted by Niemeier, et al., (2008) 
concluded that applying PCT to household energy is more equitable than carbon taxes. 
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However, several studies showed that public acceptance could become a main obstacle 
toward the implementation of the PCT in real-world (Starkey, 2012; Wallace, et al., 2010) 
An overall view of PCT schemes was introduced in (Grubb & Neuhoff, 2006), where they 
outlined points of consideration for policy implementation, such as allocation procedures, 
recipients, quantity, areas, time of validation, etc. 
Despite recent advances in fuel efficiency and green technologies, the latest U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) report shows that transportation ranked as the 
largest sources of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) in the U.S., contributing to almost 28.5 
percent of total emissions (EPA, 2018). For decades, transportation-related emissions have 
been a major concern for researchers, car manufacturers, and policymakers, which has led 
them to investigate applications of the same carbon credit scheme applicable for both car 
manufacturers (upstream) and drivers (downstream) (Harwatt, 2008; Santos, et al., 2010).  
Wang , (1994) and Albrecht, (2000) suggested a tradable permit scheme among car 
manufacturers which aims to incentivize them to produce cleaner vehicles by reducing the 
manufacturing cost, thus increasing the demand from drivers for these cleaner vehicles.  
Traffic congestion also significantly contributes to increasing carbon dioxide 
emissions (Zhang & Batterman, 2013). Researchers were inspired by the credit scheme not 
only to control emissions, but also to manage traffic congestion and limit the overall miles 
traveled by drivers with an innovative form of traffic demand management. Three different 
review articles have been published reviewing different approaches and methodologies of 
this scheme (Fan & Jiang, 2013; Grant-Muller & Xu, 2014; Dogterom, et al., 2017).  It was 
first mentioned in Goddard, (1997) and Verhoef, et al., (1997), where they proposed the 
personal tradable carbon scheme for roadway management and credit allocation design. 
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Many researchers were attracted to carbon credit schemes as a traffic management policy 
and they have conducted further research to investigate its potential benefit, effectiveness, 
and policy design (Raux & Marlot, 2005; Raux, 2004; Raux, 2002; Aziz, et al., 2015; de 
Palma, Proost, Seshadri, & Ben-Akiva, 2018; Brands, Verhoef, Knockaert, & Koster, 
2019).  
Using travel credit to manage the network congestion received greater attention in 
the last decade.  Instead of using carbon credit as proposed in Verhoef, et al., (1997), a 
travel credit, which is allocated to qualified drivers by the government, assumes that an 
equivalent travel distance (i.e. 1 mile) would be exchanged for each credit were at the same 
time, the weight of credit varies based on the network condition and the time of travel. 
Thus, a trip made on peak hours would charge more credits than the same trip made at off-
peak time. Credit-based congestion pricing (CBCP) was first introduced by Kalmanje & 
Kockelman, (2004), where they investigated its effects on congestion and welfare using 
three simulation scenarios of the policy Austin, TX: network-wide pricing, only major 
highway pricing, and no pricing. The results suggested that CBCP was beneficial for 
drivers and has potential to alleviate congestion within the network. As an attempt to 
investigate the implementation of CBCP, a questionnaire survey study was conducted by 
Kockelman & Kalmanje, (2005) reached out to 500 drivers living in Austin, TX to measure 
their opinion about deploying the CBCP in their city. The results also showed potential on 
congestion alleviation and showed that 25 percent clearly support the CBCP deployment, 
especially those who are younger and without children. A further investigation of CBCP 
was developed by Gulipalli et al., (2008), where they examined experts’ opinions, system 
cost estimation, and interest of CBCP among transport economists, toll technology experts, 
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administrators, and policy-makers.  They also investigated other aspects of CBCP such as 
credit allocation, revenue usage, system enforcement, and economic impact. A study that 
predicts the impact of CBCP on traffic, air quality, welfare, and the cost of implementation 
in the Dallas-Fort Worth metro area (DFW) was conducted by Gulipalli & Kockelman, 
(2008) and found welfare improvement among the majority of drivers and predicted that a 
high level of recurring congestion would practically disappear. Moreover, Kockelman & 
Lemp, (2011) compared three different pricing policies in terms of revenue-generating: 
flat-tolling schemes, standard congestion pricing, and CBCP. Recently, Liu & Nie, (2017), 
investigated a Pareto-improving credit-based congestion management scheme. They 
assumed a general two-mode network where transit is a cheaper, but slower alternative to 
driving alone and they showed that a good transit coverage will generate positive net 
revenue. 
The diffusion of travel credit as a traffic management scheme encouraged 
researchers to explore further extensions. Recently, the tradable credit scheme (TCS) has 
gained momentum and was given great interest among researchers who conducted multiple 
studies that investigate and compare tradable credit with current practices for its 
effectiveness in improving congestion, environmental, and economic conditions (Crals, 
2005; Crals & Vereeck, 2005; Raux, 2008). According to Grant-Muller & Xu, (2014), 
researchers generally followed three different approaches to tackle the traffic congestion 
using the tradable credit scheme: mobility management, bottleneck management, and 
parking management. Among the many studies categorized into the first group, a 
remarkable contribution was made by Yang & Wang, (2011) who proposed a mathematical 
formulation framework of tradable mobility credit (TMC) scheme. They assumed 
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homogenous travelers in the network where the government initially allocated a certain 
amount of credits to each eligible driver. Drivers then would be charged a specific amount 
of credit as they travel on each link. At the same time, travelers can sell surplus or buy 
shortage credits among themselves in a credit trading market. Their work has been carried 
out to include different aspects, such as  heterogeneous travelers (Wang et al., 2012; Zhu 
et al., 2014 ); the impact of transaction cost on auction market, where travelers buy their 
needed credits by bidding, and a negotiated market, where credits are initially allocated by 
the government to drivers and they can trade with each other (Nie, 2012), income and 
equity (Wu, et al., 2012; Wang, et al., 2014a); and “safety valve policy” which aims to 
resolve the credit price volatility under demand uncertainty (Shirmohammadi, et al., 2013). 
Considering both finite and infinite number of players, a variational inequality formulation 
was formulated by (He, et al., 2013) to capture the impact of the transaction cost on the 
tradable system and found that transaction cost impacted the trading volume when applied.  
Wang & Yang, (2012) and Wang, et al., (2014b) proposed a modified bisection based 
procedure for trial-and-error implementation of the tradable credit schemes on a single road 
and general network respectively. Ye & Yang (2013) examined the day-to-day evolution 
of credit price and traffic flow dynamics under TMC scheme considering travelers’ 
learning behavior. Miralinaghi & Peeta, (2016) proposed a multi-period tradable credit 
scheme as an approach to alleviate credit price volatility. In a multi-period scheme, unused 
credits could be transferred to future periods, either with or without penalty fees. The 
findings of this study showed that multi-period schemes mitigate credit price volatility and 
transfer fees have an advantage over free transfer by allowing the central authority to have 
more control over credit hoarding. 
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In the second group, TCS as a system generally follows the same credit allocation 
and trading process with some exceptions. The tradable bottleneck permit, also called 
tradable bottleneck credits (TBC), aims to curb peak hour congestion by mitigating the 
demand of selected critical bottlenecks within the network such that all drivers require a 
permit/credit to access these specific bottlenecks. It was first proposed by Akamatsu et al., 
(2006), as “tradable bottleneck permits”, where they showed the efficiency of the scheme 
to mitigate morning peak time congestion. Their model suggested that a limited number of 
permits to access the bottleneck should be initially issued by the authority, and each permit 
should be valid for a prespecified time period. At the same time, a trading market should 
be founded to allow travelers to trade and obtain their permits. Xiao et al., (2013) 
investigated the effectiveness and the efficiency of tradable credit scheme in managing 
peak commute congestion. The results showed that combining initial credit allocation and 
optimal credit charging can achieve SO and equality. Tian et al., (2013) examined the 
efficiency of a tradable travel credit scheme in terms of bottleneck congestion. They 
assumed heterogenous value of time (VOT) among drivers and allocated credits among 
them. At the same time, drivers could trade credit in a virtual market. The results showed 
that when SO is achieved, the optimal-credit scheme is always Pareto-improving. A new 
TCS mechanism was proposed by Nie & Yin (2013) and Nie (2015) to manage critical 
bottlenecks in the network such that driving credits will be charged to access critical 
bottlenecks during peak time. Their proposed scheme suggested that instead of allocating 
credits to drivers, travelers will be rewarded with credits by accessing bottlenecks during 
off-peak times and can sell their credits to travelers who access these bottlenecks during 
peak times. Their analysis indicated there would be up to 33 percent gain in efficiency and 
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welfare benefits. Further theoretical relationships between TBP and congestion pricing 
were investigated by Akamatsu & Wada (2017), who revealed that TBP had definite 
advantages over the congestion pricing in case of unperfect/uncertain demand information. 
2-7. Incentives-Based restriction 
Current urban traffic demand management “restriction” policies such as congestion 
pricing raised questions among researchers about their acceptability, equity, and 
effectiveness (Schade & Schlag, 2003; Giuliano, 1994; Viegas, 2001; Wang, et al., 2014) 
which increased interest among researchers to investigate other acceptable and equitable 
approaches to mitigate urban traffic congestion. It is believed that the root cause of traffic 
congestion is commuting behavior patterns as each driver desires to minimize her/his own 
travel time and commute alone which ultimately increases the number of vehicles in 
roadways during peak hours (Downs, 2000; Downs, 2005). Therefore, several researchers 
were prompted to investigate the travelers’ behavior in terms of route and time choices 
considering pre-travel trip information (Ben-Akiva, et al., 1991; Mahmassani & Liu, 1999; 
Arnott et al., 1999; Srinivasan & Mahmassani, 2003). In their study, Bamberg et al., (2003) 
concluded that using a psychological approach to influence the behavior of travelers is an 
effective way to mitigate the congestion. Instead of imposing restrictions or “punishments” 
to driving during peak-time, incentive-based traffic management emerged as a new 
approach which studies the effectiveness of incentivizing or “rewarding” drivers to 
reinforce their daily commuting behavior as an example of intervention procedure to 
change travel choice behavior. Different incentives were discussed in the literature, 
including monetary (Ben-Elia & Ettema, 2009), free public transportation (Fujii & 
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Kitamura, 2003) or discounted tolls (Bae & Bassok, 2008). The main objective of the 
incentive is to encourage travelers to switch their travel mode or time.  
An attempt to design a financial reward mechanism was introduced by Maillé & 
Stier-Moses, 2009, where they developed an algorithm to determine the optimal monetary 
reward for each commuting mode. The results show that rewards had a significant impact 
on reducing commuting time and costs, especially in highly congested area.  
Incentive-based traffic management first surfaced with the Spitsmijden1 (or Peak 
Avoidance in Dutch) experiment in Zoetermeer, the Netherlands, which was conducted in 
four phases between October 2006 and May 2009 (see Figure 2-5). In exchange for a 
change in mode, route, or time change in their daily commute in morning peak hours, as 
defined for each experiment, drivers were given a monetary incentive ranging from 2-7 
Euros or credits to obtain a smartphone by the end of the experiment (see Table 2-5) 
(Ettema & Verhoef, 2006; Knockaert, et al., 2007; Donovan, 2010; Bliemer et al., 2010). 
During the Spitsmijden experiment, multiple survey studies were conducted among 
341 drivers who participated to compare the characteristics of those who would participate 
in the experiment and those would not and what factors had the greatest impact on their 
decision. The results suggested that working time flexibility and household duties appeared 
to be main factors to participate (Ben-Elia & Ettema, 2009; Ettema et al., 2010; Knockaert 
et al., 2011). Although the result from Zoetermeer experiment suggest that incentives have 
a great potential to mitigate congestion in the short run, it remains unclear if the changed 
behavior will continue without rewards (Ben-Elia & Ettema, 2011a,b; Ben-Elia et al., 
 
1 “peak avoidance” in Dutch language 
 
51 
2011).  To compare its effectiveness with other traffic management policies, another study 
conducted by Tillema et al., (2013) compared the rewarding mechanism with congestion 
pricing in terms of their effect on drivers’ behavior and they concluded that rewards in 
general are more effective than congestion pricing in terms of rush hour avoidance. To 
study the long-run impact of the rewarding scheme in the Netherlands, a study was 
conducted by Khademi & Timmermans (2011) between 2010 and 2012 on 380 participants 
using cross-sectional Mixed Logit (ML) models. The results corresponded to previous 
studies, which suggest that the travel behavior change range from driving off-peak to 
telecommuting to route change. 
Incentive-based traffic management has also captured the attention of researchers 
in other parts on the world. In Los Angeles, an incentive-based active demand management 
platform called “Metropia” was developed by (Hu et al., 2015). This platform predicts 
traffic conditions and suggests multiple routes and departure time options to users where 
incentives are provided such that less congested, “off-peak” options would offer higher 
incentives. In other word, Metropia coordinates different options of routes and departure 
times among travelers while at the same time offering incentives to each option to achieve 
a better overall travel time coordination among drivers (see: https://metropia.com). A 10-
week pilot field experiment was conducted in April 2013 and the results showed that travel 
behavior was significantly changed and 20 percent of travel time was saved among the 
participants. Arian et al., (2018) extended their previous experiment and conducted another 
larger study based on 2270 people who used the same “Metropia” platform between May 
2015 and May 2018.  Their 364,966 trips showed that travelers are willing to change their 
travel behavior if the incentives are tailored to the time and purpose of the trip. In Beijing, 
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China, a survey study was conducted by Zhang et al., (2014) to investigate the impact of 
incentives on commuters’ travel behavior within the Beijing subway system. Their results 
showed that offering incentives such as coupons for food or free internet or discounted 
ticket fare had a positive impact on changing the commuters travel time. The potential of 
incentive-based traffic management has also encouraged the policymakers in congested 
cities in the U.S. to implement this policy. For example, in Washington, DC, a carpooling 
project to encourage lone drivers to carpool offered riders $1 for each way ($2 round trip) 
per day if they carpooled to work. Success was achieved after the program ends where 93 
percent of participants continued to carpool after the reward ended (icommute, 2012). 
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While several TDM strategies have been discussed in this chapter, SLEM could be seen to 
share several similarities with the proposed TDM policies. As shown in Figure 2-7, SLEM 
shares similarities with the financial-based restriction, namely the congestion pricing, by 
imposing score restriction instead of monetary restriction.  SLEM also shares similarities 
with the credit-based TDM by limiting some drivers’ route choice during peak hours. In 
addition, SLEM shares a similar approach as a categorization-based restriction, namely 
road rationing, by incentivizing a portion of the drivers to change their commuting mode. 
Additionally, SLEM is also an incentive-based restriction since it is motivating drivers to 
improve their driving behavior through providing incentives. Similar to the performance-
based strategy, SLEM also uses real-time telematics data to monitor drivers and their 
driving performance. Finally, SLEM could also be viewed as a priority-based TDM, such 





Figure 2-7: SLEM similarities with other TDM strategies 
2-9. Summary 
This chapter reviewed the literature on different approaches used for driver style 
profiling and monitoring as well as the history of the traffic demand management and 
different restriction policies that have been proposed and implemented.  The chapter 
reviewed driving profiling approaches that have been discussed in the literature. 
Researchers have mainly focused on detecting the driving style and the focus state of each 
driver. Different approaches including pedal operation monitoring, have been used, and as 
technology improved, more practical methods such as smartphones applications were used. 
Driving performance profiling is a well-known method among automobile insurance 
companies. Many insurance companies offer UBI policies where the driver provides the 
company access to her/his driving data in a return for discounted policy rate. Furthermore, 
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the chapter also reviewed the numerous traffic restriction schemes that have been proposed 
in the literature in the last five decades. Different approaches to tackle congestion, 
including monetary penalties, vehicle occupancy increases, and travel mile limitations, 
have been proposed. 
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Chapter 3  
SURVEY DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
3-1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the survey design and its distribution procedure. A detailed 
explanation of the survey design, participant recruitment, and distribution is provided in 
this chapter. This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 3-2 presents an overview of 
the survey structure. Section 3-3 summarizes the demographic data of the obtained sample 
and compares this data to the population to ensure that the collected sample adequately 
represents the population. Section 3-4 examines the quality of the data and its internal 
consistency to measure its reliability. Finally, Section 3-5 summarizes the survey design 
and implementation procedure.  
3-2. Overview  
A 32-question online survey was designed (See Appendix A) using Qualtrics 
software to measure public opinion about SLEM (see https://www.qualtrics.com). The 
survey was divided into three sections. The first section asked participants about their 
driving habits, such as their daily commuting distance, mode of commute, and whether 
they had had previous accidents and/or violations. The second section collected 
information on the participants’ opinion about SLEM and their main reasons for supporting 
or rejecting the system. The final section asked the participants for their demographic 
information, including their current city of residence, age, and level of income. As a part 
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of the survey validation, the first draft of the survey was piloted in September 2017 with 
twenty people from different backgrounds, majors, education levels, and nationalities at 
our home institution of Southern Methodist University (SMU) to evaluate the overall 
quality of the survey including time, flow, and clarity. Based on the pilot study, a short 
animation video clip was provided to explain the overall concept of a SLEM system to 
guarantee the consistency of the idea explanation, and to ensure equal understanding the 
idea among participants, thereby enhancing data accuracy and reducing bias.2 A snapshot 
of this video clip is provided in Figure 3-1. All survey participants were asked to watch the 
video before starting the second section of the survey. This video ensured that every 
participant received exactly the same information about the proposed system, thereby 
enhancing data accuracy and reducing bias. The final revised form of the survey was 
deemed exempt from review by SMU’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) and was 










Vehicle Connectivity Driver Performance Scoring 
  
    Penalizing Violating Drivers  Roadway Access Based on Score Value 
Figure 3-1: Snapshots of the video used to demonstrate SLEM for the survey participants 
 The survey was distributed from March 1st to April 30th, 2018. Three approaches 
were used to recruit a representative sample. First, to enlist recruiters, 45 students from 
three different engineering classes (two undergraduate and one graduate) were invited to 
participate voluntarily in the recruitment process; 32 students volunteered to participate as 
recruiters. They recruited 376 valid participants from family members and their network 
of friends who live in different states (an average of about 12 recruits per student). The 
second approach was to recruit participants face-to-face in public places such as coffee 
shops and shopping malls. These participants were asked to complete the survey either on 
the spot using a tablet, or alternatively, they were emailed or texted the survey link so they 
could complete the survey at their convenience. Those participants were also asked to share 
the survey with their relatives and friends living in other states, if possible. This approach 
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produced 97 valid responses. The third approach used an academic, research-based online 
crowdsourcing platform (see https://prolific.ac), widely used as  reliable methods for data 
collection (Rand et al., 2012). Previous researchers evaluated the reliability of these 
platforms by comparing their data with data collected using other traditional approaches, 
such as laboratory experiments and face-to-face interviews. They concluded that online 
crowdsourcing platforms generally produce results indistinguishable from other methods 
(e.g., Palan & Schitter, 2018). Through the online crowdsourcing platform used in this 
study, a total of 1,009 participants were recruited from across the country, yielding 945 
valid data points. 
  
 
Figure 3-2: Geocode locations of participants (in orange) across all 50 states (N = 1418) 
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3-3. Initial Survey Data 
The result produced a convenience sample of 1,672 participants, which satisfied the 
minimum sample size requirements, following the methodology proposed in Krejcie & 
Morgan (1970). Participants responded from all 50 states and from the District of Columbia 
(DC). Eligible participants were U.S. residents who held a driver license (DL) during the 
last 3 years. Data were cleaned by removing duplicate, inconsistent, careless, and 
incomplete responses. The 1,672 total responses were reduced to a total of 1,418 valid 
responses, which still covered all 50 states and the DC area, as presented in Figure 3-2. 
Table 3-1 compares the sample with the U.S. population distribution for main demographic 
variables. 49.3 percent (n = 700) of the participants were female, 50 percent (n = 708) were 
male, and 0.7 percent (n = 10) of the participants identified themselves as another gender. 
Participants were aged 16 years or older, with an average age of 37.2 years. The age 
distribution of the sample slightly shifted towards younger age groups. The sample had a 
larger proportion of drivers aged 25-39 (47.2 percent) than the corresponding value in the 
U.S. population (20.3 percent). The sample also underrepresented drivers aged 60 or 
greater (6.5 percent) compared to the population value (21.3 percent) (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2017a; U.S. Census Bureau, 2018).  
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Participants were divided among five different race/ethnic groups: White (77.5 
percent), Black or African American (4.5 percent), American Indian or Alaska Native (0.4 
percent), Asian (8.8 percent), and another race or ethnicity (8.8 percent). The racial/ethnic 
sample matched the U.S. population closely, with the exception of the Black/African 
American sub-population and other race/ethnicity, where the sample proportion was 
smaller. Finally, the distribution of household incomes in the sample generally matched 
that of the population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017b). Since enough data points were 
collected for each sub-population category as per Krejcie & Morgan (1970), it was 









Table 3-1: Sample and population distribution of selected demographic variables (Nobs = 
1418) 
3-4. Data Quality Assessment 
To examine the quality of the collected data, an internal consistency reliability test 
was conducted following the classical alpha test proposed by Cronbach (1951). The main 
purpose of Cronbach’s alpha test is to measure the reliability of Likert scale surveys. The 
higher the value of alpha, the more reliable the data. The general equation for Cronbach’s 
alpha is given in Equation (4) (Bland & Altaian, 1997): 








)     (4) 
 
3 10 participants who identified themselves to be other gender were considered females. 
4 Hawaiian\Islander races were considered Other. 






Gender (Female, Male)3  (50.0, 50.0)  (50.8, 49.2) 
Age [years] (16-24, 25-39, 40-59, ≥ 60)  (16.6, 47.2, 29.7, 6.5)  (12.2, 20.3, 29.7, 21.3) 
Annual Household Income [USD] 




(36.8, 35.5, 14.1, 
13.6) 
 (43.1, 29.3, 14.1, 13.6) 
Race/ Ethnicity 
(White, Black/African American, Native 
American/Alaskan, Asian, Other)4 
 
 








where k is the number of items, 𝑠𝑖
2 is the variance of the ith item, and 𝑠𝑡
2 is the 
variance of the total score obtained by summing all items. A Cronbach’s alpha score that 
is equal to 0.77 was obtained for the survey. According to Bland and Altaian (1997), a 
survey with satisfactory internal reliability should have a Cronbach’s alpha score of 0.70 
or above.  
The second survey focused on obtaining experts’ perspectives of SLEM. Another 
short questionnaire was designed using the Qualtrics software to target professionals in the 
area of traffic operations, ITS, and safety. The survey included questions soliciting 
information on the expert’s position, level of support for SLEM, and views about the 
effectiveness of SLEM at enhancing traffic safety and alleviating traffic congestion. 
Experts were also asked to list main obstacles that may prevent the adoption of this new 
technology in their regions. Finally, they were asked whether public agencies or private 
companies should operate such a system. The survey was distributed by email to more than 
100 professionals who were identified from web-based professional networks (e.g., 
LinkedIn) and by visiting the websites of public agencies and consulting firms. Twenty 
responses were obtained from 10 different states covering 16 different cities. Participants 
mostly worked as senior traffic operations and safety engineers with expertise in ITS. 
3-5. Summary 
This chapter summarized data obtained by the survey to assure its quality and 
reliability. First, the representativeness of the data was tested compared to the national 
population in terms of several demographics. The results showed a high rate of 
representativeness in most demographic variables, with a few biases and 
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underrepresentation for some groups. Second, a Cronbach’s alpha test evaluated the data’s 
internal consistency and reliability. A Cronbach's alpha of 0.77 indicated significant 
internal consistency and thus, the data had overall significant reliability.
  
65 
Chapter 4  
SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
4-1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the two distributed surveys. First, the chapter 
describes the public opinion survey discussed in the previous chapters. This survey 
revealed participants’ driving characteristics, their driving routines, and their willingness 
to change their daily driving habits. This chapter also presents their perception of SLEM 
including reporting and discussing reasons for rejection or acceptance of SLEM. A logistic 
regression of results, where the main characteristics of those who accept/reject the 
implementation of SLEM was discussed, is presented. Second, the results from another 
survey which targeted transportation experts is also presented here. Experts were asked 
about their opinion of SLEM and why they would support or reject its implementation. 
Third, different future scenarios were modeled based on a logistic regression model where 
different variables were considered to measure the effect of each on public acceptance. 
This chapter is divided into eight sections. An overview of the demographic and driving 
characteristics of the participants are provided in sections 4-2 and 4-3, respectively. In 
section 4-4, a detailed public perception of SLEM is given followed by the expert 
perception of SLEM in section 4-5. Section 4-6 provides the survey analysis results in the 
form of a logistic regression where different models were developed. Finally, the effects 
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on SLEM implementation and the issues associated with its real-world deployment 
are given in sections 4-7 and 4-8, respectively.  
4-2. Demographic Characteristics 
The baseline data obtained from the first survey were first analyzed using 
preliminary descriptive statistics. Table 4-1 provides a summary of participants’ 
demographic information. Most participants (54.5 percent) reported themselves as married 
or in a domestic relationship. In addition, about 45.5 percent of participants had at least 
one child. 37.5 percent of the participants reported a bachelor’s degree as their highest level 
of education. Other participants reported their highest education to be some college (27.5 
percent), a master’s degree (22.4 percent), a doctoral degree (6.6 percent), or high school 
or less (5.9 percent). Respondents were mostly employed, either full- or part-time (57.7 
and 17.5 percent, respectively). Ten percent were students, and only 7.9 percent reported 
being unemployed. Among the 1,418 respondents, 69.5 percent lived in urban areas. The 
highest number of participants were from Texas (181 participants), California (169 








Table 4-1: Summary of the demographics data of the survey participants 
4-3. Driving Characteristics  
Table 4-2 includes a summary of the participants’ commuting experience. About 
35.5 percent of participants defined themselves as experienced drivers with more than 20 
years of driving. In addition, 61.1 percent of the participants commuted 5 days or more 
weekly, and 80.7 percent of them commuted less than 25 miles daily. About 81.5 percent 
of the participants commuted alone, and only 4.9 percent carpooled. Almost one-third of 
the participants (32.7 percent) had one or more tickets in the last 5 years, and 32 percent 
also experienced at least one car accident during the same time period. In addition, 13.7 
percent of individuals reported that they had points on their driver licenses. Speeding was 
reported as the most common ticket received by drivers (42.3 percent). Running a red light 
was the second most common traffic violation (7.3 percent). Figure 4-1 shows a summary 
of different violations reported by participants.  
Variable  Percentage (%) 
Marital Status (Married, Single, Divorced, Widowed, 
Separated) 
 
(54.5, 38.8, 4.9, 0.9, 0.9) 
Number of Children (None, 1, 2, 3, > 3 Children)  (54.5, 15.5, 18.3, 7.7, 4.0) 
Education (No High School, High School Diploma, 
Some College, Bachelor’s, Master’s, Doctoral) 
 (0.2, 5.8, 27.5, 37.5, 22.4, 
6.6) 
Employment (Full-Time, Part-Time, Student, 
Unemployed, Retired, Disabled, Other) 
 (57.7, 17.5, 10.1, 7.9, 3.4, 
0.7, 2.7) 




Figure 4-1: Reported traffic violations 
Table 4-2: Summary of the commute characteristics data of the survey participants 
Table 4-3 summarizes the participants’ perception of congestion and their attitudes 
toward different actions to reduce traffic congestion. The majority (72.2 percent) of 
Variable Percentage (%) 
Driving Experience [years] (< 4, 4-10, 11-20, > 20) (8.5, 29.5, 26.5, 35.5) 
Weekly Commuting [days] (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, > 5) (11.5, 2.8, 5.5, 10.4, 8.8, 39.4, 
21.6) Commute Distance [miles] (< 5, 5-9, 10-14, 15-24, 
25-39, 40-59, 60-79, > 80) 
(22.0, 19.1, 19.5, 20.0, 11.0, 4.8, 
1.8, 1.8) 
5-Years, Accidents (0, 1, 2, 3, > 3) (67.3, 23.2, 6.8, 1.8, 0.9) 
5-Years, Tickets (0, 1, 2, 3, > 3) (68.0, 21.6, 6.5, 2.7, 1.2) 
Commute Mode 
     (Drive Alone, Public Transportation, Carpool, 
Other) 
(81.5, 6.6, 4.9, 7.0) 
Points on DL (No, Yes) (86.3, 13.7) 
Typ  of Ticket 
    (Speeding, Running a Red Light, Running a 
Stop Sign, Wrong Parking, Speeding & Running a 
Red Light, Other) 
(42.3, 7.2, 4.0, 3.0, 3.3, 40.2) 
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individuals agreed that congestion is a daily commute problem they face, and about 70.8 
percent of them were willing to change their commuting routine to avoid this congestion. 
Changing their route is the most common action by individuals to avoid congestion (85.3 
percent).  
Table 4-3: Summary of the congestion perception data of the survey participants 
The second most common action considered by the survey participants is changing 
the trip departure time (78.7 percent). Telecommuting is the third top action to avoid 




















General View of Drivers’ Performance 
Congestion is a Commute Problem  8.8  10.0  9.0  36.5  35.7 
Support DL suspension as 
Punishment 
 1.2  2.0  5.0  31.8  60.0 
Willingness to Change Commuting 
Routine 
 1.6  5.4  22.2  37.9  32.9 
Action to Avoid Traffic Congestion 
Change Time  4.3  10.9  6.1  43.6  35.1 
Change Route  2.4  6.3  6.0  46.9  38.4 
Change Mode  16.4  24.4  17.6  28.1  13.5 
Carpool  20.4  25.7  16.2  27.3  10.4 
Telecommuting  15.8  11.9  16.6  22.2  33.5 
Do Nothing  19.4  16.9  37.4  17.4  8.8 
Incentives to Motivate Changing Commute Performance 
Insurance Discount  1.6  3.6  10.3  36.3  48.2 
Express Lane Access  2.9  7.8  16.5  35.5  37.3 
Free Discounted Parking  7.0  6.3  21.4  25.2  40.1 
Free Discounted Tolls  5.6  5.9  21.4  27.0  40.1 
Discounted DL Renewal  4.7  8.7  20.1  31.5  35.0 
Monetary Reward  1.3  2.0  8.5  25.1  63.1 
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actions among the participants, which was expected and aligned with previous studies 
(McKenzie, 2015). Based on the obtained data, incentives seem to have great influence on 
the participants’ willingness to change their commuting behavior. Monetary rewards were 
the most desired option, with 88.2 percent of participants agreeing that monetary rewards 
could change their commuting behavior. Insurance discounts were the second most desired 
incentive chosen by participants (84.4 percent). In addition, 72.8 percent of the participants 
desired express lane access as an incentive to change their commuting performance.  
4-4. Public Perception of SLEM 
Among 1,418 participants, 932 (65.72 percent) participants supported the 
implementation of SLEM in their regions where the remaining 486 (34.28 percent) 
participants did not support SLEM implementation. Figure 4-2 shows the level of support 
for each state across the U.S. 
 
Figure 4-2: SLEM acceptance rate per state 
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 Figure 4-3 shows a summary of participants’ opinions regarding the three main 
aspects of SLEM that they were asked to evaluate. Answers were measured on a 5-point 
Likert scale including strongly agree, somewhat agree, neutral, somewhat disagree, and 
strongly disagree. First, participants were asked about SLEM’s ability to enhance travel 
safety. 1,062 participants (74.9 percent) agreed that such a system would enhance traffic 
safety in their regions. On the other hand, 147 participants (10.37 percent) did not think 
that such a system would achieve any improvement. The remaining 209 participants (14.74 
percent) had neutral opinions.  
 
Figure 4-3: Summary of the participants’ opinion on different aspects of SLEM 
Second, participants were asked to evaluate the system in terms of its fairness to 
drivers. A total of 756 participants (53.31 percent) reported that SLEM is fair to all drivers, 
and 412 participants (29.06 percent) think that SLEM is not fair. The remaining 250 
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participants (17.63 percent) had a neutral opinion about the fairness of the system. Third, 
participants were asked if they agreed that the system would improve their driving 
performance. A total of 868 participants (61.21 percent) believed that the system would 
help them improve their driving performance, while 246 participants (17.35 percent) 
thought that the system would have no effect on their driving performance. The remaining 
304 participants (21.44 percent) were neutral about the impact of the system on their 
driving performance. 
Figure 4-4 summarizes the main reasons participants either supported or rejected 
the idea of SLEM. In terms of supporting the system, most individuals supported SLEM 
because it could enhance traffic safety in their regions (N = 690, ~74 percent). The other 
top two reasons are the system’s ability to reduce congestion (N = 304, ~32 percent) and 
its fairness in penalizing low-performing drivers and rewarding high-performing drivers 
(N = 223, ~24 percent). As for why participants rejected the system, the majority of the 
participants indicated that a concern regarding invasion of privacy is the main reason for 
rejection (N = 354, ~73 percent). Participants also rejected the system because they were 
not in favor of restricting their access to roadways (N = 125, ~26 percent). Some 
participants also rejected the system because they thought that it would be hard to 











a) Rejection Reasons 
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These main reasons reported by the participants for rejecting SLEM are not 
surprising. Privacy is a common concern encountered in all CV applications. Effort is 
underway to ensure information security is unbreachable in all CV-enabled applications. 
Regarding roadway restrictions, SLEM is expected to be more acceptable because it 
restricts drivers from accessing some routes based on their driving performance rather than 
their income level, as implemented in the congestion pricing strategy, which could be 
viewed as inequitable (Ecola & Ligh, 2009). 
4-5. Experts’ Perception of SLEM  
Next, the results regarding experts’ perspectives of SLEM were present. Out of the 
20 participants, 12 experts supported the concept of SLEM, and half of them indicated  
strong support. Out of the eight experts who rejected the system, three experts indicated 
strong rejection. Figure 4-5 summarizes the experts’ perspectives on the effectiveness of 
SLEM. Experts were asked to give a score between zero (no impact) and 10 (very high 
impact) on their view of how SLEM can assist in improving the driving performance of 
the driver population, reducing traffic congestion, and enhancing traffic safety. Experts 
indicated that they expect the system to enhance the population’s driving performance and 
traffic safety, with average scores of 6.45 and 6.85, respectively. However, they were less 
certain about the ability of the system to reduce traffic congestion, as indicated by an 
average score of 5.5. As for the experts’ opinions on agencies that should administer such 
a system, about 65 percent of the experts indicated that public agencies should be in charge 
of operating such a system, while 15 percent thought that the private sector could operate 
the system. The remaining 20 percent indicated that public-private partnership could be an 
effective mechanism to successfully deploy and operate the system. Concern for privacy 
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protection and ensuring fairness could explain the reason for the high percentage of experts 
who recommended that public agencies be involved in the operation of such a system.  
 
Figure 4-5: Expert opinion of potential impacts of SLEM 
4-6. Modeling Public Acceptance 
In order to measure the level of support among the population and how their 
characteristics influence that support, a binary logistic regression model was developed 
(Chao-Ying et al., 2002). The model predicts the probability that an individual supports or 
does not support the deployment of SLEM by considering an array of independent 
variables, including the individual’s commuting experience, traffic law violation history, 
familiarity with CV technology, and other demographic variables. The General Linear 
Model function in the R statistical computing environment was used to develop that model 
(Venables & Ripley, 2002). The dataset from this study, which includes 1,418 valid 
responses, was used to develop the model. 
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Table 4-4: Comparison among different model specifications 












Number of Variables 34  29  20  17  11 
Number of Parameters 116  85  78  52  28 
McFadden's R2 0.18  0.16  0.15  0.15  0.11 
Nagelkerke R2 0.29  0.26  0.25  0.24  0.19 
Hosmer-Lemeshow 0.81  0.44  0.20  0.76  0.32 
Log-Likelihood -741.48  -761.04  -769.32  -770.27  -806.37 
AIC 1715  1692.08  1694.64  1644.55  1668.75 
BIC 1895.39  1824.29  1815.96  1725.43  1712.30 
Corrected AIC (CAIC) 1735.83  1703.06  1703.85  1648.59  1669.92 
Model Prediction Accuracy 0.73  0.71  0.72  0.72  0.70 
Several models were developed that differ in terms of their set of independent 
variables (See Appendices B - E). Table 4-4 gives several goodness-of-fit measures for 
these models. The table also gives the prediction accuracy for each model. A review of 
these goodness-of-fit measures can be found in Harrell (2015). As shown in Table 4-4, the 
full model considers all available variables. Model 1, the univariate  model, was built by 
conducting a univariate analysis for each variable and choosing variables with a p-value ≤ 
0.25 (Bursac et al., 2008). Model 2, the selection model, was built based on the best 
predictors used for the random forest (ensemble learning method) performed for the 
dataset. After all variables in the random forest model were included, the top 20 predictors 
were picked and used to form the selection logit model. Model 3, the stepwise model, was 
built using backward elimination, which performs a stepwise model selection by the least 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) value (Venables & Ripley, 2002). As shown in Table 
4-4, the stepwise model gives the best AIC, Bayesian information criterion (BIC), and R2 
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values. A Hosmer-Lemeshow value of 0.76 indicates a good data fit for this model (Hosmer 
et al., 1997). The stepwise model includes variables that measure drivers’ willingness to 
change their driving habits and also examines the set of actions that a driver is willing to 
take (e.g., change route, mode, or departure time). Model 4 uses a smaller number of 
predictors. That model includes only variables that measure the driver’s willingness to 
change her/his commuting performance and ignores other variables that measure the 
driver’s level of support for the set of actions she/he may consider. While eliminating a 
subset of the variables might worsen the value of the goodness-of-fit measure, developing 
a model with a reduced set of variables simplifies its application. For example, as shown 
in Table 4-4, though the AIC measure slightly increases from 1644.55 to 1668.75 in Model 
4 compared to Model 3, reducing the number of variables from 17 to 11 makes the model 
more applicable. The prediction accuracy of this model is comparable to those of other 
models with a large number of variables. 
Table 4-5 provides additional details on Model 4, the reduced model. The table lists 
the independent variables, estimated parameter(s) for each variable, and the measures of 
their significance. The odds ratio (OR) is a measure of association that reflects the effect 
that each independent variable has on the level of support of SLEM (OR value = 1, no 
effect; OR < 1, less likely to support; and OR > 1, more likely to support). Two 
demographic variables considered in the model are the household income and number of 
children. Other variables considered in this model include:  
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• Driver’s opinion on the level of congestion encountered during her/his commute. 
• Number of tickets issued in the past 5 years. 
• Presence of any points on driver’s license.  
• Driver’s willingness to change commuting behavior to reduce congestion. 
• Driver’s anticipation of her/his score if the new system were deployed (this variable 
gives information on the driver self-assessment of her/his driving performance). 
• Driver’s familiarity with the CV and telematics technology.  
• Driver’s acceptance of driving license suspension as a punishment for driving violation 























Driving Experience   
(Reference = Less Than 4 Years) 
     
4-10 Years -0.68 0.51 (-1.19, -0.2) -2.70 0.01 
11-20 Years -0.83 0.44 (-1.35, -0.33) -3.20 0.00 
More Than 20 Years -0.68 0.5 (-1.21, -0.18) -2.6 0.01 
Weekly Commuting [Days] 0.05 1.05 (-0.01, 0.11) 1.54 0.12 
Number of Tickets [Last 5 Years] 0.21 1.23 (0.03, 0.39) 2.30 0.02 
Points on DL (Reference = No)      
Yes 0.39 1.48 (-0.04, 0.84) 1.76 0.08 
Congestion is a Commute Problem 
(Reference = Strongly Disagree) 
     
Somewhat Disagree 0.31 1.36 (-0.22, 0.84) 1.14 0.25 
Neutral 0.77 2.17 (0.21, 1.34) 2.69 0.01 
Somewhat Agree 0.65 1.92 (0.21, 1.09) 2.88 0.00 
Strongly Agree 0.34 1.41 (-0.11, 0.79) 1.51 0.13 
Willingness to Change Commuting 
Routine (Reference = Extremely 
Unlikely) 
     
Somewhat Unlikely 0.40 1.49 (-0.67, 1.5) 0.73 0.47 
Neutral 0.43 1.54 (-0.54, 1.45) 0.86 0.39 
Somewhat Likely 1.02 2.77 (0.04, 2.03) 2.03 0.04 
Extremely Likely 1.3 3.68 (0.32, 2.32) 2.58 0.01 
DL Suspension as Punishment 
(Reference = Strongly Disagree) 
     
Somewhat Disagree 0.80 2.22 (-0.54, 2.17) 1.17 0.24 
Neutral 1.09 2.99 (-0.1, 2.33) 1.78 0.07 
Somewhat Agree 1.2 3.32 (0.1, 2.35) 2.12 0.03 
Strongly Agree 1.52 4.55 (0.42, 2.66) 2.69 0.01 
CVs Familiarity  
(Reference = No) 
     
Yes 0.34 1.40 (0.05, 0.62) 2.31 0.02 
Expected Score (Reference = Excellent)      
Poor -3.05 0.05 (-6.15, -0.77) -2.46 0.01 
Fair -1.67 0.19 (-2.42, -0.93) -4.41 0.00 
Good  -1.16 0.31 (-1.53, -0.8) -6.26 0.00 
Very Good -0.72 0.49 (-1.02, -0.42) -4.7 0.00 
Number of Children  0.17 1.19 (0.05, 0.3) 2.83 0.00 
Household Income  
(Reference = < $50,000) 
     
$50,000-$99,999 0.24 
 
1.27 (-0.04, 0.51) 1.66 0.10 
$100,000-$150,000 0.58 1.79 (0.18, 0.99) 2.83 0.00 
> $150,000 0.68 
 
1.98 (0.25, 1.13) 3.03 0.00 
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Based on the model estimation results, respondents who reported congestion to be 
a commuting problem are 1.92 times more likely to support SLEM than those who did not 
(OR = 1.92, p = 0.004). Interestingly, respondents who are willing to change their 
commuting performance are significantly more willing to support SLEM (OR = 3.68, p = 
0.01). Traffic law violation history is also a statistically significant variable, which implies 
that participants who have more violations tend to support SLEM more than those with no 
or fewer violations (OR = 1.23, p = 0.02). One possible explanation for this outcome is that 
drivers support SLEM because they believe that it could help them to seek a second chance 
to improve their driving performance over time and avoid monetary penalties.  
Drivers who support DL suspension as punishment for violating drivers are also 
supportive of SLEM. Those who somewhat agreed with DL suspension are 3.32 times more 
likely to support the system than those who strongly disagreed, and those who strongly 
agreed are 4.55 times more likely to support the system (OR = 4.55, p = 0.007). In addition, 
participants who reported that they are familiar with CV technology are more likely to 
support SLEM than those who are unfamiliar (OR = 1.4, p = 0.02). Furthermore, 
participants were asked to rate their expected driving score on a five-level Likert scale 
(poor, fair, good, very good, and excellent). As expected, those who rated themselves with 
lower scores showed less acceptance of SLEM than those who reported their scores to be 
excellent (OR = 0.05, p = 0.01). Variables such as number of commuting days and having 
points on drivers’ license were not statistically significant in this model.  
4-7. Effects on SLEM Implementation 
Figure 4-6 summarizes different hypothesized scenarios based on the logit model 
presented in Table 4-5. Initially, the model predicted public acceptance of SLEM to be 81.2 
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percent. One can notice the difference between the acceptance rate reported by the model 
and that of the sample. This difference returns to the fact that the model does not have 
perfect prediction accuracy. As given in Table 4-4, the model has a prediction accuracy of 
70% which means that there is a 30% chance that the model predicts a positive response to 
a participant who was reported in the sample to reject SLEM (i.e., negative response). An  
attempt to test the model performance under four scenarios was performed. Each scenario 
was repeated 50 times to assure accuracy. In Figure 4-6, the average value was plotted as 
a solid curve within the maximum and minimum bound, shown in shaded range. First, as 
shown in Figure 4-6a, the number of drivers who experience daily congestion increased 
from 72.2 percent (the base scenario) to over 95 percent and found that the acceptance of 
SLEM increased from 81.2 to 84.9 percent. Second, the relationship between CV 
familiarity and the level of acceptance of SLEM. Based on the results in Figure 4-6b, 
increasing the familiarity rate from 30 percent to over 92 percent increased the acceptance 
from 81.2 percent to approximately 92 percent. Third, as shown in Figure 4-6c, increasing 
the proportion of safe drivers from 78.5 percent to over 95 percent increased the acceptance 
of SLEM from 81.2 percent to over 88.5 percent. Finally, as given in Figure 5-6d, the 
number of drivers who had an income of $100,000 or more was increased from 27.8 percent 
to over 92 percent, which increased acceptance of SLEM from 81.2 percent to about 88.1 
percent. Given that income is usually correlated with level of education, this result implies 
that SLEM would be more accepted in communities with higher levels of education.   
This analysis provides several insights about acceptance of SLEM. A broad 
spectrum of actions needs to be proposed by policymakers and institutions, including 
education and partnerships with transportation agencies and manufacturers to raise public 
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awareness of the safety advantages of SLEM. Educating people about CV technology is a 
key element of achieving this goal, since this study revealed that more than 70 percent (N 
= 1000) of the participants were not aware of CV technology. Although acceptance of 
SLEM was 65.7 percent, it is necessary to mention that 15.5 percent (N = 221) reported 
that privacy concerns were their only reason for rejecting this policy, which emphasizes 
the fact that raising awareness and educating the public could boost the acceptance of this 
policy to over 80 percent. In addition, about 2.19 percent (N = 31) of participants reported 
that they rejected the SLEM because they believed it could not be deployed. Addressing 
concerns over privacy and demonstrating an operational system could increase the public 














Figure 4-6: The acceptance of SLEM under different operational scenarios 
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4-8. Summary and Discussion 
Several issues related to the deployment of SLEM are worth discussion. First, the 
SLEM is an autonomous system with built-in traffic violation detection capabilities. These 
capabilities could be expanded through installation of appropriate sensors to detect other 
severe violations, such as driving under influence and hit-and-run incidents. Expanding 
these capabilities would significantly reduce dependence on traditional policing operations 
for enforcing the law against these felonies. Second, intensive research will be required to 
determine the weight of each detected traffic violation in the overall score assigned to each 
driver. These weights could vary by community or based on the prevailing traffic 
conditions in the network. For example, a single-occupancy vehicle in an HOV lane might 
be assigned a higher penalty in the peak periods as compared to a penalty assigned outside 
the peak periods. Third, the overall purpose of SLEM is to improve compliance with 
driving laws in a more equitable way. Therefore, differentiating between innocent and 
intentional violations is important for achieving public trust of SLEM. Fourth, the score 
could be extended to incorporate other factors in addition to driving performance. The 
score could include measures such as the vehicle’s level of maintenance as an incentive for 
drivers to routinely maintain the minimum legal safety requirement of their vehicles. In 
addition, incentives could be offered for drivers to improve their scores. For example, 
drivers who reduce the total number of miles traveled, reduce their traveled miles in the 
peak period, or increase their dependence on transit and non-motorized vehicles could be 




Chapter 5  
THE SCORE-BASED TRAFFIC LAW-ENFORCEMENT AND NETWORK 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: PROBLEM DEFINITION AND FORMULATION 
5-1. Introduction 
This chapter describes the proposed score-based traffic law-enforcement and 
network management system (SLEM). First, the main assumptions considered for SLEM 
are listed. Then, the theories of user equilibrium and system optimal for traffic network are 
described. A formal definition of the problem is then given, followed by its mathematical 
formulation. This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5-2 gives the assumptions that 
were considered for designing SLEM. A background of SO and UE traffic assignments is 
then provided in section 5-3. The problem definition followed by the mathematical 
formulation are then introduced in sections 5-4 and 5-5, respectively. Finally, a summary 
of chapter 5 is then provided in section 5-6. 
5-2. Main Assumptions 
This chapter introduces the mathematical model for SLEM. Several assumptions 
are considered for the system:   
(a) A vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) secured connected system is established across the 
entire roadway network, which is capable of collecting high-frequency real-time data 
describing the location, movement direction, speed, acceleration, steering wheel angle, 
and tailgating distance for each vehicle on the road. The system can also obtain real-
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time information on the status of each traffic light. The system is connected to a database 
describing the speed limit for all links and all mandatory signs in the network.  
(b) SLEM is equipped with built-in rules that can be applied to reliably detect traffic 
law violations such as running a red light, violating the speed limit, tailgating, and 
performing a prohibited maneuver, etc.  
(c) Each vehicle trip has an identified registered driver linked to it. Drivers have 
knowledge of SLEM and its functionality as an integrated law enforcement and traffic 
network management system.  
(d) SLEM assigns each driver a score that reflects her/his average performance over a pre-
defined period. This score is used to determine the driver’s eligibility for route access 
for her/his current trip.    
(e) Each driver can get a record of her/his violations in real-time along with instructions 
and incentives to improve her/his current score. Drivers who consistently fail to adhere 
to the traffic laws are subject to severe penalties ranging from imposing points on driver 
license to driving license suspension or jail time.  
5-3. User Equilibrium and System Optimal: A Brief Review 
We defined 𝑆 as the list of possible score levels that a driver could be assigned such 
that 𝑠1 > 𝑠2 implies that drivers with score 𝑠1 have a higher driving performance than those 
with score level 𝑠2. Two dynamic traffic route assignment strategies are considered: (a) 
dynamic user equilibrium (DUE) and (b) dynamic system optimal (DSO) (Peeta & 
Mahmassani, 1995). Each pattern defines a set of superior routes for each origin-
destination (OD) pair and departure time interval that are used by the drivers. The DUE 
pattern assumes that each driver selects the route that minimizes her/his travel time under 
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a perfect information scenario. At equilibrium, no driver can improve her/his travel time 
by unilaterally changing her/his route. In the DSO routing strategy, drivers are assumed to 
fully comply with a route guidance strategy in which they are assigned to routes that 
minimize the total network travel time. Under the DSO equilibrium, no driver can improve 
her/his marginal travel time by unilaterally changing her/his route.  
A successful traffic management strategy would shift the traffic route assignment 
pattern in the network from the undesirable DUE pattern to the desirable DSO pattern in 
order to minimize the total travel time in the network. SLEM determines a route restriction 
scheme, which is defined in terms of the lowest (worst) score threshold for each route such 
that drivers with scores equal to or higher than this threshold are allowed to use this route. 
Assuming that drivers are choosing routes that minimize their travel time in the network, 
these thresholds are determined such that the traffic pattern in the network is transformed 
from DUE toward the DSO pattern. In other words, the threshold value for each route is 
strategically determined such that (a) the total travel time in the network is minimized, and 
(b) drivers with high scores are assigned high travel priority and may access faster routes 
in the network. 
5-4. Problem Definition 
Notations:  
𝐺(. ) : A directed network 
𝑁 : The set of nodes in 𝐺 indexed by 𝑖 and 𝑗 
𝐴 : The set of roadway links in 𝐺 indexed by 𝑎 




𝑡 : Observation interval, 𝑡 = 1,…, |𝑇|  
𝑆 : The set of driving performance score classes indexed by 𝑠 (𝑠𝑛 is performing better 
than 𝑠𝑛+1) 
𝐾 : The set of superior routes in 𝐺 indexed by 𝑘  
𝜏 : Departure time interval, 𝜏 = 1,…, |𝑇′| 
𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝜏  : Number of vehicles traveling from origin 𝑖 to destination 𝑗 at departure interval 𝜏 
𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑠
𝜏  : Number of vehicles traveling from origin 𝑖 to destination 𝑗 at departure interval 𝜏 
by drivers belonging to score class 𝑠 
𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑠
𝜏  : Percentage of vehicles traveling from origin 𝑖 to destination 𝑗 at departure interval 
𝜏 with by drivers belonging to score class 𝑠. 
𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝜏  : Number of vehicles traveling from origin 𝑖 to destination 𝑗 at departure interval 𝜏 
using route 𝑘 
𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑠
𝜏  : Number of vehicles traveling from origin 𝑖 to destination 𝑗 at departure interval 𝜏 
using route 𝑘 by drivers belonging to score class 𝑠 
𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘𝜏 : Minimum driving performance score allowed to travel from origin 𝑖 to destination 
𝑗 using route 𝑘 at departure interval 𝜏 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝜏  : The travel time of route 𝑘 between origin-destination pair 𝑖 − 𝑗 at departure 
interval 𝜏  
𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑠
𝜏  : A binary decision variable that is equal to one if a driver of class 𝑠 can use route 
𝑘 between OD pair 𝑖 − 𝑗 in departure interval 𝜏, and zero otherwise.  
𝑥𝑎
𝑡  : The traffic flow on link 𝑎 at time interval 𝑡 
𝑥𝑎𝑠
𝑡  : The traffic flow from class 𝑠 on link 𝑎 at interval 𝑡 
𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝜏−𝑎𝑡 : An element in the route-link incidence matrix, which is equal to one if link 𝑎 in 
interval 𝑡 ∈ |𝑇′| is part of route 𝑘 connecting OD pair 𝑖 − 𝑗 in departure interval 
𝜏 ∈ 𝑇, and zero otherwise. 
𝑡𝑡𝑎
𝑡 (𝑥𝑎
𝑡 ) : The travel time of link 𝑎 in observation interval 𝑡 
Consider a roadway network 𝐺(𝑁, 𝐴, 𝐷), where 𝑁 is the set of nodes, 𝐴 is the set 
of links, and 𝐷 is the time-dependent traffic demand pattern defined for the network for a 
pre-defined horizon of interest 𝑇. This horizon includes |𝑇| departure time intervals and 
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|𝑇′| link observation intervals. The vehicle demand 𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝜏 ∈ 𝐷 for each origin-destination 
(OD) pair 𝑖 − 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 and departure interval 𝜏 ∈ 𝑇 is assumed given. Assume the existence 
of a CV environment that enables the development of a telematics platform to infer reliable 
information on the driving performance of each driver. With this platform, drivers could 
be assigned scores that reflect their driving performance over a pre-defined past horizon or 
for a certain number of past trips. A high number of violations indicates a low driving 
performance score, and vice versa. We define 𝑆 as the list of possible score classes that 
could be assigned to drivers such that 𝑠1 > 𝑠2 implies that drivers assigned to level 𝑠1 
exhibit a better (i.e., higher) driving performance than those assigned to level 𝑠2. For each 
OD pair 𝑖 − 𝑗 and departure interval 𝜏, the driver score distribution is assumed to be given, 
where 𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑠
𝜏  is the percentage of drivers belonging to class 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆. Here, the number of score 
classes |𝑆| for any OD pair and departure time interval is defined such that the number of 
vehicles in each class is much smaller than the capacity of any of the roadway links in the 
network. Thus, no link will be saturated by the vehicles of one score class of a given OD 
pair and departure time interval, which provides flexibility for SLEM to assign the traffic 
obtaining a pattern that is close to that of the SO one. We define 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑠
𝜏  as the number of 
drivers traveling between OD pair 𝑖 − 𝑗 in departure interval 𝜏 and belonging to score class 
𝑠 ∈ 𝑆.  
Each route 𝑘 that connects an OD pair 𝑖 − 𝑗 at departure interval 𝜏 is allocated a 
minimum score threshold 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘𝜏. Drivers belonging to a score class 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 that is less than 
𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘𝜏 are restricted from using that route or any other route with a score threshold greater 
than 𝑠.  Drivers who do not comply with such route access restrictions mandated by the 
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system expect to see their scores worsen and could be subjected to other penalties. Figure 
5-1 displays an OD pair having three routes connecting them. Drivers employing one of 
these routes and traveling from origin to destination are assigned to one of three 
performance score levels ranked from highest (s=1) to lowest (s=3). In this example, the 
score threshold for Route 1 equals 2, implying that only drivers belonging to score classes 
1 and 2 (𝑑𝑖𝑗1
𝜏  and 𝑑𝑖𝑗2
𝜏 ) are eligible to use this route. Similarly, Route 2’s score level is equal 
to 1, thus limiting access to this route to drivers belonging to the highest driving 
performance class (𝑑𝑖𝑗1
𝜏 ).   
 
Figure 5-1: Access eligibility for three routes with different score thresholds 
Vehicles traveling between an OD pair in any given departure time interval are 
assigned to a superior set of routes 𝐾 connecting this OD pair. We assume that the routes 
belonging to this set are sorted in descending order based on their travel time values. Thus, 
a route with a low index has less travel time than that of a route with a high index. We 
define 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘











Eligible Demand of 
Route 1: 𝑑𝑖𝑗 1
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𝜏 ∈ 𝑇 using route 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾. The level of congestion on each route is measured in terms of the 
route travel time 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝜏 (. ). The portion of vehicles with drivers who belong to score class 
𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 and use route 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 is defined as 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑠
𝜏 . The binary decision variable 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑠
𝜏  indicates 
whether a vehicle with a driver of class 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 is eligible to use route 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 connecting OD 
pair 𝑖 − 𝑗 in departure interval 𝜏 ∈ 𝑇. The corresponding traffic flow 𝑥𝑎𝑠
𝑡  from class 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 
on link 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 in observation interval 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇′ can hence be defined using the information of 
the assignment matrix 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝜏−𝑎𝑡 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘, 𝑎, 𝜏, 𝑡, which maps the route flows to the link flows. 
Finally, we define 𝑥𝑎
𝑡  and 𝑡𝑡𝑎
𝑡 (𝑥𝑎
𝑡 ) as the total flow and corresponding travel time of link 
𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 in interval 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇′, respectively. 
5-5. Mathematical Formulation  
The route score thresholds 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘𝜏 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘, 𝜏 constitute the problem’s decision 
variables, and these are determined so as to minimize total travel time in the network while 
assuming that travelers are exhibiting a route choice behavior that they perceive as 
minimizing their travel times. The formulation ensures that drivers having high scores can 
access faster routes in the network, while restricting those having low scores to slower 
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Subject to: 
𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝜏 = ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝜏
𝑘𝜏𝑖𝑗     ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝜏    (7) 
𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝜏 = ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑠
𝜏
𝑠     ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘, 𝜏   (8) 
𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑠
𝜏 = ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝜏
𝑘      ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘, 𝜏   (9) 
𝑥𝑎




)𝜏𝑘𝑖𝑗   ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘, 𝜏   (10) 
𝑥𝑎𝑠
𝑡 = ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝜏−𝑎𝑡. 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑠
𝜏
𝜏𝑘𝑖𝑗     ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘, 𝜏, 𝑠 ≥ 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘𝜏  (11) 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝜏 = ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝜏−𝑎𝑡 ∙ 𝑡𝑡𝑎
𝑡 (𝑥𝑎
𝑡 )𝑎    ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘, 𝜏   (12) 
𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑠
𝜏 ≥ 0      ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝜏, 𝑘, 𝑠    (13) 
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The problem is formulated in the form of a bi-level mathematical program. The 
upper-level problem given in (1-5) determines the optimal score threshold for each route, 
while the lower-level problem given in (6-13) captures the drivers' route choice behavior 
in response to the thresholds determined in the upper-level problem. The objective function 
given in (1) minimizes total travel time, i.e., the sum of the travel times of all vehicles in 
the network. For each OD pair 𝑖 − 𝑗 and departure interval 𝜏, the demand of the different 
score classes allowed on route 𝑘 is summed, and this total is then multiplied by the route’s 
travel time.  
The constraint in (2) restricts drivers from accessing routes with score thresholds 
that are higher than their score levels. The constraint in (3) ensures that drivers with high 
scores are accorded high travel priorities within the network. For instance, consider two 
drivers traveling between node pair 𝑖 − 𝑗 at departure interval 𝜏 who belong to classes 𝑠 
and 𝑠′ such that 𝑠 ≥ 𝑠′. If these two drivers are assigned to routes 𝑘 and 𝑘′, respectively, 
route 𝑘’s travel time must be less than or equal to that of route 𝑘′. The constraint in (4) 
specifies that the route score thresholds are positive integers. The constraint in (5) ensures 
that drivers with higher scores are provided higher access priority at the link level, 
irrespective of their OD pairs.  
The lower-level problem solves for the user equilibrium dynamic traffic assignment 
pattern that satisfies the route restriction constraints obtained from the upper-level problem. 
The objective function in Equation (6) describes the dynamic user equilibrium (UE) 
objective function. The flow conservation constraints at the OD, route, and score levels are 
given in the constraints in (7)-(9), respectively. The constraints in (10) and (11) use the 
assignment matrix to determine the link flows as a function of the route flows. Similarly, 
 
94 
the constraint in (12) calculates the travel time for each route. Finally, the non-negativity 
of the route flows is guaranteed by the constraint in (13).      
5-6. Summary 
This chapter present a formal problem definition and the mathematic formulation 
for SLEM. The problem is formulated as a bi-level mathematical program. The upper-level 
problem minimizes the total travel time in the network under the optimal score threshold 
for all the routes. The lower-level problem represents the travelers’ route choice behavior 
assuming a user equilibrium traffic flow pattern. The next chapter present an efficient 
solution methodology for this mathematic program. 
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Chapter 6  
SOLUTION METHODOLOGY 
6-1. Introduction  
This section presents the solution algorithm developed for the problem described 
in the previous chapter. A heuristic-based approach was adopted to obtain a sub-optimal 
solution for the problem. This heuristic decomposes the problem into two sequential sub-
problems, the first of which solves the dynamic SO traffic flow pattern in the network. The 
solution to this problem gives the time-varying path flows and their corresponding link 
flows. The second sub-problem determines the optimal score threshold values for a  given 
driver population following its performance score distribution. These thresholds are 
determined such that the resulting traffic flow pattern in the network is as close as possible 
to the dynamic SO flow pattern obtained from solving the first sub-problem.  This chapter 
is organized as follows. Section 6-2 explains the steps of the solution algorithm and how 
the heuristic algorithm obtains the score threshold allocated on each link on the traffic 
network, as demonstrated in the accompanying. Finally, a summary of this chapter is 
provided in section 6-3. 
6-2. The Optimal Score Threshold  
Finding the optimal solution for the bi-level mathematical program is a challenging 
task. The program consists of upper-level and lower-level problems that are nonlinear  
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(Sheffi, 1985). In both problems, the flow pattern assigned to a path is a function of the 
travel time of that path, which in return depends on the amount of traffic assigned to that 
route. In addition, there is no guarantee of the convexity of the objective function given in 
(1), given the discrete nature of the decision variables 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘𝜏 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘 , 𝜏. To overcome these 
difficulties, a heuristic-based approach was adopted to obtain a sub-optimal solution for 
the problem. This heuristic decomposes the problem into two sequential sub-problems, the 
first of which solves the dynamic SO traffic flow pattern in the network. The solution to 
this problem gives the time-varying path flows and their corresponding link flows 𝑦𝑎
𝑡 ∀ 𝑎, 𝑡. 
The second sub-problem determines the optimal score threshold values 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘𝜏 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘 , 𝜏 for 
a given driver population with performance score distribution 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑠
𝜏  ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑠 , 𝜏. These 
thresholds are determined such that the resulting traffic flow pattern in the network is as 
close as possible to the dynamic SO flow pattern obtained from solving the first sub-
problem.  
The first sub-problem has been intensively studied in the literature. For example, 
the pioneering work in (Peeta & Mahmassani, 1995) presents an iterative simulation-based 
dynamic traffic assignment methodology to solve the dynamic SO traffic assignment 
problem. Additional details on mathematical formulations and solution methodologies 
developed for the dynamic SO problem can be found in (Merchant & Nemhauser, 1978; 
Ziliaskopoulos, 2000).  The second sub-problem can be described using the mathematical 
program given in Equations (14) through (24). The objective function in (14) minimizes 
the squared difference between the time-varying link flows under SLEM’s route guidance 
strategy, 𝑥𝑎
𝑡  ∀ 𝑎, 𝑡, and those associated with the dynamic SO traffic flow pattern, 𝑦𝑎
𝑡 ∀ 𝑎, 𝑡. 
Similar to the formulation above, the constraint given in (15) determines the link flows 
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from the path flows, and the constraints in (16) and (17) ensure flow conservation at the 
path and OD pair levels, respectively. The constraint in (18) determines if the demand of 
OD pair 𝑖 − 𝑗 and departure time interval 𝜏 that belongs to class 𝑠 is eligible to use route 𝑘 
or not. Class 𝑠 is eligible to use route 𝑘 only if the variable 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑠
𝜏  is equal to one. Given that 
the routes between each OD are sorted in an ascending order based on their travel time 
values, the constraint in (19) ensures that the shortest route is always available for drivers 
with the highest performance (i.e., 𝑠 = 1). The constraint in (20) ensures that no better 
route can be assigned to drivers with lower performance classes. The constraint in (21) is 
the same as constraint (5) as described above. The constraint in (22) ensures that each class 
of driver is assigned to one route. The non-negativity of the path flows is satisfied in the 
constraint in (23). Finally, the constraint in (24) defines the variable 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑠
𝜏  as a binary 
variable.   
Minimize  ∑ ∑ (𝑦𝑎
𝑡 −  𝑥𝑎
𝑡 )2𝑡𝑎         (14) 
Subject to: 
𝑥𝑎
𝑡 = ∑ ∑ ∑ (𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝜏−𝑎𝑡. 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝜏 )𝜏𝑘𝑖𝑗        ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘, 𝜏      (15) 
𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝜏 =  ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑠
𝜏
𝑠        ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘, 𝜏     (16) 
𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝜏 =  ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝜏
𝑘         ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘, 𝜏     (17) 
𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑠
𝜏 =  𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑠
𝜏  ∙ 𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑠
𝜏 ∙ 𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝜏        ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘, 𝜏, 𝑠     (18) 
𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑠
𝜏 = 1        ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘 = 1, 𝑠 = 1    (19) 
𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑠
𝜏 ≤ ∑ 𝜇𝑖𝑗?̅?𝑠
𝜏






?̅?≤𝑘 + ∑ 𝜇𝑖̅?̅??̅??̅?
𝜏 + (∑ 𝜇𝑖̅?̅??̅??̅?
𝜏 )?̅?≤𝑘 ∙  (1 − 𝛿𝑖̅?̅?𝑘
𝜏−𝑎𝑡) ≥  𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝜏−𝑎𝑡 ∙?̅?≤𝑘 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑠
𝜏   
           ∀ 𝑎, 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑖,̅ 𝑗,̅ 𝑘, ?̅?, 𝜏, ?̅? = 𝑠 − 1  (21) 
∑ 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑠
𝜏
𝑘 = 1                ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑠     (22) 
𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑠
𝜏 ≥ 0        ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝜏, 𝑘, 𝑠     (23) 
𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑠
𝜏  ∈ (0,1)       ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝜏, 𝑘, 𝑠     (24) 
Figure 6-1 describes the main steps of the heuristic. As shown in the figure, the 
methodology consists of two main steps that are solved sequentially. In the first step, the 
dynamic SO problem is solved following the simulation-based assignment methodology 
described in (Peeta & Mahmassani, 1995). At each iteration, the following steps are 
implemented: (1) computing the time-varying link marginal travel time for all links in the 
network; (2) determining the time-dependent least marginal travel time path for all OD 
pairs and departure time intervals; (3) performing all-or-nothing traffic assignments using 
the optimal paths obtained in step (2); (4) applying the method of successive averages to 
update the time-varying path flows; and (5) checking for convergence by examining a pre-
defined stopping criteria. The solution to the dynamic SO traffic assignment problem gives 
the time-varying path flows and their corresponding link flows 𝑦𝑎
𝑡 ∀ 𝑎, 𝑡. The solution also 
gives the list of paths connecting each OD pair at each departure time interval. These paths 
are sorted in an ascending order based on their travel time values.    
As mentioned earlier, the driver performance classes are set with high resolution 
such that the number of drivers belonging to any one class is much less than the capacity 
of roadway links. Thus, a link is not saturated by assigning the demand of one driver class 
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of any OD pair and departure time interval.  Given this assumption, the second step 
implements an all-or-nothing traffic assignment procedure to sequentially assign the 
demand of each class for all departure time intervals. Driver classes are assigned to paths 
such that the resulting flow pattern is as close as possible to the dynamic SO one. As shown 
in the figure, for the first departure time interval (𝜏 = 1) in the time horizon and for a 
randomly selected OD pair, 𝑖 − 𝑗, the heuristic assigns the driver class with the highest 
performance (𝑠 = 1) to the SO path 𝑘 with the least travel time (i.e., the first path in the 
SO paths list). The heuristic determines the residual flow, 𝑟𝑘
𝜏𝑖𝑗
, for path 𝑘 by checking the 
difference 𝑟𝑎
𝑡 = 𝑦𝑎
𝑡 −  𝑥𝑎
𝑡   ∀ 𝑎, 𝑡. If the difference 𝑟𝑎
𝑡 is less than or equal to zero for any of 
the links of path 𝑘, this path is eliminated from the paths list of the departure time interval 
𝜏 and the OD pair 𝑖 − 𝑗. The path 𝑘 is also marked as unavailable for all remaining classes. 
The list of paths is then updated for all other OD pairs, 𝑖′ − 𝑗′ ≠ 𝑖 − 𝑗. Any path 𝑘′ between 
OD pair 𝑖′ − 𝑗′ with 𝛿𝑖′𝑗′𝑘′
𝜏−𝑎𝑡 = 1 and 𝑟𝑎
𝑡 ≤ 0 is removed from the paths list of OD pair 𝑖′ −
𝑗′ and departure time interval 𝜏. The process is repeated to assign the demand of the highest 
performing driver class for all OD pairs in the current departure time interval. The process 
then proceeds to assign the next driver class, continuing until the entire demand of the 
current departure time interval is assigned. The steps are repeated for the next departure 
time interval until the end of the time horizon is reached. The output includes the values of 
𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑠
𝜏 , ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝜏, 𝑘, 𝑠, which specifies the route available for each driver class (i.e., SLEM’s 
route guidance strategy), and the resulting path assignment pattern 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑠
𝜏 , ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝜏, 𝑘, 𝑠. The 
latter is used as input to a traffic network simulation model that estimates the overall 




Figure 6-1: The steps of the solution methodology 
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6-3. Summary  
In this chapter, we present the solution methodology for the score-based law 
enforcement and traffic network management problem. Considering the problem 
complexity, a heuristic-based approach was adopted. The heuristic‘s goal is to find a near-
optimal solution for the problem by decomposing the problem into two sequential sub-
problems. The first problem obtains the SO traffic flow pattern in the network which 
provides the time-varying path flows and their corresponding link flows, where the second 
sub-problem finds the optimal score threshold score for a given driver population. These 
thresholds are then used to shift the traffic pattern from the undesirable UE to that is close 
to the SO traffic pattern.  
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Chapter 7  
EXPERIMENTS, RESULTS, AND ANALYSIS 
7-1. Introduction  
In this chapter, we present the results of a set of experiments that are designed to 
evaluate SLEM performance under different operational scenario. These experiments 
illustrate how SLEM could be used to shift the traffic pattern in the network for the 
undesirable UE pattern to the SO pattern. In section 7-2, an overall description of the 
experiment design and setup is provided. Section 7-3 provides a preliminary network 
performance under the SO and UE traffic assignment to be compared as upper and lower 
bound performance benchmarks. Sections 7-4 through 7-8 provide five different 
experiments that were conducted to examine the effectiveness of SLEM’s route guidance 
strategy under different operational scenarios to measure the effect of the scoring system 
resolution, route assignment comparison, the effect of driver performance distribution, 
SLEM’s performance under different compliance scenarios, and SLEM’s performance 
under a non-recurrent incident, respectively. Finally, a summary of the results is provided 
in section 7-9. 
7-2. Testbed Network Description and Setup 
A real road network with real demand was used as a testbed network. The network 
includes about 25 miles of North Central Expressway (US-75) and parallel arterials. This 
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corridor is in Dallas, Texas. As shown in Figure 7-1, US-75 is a major commute corridor 
which links the Dallas downtown in the south to northern Dallas cities such as Richardson, 
Plano, and Allen. This corridor consists of a 4-lane per direction highway at most sections; 
however, some sections have auxiliary-lanes. Furthermore, there is an HOV lane facility 
added to its northern section which starts from the I-635 to the northern city of Allen, TX. 
A light rail line is extended along the eastern side of US-75 which serves `the Dallas-Fort 
Worth (DFW) metropolitan area. The US-75 corridor also includes an arterial network that 
connects different cities within the DFW metropolitan area. The network includes 10,000 
origin-destination (OD) pairs, 3,000 links, and 1,300 nodes with 365 signalized 
intersections.  
 The used network is in the form of a corridor network which consists of two types 
of traffic (i.e., serving two types of origin-destination pairs): a) longitudinal/main traffic 
traveling along a main direction of the corridor (i.e., NS&SN directions); and b) 
crossing/secondary traffic that cuts the corridor (short trips in EW&WE directions). Here, 
the longitudinal traffic, which represents the movement of the commuters from the north 
suburban areas to the downtown area, is the focus of our analysis. The crossing trips are 
considered background traffic to make sure we capture the right congestion level on the 
crossing arterials.  We recorded the travel time savings for (1) all travelers in the network 
(longitudinal and crossing) and (2) trips with travel distance greater than or equal to 10 
miles, representing mainly the longitudinal trips. Based on the reported results, significant 
savings were recorded for commuting traffic along the main direction of the corridor. Of 
course, one can expect these benefits to be diluted as we consider all trips in the network 




Figure 7-1: The testbed network used to evaluate SLEM’s route guidance strategy 
7-3. Preliminary Network Performance Under UE and SO Travel Patterns 
User Equilibrium and System Optimal traffic assignments were performed on the 
US-75 network before conducting the set of experiments in order to check the convergence 
rates and the final objective functions for both algorithms. Figure 7-2 shows the 
convergence pattern of both UE and SO solution algorithms as the SO paths are used in the 
next steps of the solution algorithm. Furthermore, the value of the objective function 
resulting from SO and UE are compared against the objective function values generated by 
the heuristic.  
We envision the SLEM system as an operational planning tool that runs ahead of a 
peak period to plan the route guidance strategy for that period. As discussed earlier, the 
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SLEM algorithm is executed in two main steps: the first step determines a System Optimal 
traffic assignment pattern and the second step executes the SLEM route guidance 
development. Using the Dell server machine (model PET636) equipped with 256 GB RAM 
and two Xeon processors, each with 22 cores and 2.2 GHz, the first step is executed in less 
than a minute while the second step is executed in 56 minutes for the 100 classes, which 
would increase as the number of classes increases. Thus, the current computation time is 
around one hour for the US-75 Corridor network used in this dissertation. This execution 
time depends on two main elements: the network size (i.e., number of nodes, links, and 
number of OD pairs) and number of performance score classes. Of course, adopting SLEM 
as a real-time route guidance tool will require reducing its execution time. Strategies to 
reduce the running time include (1) adopting penalization strategies (e.g., parallelizing the 
assignment of the demand of OD pairs that are far from each other); and (2) the use of 
warm starts that are obtained based on historical implementation of the system in previous 
days with similar traffic patterns. 
 
 Several experiments are presented in this chapter which reflect different real-world 
scenarios. The network configuration and the demand data are obtained based on a sub-
area analysis that is conducted to extract the US75 Corridor network from the Dallas-Fort 
Worth regional model developed by North Central Texas Council of Government 
(NCTCOG) (See: https://www.nctcog.org). This effort was conducted as part of a previous 
project focusing on developing integrated corridor management strategies for the US75 
Corridor (Hashemi & Abdelghany, 2016). Each experiment measures the performance of 
SLEM in the traffic management given the assumed scenario. In order to measure its 
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performance, first the initial UE and SO performance are obtained as a benchmark result 
which will be referred to in the experiments’ results. 
As shown in Table 7-1, the morning peak hour between 7:00 – 8:00 AM was chosen 
to be the base time of the experiment. It is the most congested time in the network with a 
total demand of 279,809 travelers. For the UE travel assignment, the travelers used a total 
of 14,816 paths to travel within the network with an average travel time of 11.63 minutes, 
which resulted in a total travel time of 54,246.11 hours. The average travel distance and 
speed were 6.45 miles and 33.26 miles/hour respectively. The SO travel assignment on the 
other hand produced 23,912 paths in the network and, as expected, a lower average and 
total travel time of 10.88 minutes and 50,742.65 hours. The SO average travel distance 
increased to 6.59 miles and the average speed improved to 36.37 miles/hour. By comparing 
the results of UE and SO assignments, as expected, the network was found to perform 
better under the SO assignment with an overall 6.45 percent reduction in total network 
travel time. 
However, the nature of the testbed network (where arterials crossing from east to 
west are generally shorter sections) resulted in relatively short average travel distances. 
Therefore, besides reporting the total network performance, we considered reporting the 
results of the remote ODs which are at least ten miles away. Table 7-1 shows the same 
measures reported above for the remote ODs where UE generated 7,935 paths with average 
distance of 14.47 miles and average travel time and an average speed of 25.09 minutes and 
34.61 miles/hour respectively. The SO on the other hand produced a total of 13,963 paths 
with slightly longer average distance of 14.55 miles and improved average travel time and 
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speed of 22.46 minutes and 38.87 miles/hour. These results clearly show a better network 






(a) SO algorithm (b) UE algorithm 

































Table 7-1: The performance of initial UE and SO assignments during peak hour 7:00 – 
8:00 AM 
7-4. Effect of the Scoring System Resolution 
The first experiment aims to examine the performance of SLEM under different 
class resolutions. In other words, dividing the drivers within the network under multiple 
classes or categorizations which range from exceptional to very poor, based on their scores. 
The objective is to achieve a performance that is closer to the SO traffic pattern. By having 
a higher number of classes (resolution), SLEM class categorization would likely have more 
flexibility to assign drivers in a pattern that is closer to the SO due to the smaller sample 
number of drivers in each class.  
Assuming the morning peak-hour with 279,809 travelers, starting with 15 classes 
and increased to 20,50,100,200, and 500 classes. In each of these classes, an attempt to 
measure the total network travel time, as well as the average travel time, distance, and 
speed for each traveler is performed. Then, compare those results with the initial SO 
 All ODs 
 
ODs ≥ 10 Miles Apart 
 UE  SO UE 
 
SO 
Demand Volume 279,809 61,879 74,284 
Number of Paths 14,816 
 
23,912 7,935 13,963 
Average Travel Time (min) 11.63 10.88 25.09 22.46 
Average Travel Distance (miles) 6.45 6.59 14.47 14.55 
Average Travel Speed (miles/h) 33.26 36.37 34.61 38.87 
UE/SO Change 6.45 % 10.49 % 
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benchmark performance reported in Table 7-1, such that the closest total travel time to the 
initial SO travel time indicates a better result. 
Table 7-2 summarized the overall performance of the SLEM traffic assignment 
with respect to each class resolution case. An illustration of these results is also shown in 
Figure 7-3. In the first case where travelers were distributed among 15 classes, the total 
network travel time increased to 55,149.87 hours compared to the initial SO’s of 50,742.65 
hours, with an almost 8.68 percent increase which resulted in a performance that is lower 
than the UE. As a result, the average travel time, distance, and speed also increased to 
11.826 minutes, 6.67 miles, 33.88 miles/hour respectively. By increasing the resolution to 
20 classes, the total travel time improved to 53,260.49 hours, which is 4.95 percent away 
from the SO traffic pattern. The average travel time and speed were also improved to 
11.418 minutes and 35.11 miles/hour respectively. The average travel distance, on the other 
hand, slightly increased to 6.67 miles per traveler. When a higher resolution experiment of 
50 classes was conducted and compared to the 20 classes experiment, the SLEM produced 
a better result in terms of total travel time of 52,066.05 hours which is closer to the SO 
traffic pattern by 2.60 percent. Also, each of the average travel times, distance, and speed 
were improved to 11.166 minutes, 6.67 miles, 35.85 miles/hour respectively.  
While increasing the resolution resulted in a better SLEM performance, a 100-class 
resolution was conducted to measure performance. As expected, a better result was 
achieved with 50 classes, where the total travel time became 51,566.41 hours which is 1.62 
percent higher than the SO traffic pattern. A slight improvement was also observed in the 




Although the 100-class case produced reasonable results, further experiments were 
conducted to observe the behavior of change observed in the SLEM. Therefore, two more 
score resolutions were examined to test the effect of higher resolution on the performance 
of SLEM, at 200 and 500 classes. In the former, the total travel time was 51,091.97 hours 
which is only 0.69 percent higher than the SO pattern. The observed average travel time, 
distance, and speed were also improved to 10.95 minutes, 6.62 miles, 36.28 miles/hour 
respectively. In the latter case of 500 classes, an almost exact result as compared to the SO 
was achieved in all measures of performance. Total travel time was 50,836.24 hours which 
is only 0.18 percent more than the SO.  
Table 7-2: SLEM performance under different class resolution during peak hour 07:00 
AM – 08:00 AM with SO travel time of 50,742.65 hours 
 Number of Classes 
 15  20  50  100  200  500 
Total Travel Time 
(hour) 
55,149.87  53,260.49  52,066.05  51,566.41  51091.97  50836.24 
Average Travel 
Time (min) 
11.82  11.41  11.16  11.05  10.95  10.89 
Average Distance 
(miles) 
6.67  6.68  6.67  6.65  6.62  6.60 
Average Speed 
(miles/h) 
33.88  35.11  35.85  36.10  36.28  36.35 




Figure 7-3: Network performance given scoring systems having different resolutions 
7-5. Route Assignment Pattern Comparison 
This experiment aims to test the driver score relationship with the level of demand 
assuming the scores are distributed among 100 classes. Given different demand levels, the 
minimum score to access major highways was assumed to change with respect to the 
demand level, such that when demand is low the low-performance drivers would have a 
higher chance to access their preferred routes. Besides, the SO and SLEM traffic 
assignment would also have no superior performance over the UE traffic assignment. 
Figure 7-4 shows a 24-hour demand volume of the testbed network where four different 






































Figure 7-4: Network demand volume during a single-day time horizon 
An early morning hour between 01:00 AM to 02:00 AM was chosen to be the first 
time period. As shown in Figure 7-4, this is the lowest demand period in the network with 
a total of only 24,927 travelers. As expected, during such low traffic volume, the UE, SO, 
and SLEM traffic assignments had almost identical performance. A detailed result is 
presented in Table 7-3 where it shows a slightly higher number of paths in the network 
between the UE with a total of 2,517 paths and both the SO and SLEM where 2,615 paths 
were generated. As for the other performance measures, the UE traffic assignment 
performed slightly better (about 0.01%) than the SO and SLEM in terms of average travel 
time, distance, and speed at 6.82 minutes, 5.72 miles, and 50.39 miles/hour respectively. 
In terms of the remote ODs, the SO and SLEM performed slightly better than the UE with 
almost 0.18 percent improvement. For the UE, the average travel time of 15.20 minutes, 


































and SLEM traffic assignment a better performance was observed for those same metrics 
with average speed 15.17 minutes, distance of 14.37 miles, and speed of 45.85 miles/hour. 
Table 7-3: UE and SO statistics summary for late night period 01:00 AM – 02:00 AM 
 All ODs  ODs ≥ 10 Miles apart 







Demand Volume 24,927 2,468 2,503 2,503 
Number of Paths 2,517  2,615  2,615  668  711  711 
Average Travel Time (min) 6.82  6.82  6.82  15.20  15.17  15.17
Average Travel Distance (miles) 5.72  5.73  5.73  14.40  14.37  14.37
Average Travel Speed (miles/h) 50.39  50.40  50.40  56.84  56.85  56.85
UE/SO Change 0.01%    0.18%   
SLEM \SO Change   0.00%    0.00% 
As the next time period, the morning peak hour from 07:00 AM to 08:00 AM was 
chosen. Total travelers of 279,809 were traveling within the network. In Table 7-4, a 
detailed result of the performance of the UE, SO, and SLEM traffic assignments is 
presented. During such high demand, a higher number of paths is generated with a total of 
14,816 paths for the UE and 23,912 paths for both SO and SLEM traffic assignments. As 
for the average travel time, distance, and speed, the UE had 11.63 minutes, 6.44 miles, and 
33.26 miles/hour respectively. The SO traffic on the other hand generated a total of 23,912 
paths in the network and an average travel time of 10.88 minutes, as well as an average 
travel distance of 6.59 miles, and an average travel speed of 36.37 miles/hour with a total 
improvement rate of 6.46 percent compared to the UE. The SLEM traffic assignment 
generated the same 23,912 paths of the SO. As expected, it also performed better than the 
UE traffic assignment with an average travel time of 11.05 minutes, average travel distance 
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of 6.65 miles, and an average travel speed of 36.11 miles/hour. These results show that the 
performance of the SLEM was only 1.58 percent higher than the SO traffic assignment. 
While the SO traffic assignment improved the total network travel time by 6.46 percent, it 
improved the total travel time within the remote ODs by 10.49 percent. Within these remote 
ODs, the UE generated a total of 7,935 paths where both the SO and SLEM traffic 
assignment generated 13,963 paths each. In terms of other measures of performance, the 
average travel time, distance, and speed were 25.09 minutes, 14.47 miles, and 34.61 
miles/hour respectively. The SO traffic assignment had an average travel time of 22.46 
minutes, an average distance of 14.55 miles, and an average speed of 38.87 miles/hour. 
Finally, the SLEM traffic assignment recorded an average travel time of 23.23 minutes, an 
average distance of 14.55 miles, and an average speed of 38.87 miles/hour which is 3.33 
percent away from the SO traffic assignment. 
Table 7-4: UE and SO statistics summary for morning peak period 07:00 AM – 08:00 
AM 
 All ODs  ODs ≥ 10 Miles apart 







Demand Volume 279,809 61,880 74,284 74,284 
Number of Paths 14,816  23,912  23,912  7,935  13,963  13,963 
Average Travel Time (min) 11.63  10.88  11.05  25.09  22.46  23.23
Average Travel Distance (miles) 6.44  6.59  6.65  14.47  14.55  14.55
Average Travel Speed (miles/h) 33.26  36.37  36.11  34.61  38.87  38.87
UE/SO Change 6.46%    10.49%   
SLEM \SO Change   1.58%    3.33% 
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Another period examined was the lunch break hour between 12:00 PM to 13:00 
PM. During this one hour, the total number in the network was 148,703 travelers. As shown 
in Table 7-5, the UE traffic assignment produced a total of 6,371 paths within the network 
and had an average travel time of 8.46 minutes, an average distance of 6.28 miles, and an 
average speed of 44.52 miles/hour. The SO traffic assignment on the other hand improved 
the network performance under the UE traffic assignment by 2.07 percent where the 
average travel time, distance, and speed were 8.29 minutes, 6.25 miles, and 45.27 
miles/hour respectively. Additionally, the SLEM traffic assignment produced not only the 
same number of paths produced under the SO traffic assignment, but also almost identical 
overall performance with only a 0.13 percent difference, where the average travel time, 
distance, and speed were 8.29 minutes, 6.25 miles, and 45.24 miles/hour respectively. The 
remote ODs produced a better performance for the SO and SLEM traffic assignments 
compared to the UE traffic assignment, where 2,592 paths were produced in the latter 
versus 4,552 in both SO and SLEM. Under the UE traffic assignment, the average travel 
time was 17.72 minutes, distance was 14.13 miles, and speed was 47.83 miles/hour. The 
SO traffic assignment improved travel by 4.30 percent with an average travel time of 16.96 
minutes, an average distance of 14.16 miles, and an average speed of 50.08 miles/hour. 
Surprisingly, the SLEM performance was the same as the SO traffic assignment in terms 
of the average travel distance and speed of 14.16 miles and 50.08 miles/hour respectively. 
As for the travel time, the system under the SLEM had an average trip time of 17.02 




Table 7-5: UE and SO statistics summary for afternoon period 12:00 PM – 13:00 PM 
 All ODs  ODs ≥ 10 Miles apart 







Demand Volume 148,703 25,997 26,031 26,031 
Number of Paths 6,371  10,274  10,274  2,592  4,552  4,552
Average Travel Time (min) 8.46  8.29  8.29  17.72  16.96  17.02
Average Travel Distance (miles) 6.28  6.25  6.25  14.13  14.16  14.16
Average Travel Speed (miles/h) 44.52  45.27  45.24  47.83  50.08  50.08
UE/SO Change 2.07%    4.30%   
SLEM \SO Change   0.13%    0.34% 
Lastly, the evening peak hour between 17:00 PM and 18:00 PM was the second 
most congested hour with a total of 227,124 travelers. Table 7-6 illustrates the results of 
this period where the total number of paths produced under the UE traffic assignment was 
11,363 paths, while both the SO and SLEM produced 17,821 paths. Under the UE traffic 
assignment, the average travel time was 10.38 minutes, the average travel distance was 
6.52 miles, and the average travel speed was 37.71 miles/hour. The network performance 
was improved by 6.02 percent under SO traffic assignment where the average travel time, 
travel distance, and travel speed were 9.67 minutes, 6.59 miles, 40.55 miles/hour, 
respectively. Despite the high demand during this time period, the SLEM traffic 
assignment produced a remarkable performance with only 0.34 percent difference 
compared to the SO assignment. In terms of the other measures, the SLEM assignment had 
an average travel time of 9.81 minutes, average travel distance of 6.62 miles, and average 
travel speed of 40.46 miles/hour. For the remote ODs, the UE traffic assignment produced 
5,959 paths with an average travel time of 22.51 minutes, average travel distance of 14.22 
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miles, and average travel speed of 37.90 miles/hour. A significant improvement in the 
network performance was achieved under the SO traffic assignment which reached 10.34 
percent compared to the UE traffic assignment. With a total of 9,934 paths, the SO had an 
average travel time, average travel distance, and average travel speed of 20.18 minutes, 
14.35 miles, and 42.65 miles/hour respectively. The SLEM also produced a promising 
result within the remote ODs with only 0.70 percent variance from the SO. The SLEM also 
had the same number of paths as the SO and had an average travel time of 20.39 minutes, 
average travel distance of 14.45 miles, and average travel speed of 42.52 miles/hour. 
Table 7-6: UE and SO statistics summary for evening peak period 17:00 PM – 18:00 PM 
 All ODs  ODs ≥ 10 Miles apart 







Demand Volume 227,124 48,363 49,541 49,541 
Number of Paths 11,363  17,821  17,821  5,959  9,934  9,934
Average Travel Time (min) 10.38  9.76  9.81  22.51  20.18  20.39
Average Travel Distance (miles) 6.52  6.59  6.62  14.22  14.35  14.45
Average Travel Speed (miles/h) 37.71  40.55  40.46  37.90  42.65  42.52
UE/SO Change 6.02%    10.34%   
SLEM\SO Change   0.34%    0.70% 
To further investigate the score changing, two remote ODs were picked to illustrate 
the experiment in order to achieve a deeper understanding of the SLEM performance 
compared to the UE and SO. Figure 7-5 shows the map of the city of Dallas, TX, and the 
two ODs. The first OD (in red) is over 16 miles long and located on US-75 where it starts 
from the southern part of the highway near the downtown and ends up in the northern part 
of the highway in Plano, TX. The second OD (in blue) is about 13 miles long where it starts 
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from the western part of Plano, TX to the northeast part of Dallas, TX, namely the Interstate 
635 (I-635).  
 
Figure 7-5: Dallas map with the two selected ODs location 
Considering the morning peak hour between 07:00 AM and 08:00 AM and 100 
score classes, the UE, SO, and SLEM generated different paths between these two ODs 
illustrated in Figure 7-5. As shown in Figures 7-6a through 7-6f, multiple paths linked each 
of these ODs. For OD1, a total of 11 paths were generated among all three traffic patterns 
where path 1 was the lowest cost and path 11 had the highest. Figure 7-6a shows the first 
two paths between the OD, where path 1 has a length of 16.1 miles and path 2 is 16.4 miles 
 
120 
long. Both path 1 and 2 overlap the majority of their lengths on the US-75 except for the 
last small part where they differ as shown in the zoomed-in upper-left corner. Paths 3 to 5 
are shown in Figure 7-6b where they differ from the first two and are slightly longer where 
their lengths are 16.6, 17.3, and 17.2 miles respectively. Path 3 travels primarily on US-75 
where it eventually diverges toward the eastern side arterial. Both paths 4 and 5 have major 
divergences to the west side US-75 arterials. Figure 7-6c illustrates paths 6, 7, and 8, which 
have lengths of 17.5, 16.6, and 16.9 miles, respectively. Path 6 is the longest among all 11 
paths, diverging west as do both paths 4 and 5. As for 7, it has frequent link turns which 
shape the zigzag characteristics of that path. Path 8 on the other hand has the majority of 
its length on the eastern parallel arterial to the US-75. Figure 7-6d shows the last three 
paths 9, 10, and 11 which are 16.9, 17.2, and 16.9 miles long respectively. Path 9 shares 
similarities with both paths 1 and 2 where it has the majority of its links on the US-75 and 
only differs in the last few miles to the destination. Both paths 10 and 11 have major parts 
of their length on the US-75 but diverge from it on other parts. 
For OD2, a total of six different paths were generated between the origin in Plano, 
TX to the destination in northeast Dallas, TX such that path 1 is the lowest cost path and 
path 6 is the highest cost. Paths 1, 2, and 3 are shown in Figure 7-6e where their lengths 
are 12.8, 14, and 13.4 miles respectively. Path 1 has most of its length on a major arterial 
on the south direction and I-635 on the east direction. Similarly, path 2 has the southern 
direction on a minor road where it shares path 1’s eastern direction on I-635 highway. Path 
3 on the other hand does not share the characteristics of the first two paths. In fact, it is 
constructed of multiple minor and major roads. Paths 4 through 6 are illustrated in Figure 
7-6f where they are 19.9, 12.9, and 14 miles long. Path 4 has minor roads on the southern 
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direction and then the I-635 on the eastern direction. Path 5 has a different characteristic 
where it is mostly constructed of minor roads in different directions. Path 6 has the majority 
of the south direction constructed of minor roads and I-635 to the east direction.
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Origin 1–Destination1 Origin 1–Destination 1 Origin 1–Destination 1 Origin 1–Destination 1 Origin 2–Destination 2 Origin 2–Destination 2 
      
Path 1: 16.1 Miles 
 Path 2: 16.4 Miles 
Path 3: 16.6 Miles 
Path 4: 17.3 Miles 
Path 5: 17.2 Miles 
Path 6: 17.5 Miles 
Path 7: 16.6 Miles 
Path 8: 16.9 Miles 
Path 9: 16.9 Miles 
Path 10: 17.2 Miles 
Path 11: 16.9 Miles 
Path 1: 12.8 Miles 
Path 2: 14.0 Miles 
Path 3: 13.4 Miles 
Path 4: 13.9 Miles 
Path 5: 12.9 Miles 
Path 6: 14.0 Miles 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Figure 7-6: All paths generated in UE, SO, and SLEM between O1D1 and O2D2 for all analyzed departure time intervals 
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To further investigate the score, change, and how the SLEM traffic assignments 
perform compared to both UE and SO traffic assignment patterns, the results extracted of 
the two remote ODs are visualized in Figure 7-6 during each of the four time periods 
reported in Tables 7-3 through 7-6. The objective of this experiment is to observe the 
change of score and how the score reacts to the level of demand. For each OD, the UE, SO 
and the SLEM traffic assignments were compared based on the used routes and the 
percentage of assigned travelers for each path. Figure 7-7 shows the difference in the 
assignment split among all three traffic patterns for both ODs. In OD1, Figures 7-7 
illustrates the demand split of the UE, SO, and SLEM for each period evaluated, as well as 
the split of the demand among the different paths generated between each OD as show in 
Figure 7-6.  
Figures 7-7a-d illustrate the OD1 demand split over time. For the first time period 
of 01:00 AM - 02:00 AM results are as expected. As shown in Figure 7-7a, a similar split 
pattern was produced among all three traffic assignment patterns UE, SO, and SLEM in 
terms of the traffic assignment weight of each path due to the low demand level.  
When the demand is high during the 07:00 AM – 08:00 AM period as shown in 
Figure 7-7b and Table 7-7, a different split among all 8 paths are occurs. For the UE traffic 
assignment, the majority of travelers (98.44 percent) were assigned to the first path where 
the remaining 1.56 percent were assigned to the second path. As for the SO traffic 
assignment, the travelers were assigned to the first eight paths with different weights. As 
shown inTable7-7, the majority of 81.47 percent of travelers were assigned to path 1. The 
rest of (18.53 percent) were assigned as follows: 7.41 percent were assigned to path 7, 3.70 
percent were assigned to path 2, 2.78 percent were assigned to path 5, 1.85 percent were 
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assigned to path 6, and finally paths 3, 4, and 8 were each assigned 0.93 percent equally. 
The SLEM traffic pattern split of the morning peak hour has a different split where the 
majority of only 57.16 percent were assigned to path 1. The remaining 42.84 percent were 
assigned as follows: 25.44 percent were assigned to path 8, 8.32 percent were assigned to 
path 7, 4.38 were assigned to path 5, and finally paths 4 and 6 received 2.51 and 2.19 
percent respectively. As shown in Table 7-7, the scores of the SLEM traffic assignment 
were distributed as follows: path 1 was assigned to the top 15 classes 1-15, path 4 was 
assigned to score class 16, path 5 was assigned to score classes 17 and 18. Class 19 was 
assigned to path 6, the next five classes 20-24 were assigned to path 7, and the next 76 
classes 25-100 were assigned to path 8. 
Table 7-7: Demand split of OD1 during the morning peak hour 07:00 AM – 08:00 AM 
 Path Number 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11 
UE (%) 98.44  1.56  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ---- 
SO (%) 81.47  3.7  0.93  0.93  2.78  1.85  7.41  0.93  ----  ----  ---- 
SLEM (%) 57.16  ----  ----  2.51  4.38  2.19  8.32  25.44  ----  ----  ---- 
SLEM scores 1-15  ----  ----  16  17-18  19  20-24  25-100  ----  ----  ---- 
During the lunch hour period 12:00 PM – 13:00 PM, the travel demand is relatively 
low compared to the morning hour. Figure 7-7c illustrates the demand split under each of 
the three traffic patterns. First, under the UE traffic assignment the demand was split into 
two paths where 98.15 percent were assigned to path 1 and the remaining 1.85 were 
assigned to path 2. Under the SO assignment pattern, the demand was split into three paths 
which are path 1, 2, and 9 with a demand weight of 95.6 percent, 1.1 percent, and 3.3 
percent respectively. Finally, the demand under the SLEM traffic assignment was split into 
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two paths. The majority of 91.23 percent of the demand was assigned to path 1 which 
included the score classes 1 - 41. The remaining 8.77 percent of the demand was assigned 
to path 9 with the score classes from 42-100. 
The evening peak hour period from 17:00 PM to 18:00 PM is the second-highest 
congested hour to be considered. Under the UE traffic assignment, the demand was split 
into three paths. As shown in Table 7-8, the majority of demand of 97.83 percent was 
assigned to path 1 where the remaining 2.17 percent were assigned to paths 9 and 10 with 
1.45 percent and 0.72 percent respectively. Under the SO pattern, the demand was split 
into five different paths where the majority of 94.4 percent were assigned to path 1. Both 
paths 2 and 11 were assigned 1.87 percent and both paths 9 and 10 received 0.93 percent 
of the demand. The SLEM assignment generated three paths during this hour. The majority 
of 74.57 percent of demand was assigned to path 1 which includes the score classes of 1-
24. Score class 25 which weighs 1.46 percent was assigned to path 9. Finally, path 10 was 
the second busiest path under the SLEM traffic pattern with 23.97 percent of the demand, 
which included score classes 26-100.  
Table 7-8: Demand split of OD1 during the evening peak hour 17:00 PM – 18:00 PM 
 Path Number 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11 
UE (%) 97.83  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  1.45  0.72  ---- 
SO (%) 94.4  1.87  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  0.93  0.93  1.87 
SLEM (%) 74.57  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  1.46  23.97  ---- 
SLEM scores 1-24  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  25  26-100  ---- 
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The second OD to examine (OD2) has a total of 6 paths as shown in figure 7-6, and 
their detailed demand split is illustrated in figures 7-7e through 7-7h below. Choosing the 
same four demand intervals as the OD1, a similar result was obtained for the early morning 
hour between 01:00 AM to 02:00 AM where the three traffic assignment patterns were 
exactly the same and no split was observed as illustrated in Figure 7-7e.  
As expected, during the morning peak hour 07:00 AM – 08:00 AM, a demand split 
was observed within all three traffic assignment patterns as shown in Figure 7-7f and Table 
7-9. Under the UE, the traffic between this OD was split into three paths: 98.44 percent of 
travelers were assigned to path 1 and the remaining 1.56 percent were divided equally into 
path 3 and path 4, with 0.78 percent each. When the SO traffic assignment was considered, 
the demand between this OD was split into five different paths. As expected, path 1 had 
the majority of 96.28 percent of the total demand, where the remaining 3.72 percent was 
distributed equally among paths 2-5 with 0.93 percent each. Under the SLEM assignment, 
the demand between this OD was distributed among three paths. Path 1 also had the 
majority of 74.57 (score classes 1-24), which is considerably less compared to the UE and 
SO. The remaining 25.43 percent where assigned as follows: 1.46 percent (score class 25) 
was assigned to path 2 and 23.97 percent (score classes 26-100) was assigned to path 5. 
Table 7-9: Demand split of OD2 during the morning peak hour 07:00 AM – 08:00 AM 
 Path Number 
 1  2  3  4  5  6 
UE (%) 98.44  ----  0.78  0.78  ----  ---- 
SO (%) 96.28  0.93  0.93  0.93  0.93  ---- 
SLEM (%) 74.57  1.46  ----  ----  23.97  ---- 
SLEM scores 1-24  25  ----  ----  26-100  ---- 
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During the lunch hour break from 12:00 PM to 13:00 PM, the demand split between 
OD2 did not occur across all three traffic assignments. As shown in Figure 7-7g, the UE, 
SO, and the SLEM all had similar patterns where all demand was assigned to path 1, which 
indicates a low demand.  
Figure 7-7h shows the demand split pattern between OD2 during the evening peak 
hour from 17:00 PM to 18:00 PM and the detailed percentages are reported in Table 7-10. 
Under the UE traffic assignment, all travelers were assigned to path 1 and surprisingly, no 
path split was observed. When SO traffic assignment was implemented, the OD2 demand 
was split into two paths where the majority of travelers were assigned to path 1 with 99.07 
percent, and only 0.93 percent of travelers were assigned to path 6, which is the least. A 
demand split was also observed under the SLEM traffic pattern. Similar to the SO, the split 
occurred on paths 1 and 6 with the majority of travelers (91.71) percent assigned to path 1, 
which includes score classes 1-42. The remaining 8.29 percent (score classes 43-100) was 
assigned to path 6. 
Table 7-10: Demand split of OD2 during the evening peak hour 17:00 PM – 18:00 PM 
 Path Number 
 1  2  3  4  5  6 
UE (%) 100  ----  ----  ----  ----  ---- 
SO (%) 99.07  ----  ----  ----  ----  0.93 
SLEM (%) 91.71  ----  ----  ----  ----  8.29 
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 Figure 7-7: Detailed distribution of the selected remote ODs 
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7-6. Effect of Driver Performance Distribution 
In this experiment, another real-world scenario was conducted to test SLEM 
performance given different drivers’ characteristics. Figure 7-8 provides an illustration of 
the default driver distribution used in this dissertation. This data was obtained from a 
nationwide survey distributed among eligible drivers in the U.S., including all 50 states 
and the District of Columbia (Alghuson, et al., 2019). The characterization of the drivers 
was determined based on their 5-year violation history such that the more violations a 
driver received the riskier he/she becomes, and vice versa.  
 
Figure 7-8: Original scores distribution 
 Two cases were examined where each case includes three scenarios. In the first 
case, the percentage of safer drivers was increased in the network by 10, 20, and 30 percent. 
In other words, SLEM performance was examined as risky drivers became more compliant 
with traffic laws, and thus safer drivers. In the second case, the percentage of safe drivers 


















compliant with traffic laws. The total of six distributions is illustrated in Figure 7-9. The 
main objective of this experiment is to understand how SLEM can perform when extreme 
change in driving characteristics occur, and how such events can impact the travel time 
under SLEM.  
 
Figure 7-9: Scores distribution with a 10, 20, and 30 percent rate of change 
As shown in Figure 7-10, when the driver population became safer, the travel time 
was slightly worse compared to the original (base) drivers’ distribution. Surprisingly, when 
drivers were shifted toward the riskier categorization, the travel time improved compared 
to the initial SLEM distribution. In the first case where drivers became safer (when their 
rate increase by 10 percent) a worsening in total travel time was observed where it slightly 
increased by 0.01 percent from 51,566.41 hours to 51,572.39 hours. A 20 percent increase 

























Base 10 % Safer 10% Riskier 20% Safer
20% Riskier 30% Safer 30% Riskier
 
131 
total of 51,578.29 hours. When the safe drivers increased to 30 percent, the total network 
travel time increased 0.07 percent (51,604.61 hours). In case 2, when the safe drivers were 
reduced by 10 percent, the total network travel time did not change. A 20 percent reduction 
in safe drivers resulted in a 0.03 percent improvement in total network travel time which 
reached 51,552.22 hours compared to the initial SLEM total travel time of 51,566.41 hours. 
When safe drivers were reduced by 30 percent, the total network travel time was also 
reduced by 0.05 percent which is equivalent to 51,540.97 hours. A possible explanation of 
this result is that the reduction in safer drivers led to a decrease in the size of classes for 
safer drivers, which resulted in a reduced number of drivers competing for the best route, 
and thus SLEM had more freedom to distribute drivers to higher cost paths. 
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 While the total network performance is illustrated above, detailed average 
performance metrics are reported in Table 7-11. When safer and risky drivers increased by 
10, 20, and 30 percent, the average network travel time, distance, and speed were almost 
the same for both as compared to the initial SLEM at 11.05 minutes 6.65 miles, and 36.11 
miles/hour respectively. When the same metrics were applied to the remote ODs, no 
significant change was noticed in the average travel time compared to the SLEM. However, 
increasing both the safer and risky drivers by 10, 20, and 30 percent increased the average 
travel distance along all six distributions by almost 2 percent, from 14.55 minutes under 
initial SLEM to 14.84. As for the average travel speed, although no significant changes 
were observed among all six distributions, one can conclude that the increasing rate of 
risky drivers slightly increased the average speed, which could be explained by the fact 
that the punishment was more severe on more drivers, also resulting in an increase of the 
average distance. 
Table 7-11: Summary for different class distributions during the morning peak hour 
07:00 AM – 08:00 AM 
  Initial 
SLEM 
 Safer Drivers  Risky Drivers 
For all ODs  
 
+10%  +20%  +30% 
 
+10%  +20%  +30% 
Average Travel Time (minutes)  11.05 11.06  11.06  11.07 11.06  11.05  11.05 
Average Travel Distance (miles)  6.65 6.65  6.65  6.66 6.65  6.66  6.65 
Average Travel Speed (miles/h)  36.11 36.10  36.10  36.09 36.11  36.13  36.12 
For Remote ODs             
Average Travel Time (minutes)  23.23 23.25  23.24  23.26 23.24  23.24  23.23 
Average Travel Distance (miles)  14.55 14.84  14.84  14.84 14.84  14.85  14.85 
Average Travel Speed (miles/h)  38.87 38.85  38.86  38.84 38.86  38.90  38.90 
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7-7. SLEM Performance Under Different Compliance Scenarios 
Another real-world scenario is conducted in this section where a non-compliant 
behavior from certain drivers is considered. Five different ratios of non-compliance were 
considered where they ranged from as low as 5 percent (95 percent compliance rate) to a 
severe scenario of 25 percent (75 percent compliance rate). As illustrated in Figure 7-11, 
the initial total network travel time under SLEM was 51,566.41 hours and a one-percent 
non-compliance had no impact on the total travel time. When the non-compliance rate was 
increased to 5 percent, the total travel time increased by 0.78 percent to reach 51,947.57 
hours. Next, the noncompliance rate increased by 5 percent in steps of 10, 15, 20, and 25 
percent, and the total network travel time worsened to 52,264.60 hours (1.35 percent), 
52,678.13 hours (2.15 percent), 53,026.54 hours (2.83 percent), and 53,808.13 hours (4.34 
percent) respectively.  
 




































 A detailed result is reported in Table 7-12 where the impact of the different non-
compliance rates on other network performance metrics was compared. When non-
compliance rate was increased by 1, 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 percent, the average network 
travel time increased from 11.05 minutes by 0.18, 0.81, 1.45, 2.26, 2.90, and 4.43 percent 
respectively. The average network travel distance also increased from the initial 6.65 miles 
by 0.15, 0.3, 0.45, 0.75, 0.90, and 1.2 percent respectively. Similarly, the average network 
travel speed was also worsened by 0.06, 0.47, 0.91, 1.47, 1.94, and 3.07 percent 
respectively from its initial average speed of 36.11 miles/hour. While the impact on the 
whole network was not significant, the same non-compliance rates had a more significant 
impact on the remote ODs. As shown in Table 7-12, the average travel time increased from 
23.23 minutes initially by 0.22, 1.46, 2.67, 3.75, 4.95, and 7.4 percent respectively. The 
average travel distance also increased from its initial 14.55 miles by 2.13, 2.89, 3.51, 3.78, 
4.12, and 4.81 percent respectively. Finally, the average travel speed also worsened from 











Table 7-12: Results summary for non-compliance impact on network performance.  
7-8. SLEM Performance Under Non-Recurrent Incident 
In this experiment, the performance of SLEM’s route guidance strategy under non-
recurrent congestion situations is evaluated. In the morning peak hour, incidents frequently 
occur on the southbound direction upstream of the interchange with I-635, as illustrated in 
Figure 7-12. Among the 4-lanes, three different lane closure scenarios were considered: 1 
lane (25 percent), 2 lanes (50 percent), and 3 lanes (75 percent). Two cases were considered 
for each incident scenario. In the first case, SLEM’s route guidance strategy obtained for 
the no-incident scenario was applied, representing a situation in which the incident 
information was not communicated to SLEM. In the second case, the incident information 
was communicated to SLEM, which generated an updated route guidance strategy that 
captured the congestion caused by the incident. 
  Non-Compliance Rate 
For all ODs  Initial  1%  5%  10%  15%  20%  25% 
Average Travel Time (minutes)  11.05  11.07  11.14  11.21  11.3  11.37  11.54 
Average Travel Distance (miles)  6.65  6.66  6.67  6.68  6.70  6.71  6.73 
Average Travel Speed (miles/h)  36.11  36.09  35.94  35.78  35.58  35.41  35.00 
For Remote ODs               
Average Travel Time (minutes)  23.23  23.28  23.57  23.85  24.1  24.38  24.95 
Average Travel Distance (miles)  14.55  14.86  14.97  15.06  15.1  15.15  15.25 
Average Travel Speed (miles/h)  38.87  38.3  38.12  37.88  37.59  37.29  36.67 
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Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
Figure 7-12: A one-week observation map of the incident location 
Interestingly, the first case showed that no significant effect was observed in any of 
these scenarios. As shown in Figure 7-13, the total network travel time under the UE traffic 
pattern increased from 54,246.11 hours to 54,289.49, 54,393.46, and 54,603.53 hours as 
the closure rate increased from 25, to 50, and 75 percent, respectively. Under the SO traffic 
pattern, the total network travel time increased from 50,742.65 hours to 50,801.12, 
50,901.86, and 51,143.47 hours when closure rates of 25, 50, and 75 percent were applied 
respectively. Under the SLEM traffic assignment, the result unexpectedly showed trivial 
improvement in total network travel time in the 25 percent closure rate. From the initial 
total network travel time of 51,566.41 hours, the number improved by 0.11 percent under 
the single lane closure to become 51,512.01 hours. When two and three lanes were closed 
the total network travel time under the SLEM traffic pattern increased to 51,651.92 and 
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51,931.69 hours respectively. A possible explanation for the 25% closure improvement is 
that when a single lane was closed, it functioned as a meter which reduced the traffic speed 
behind it, but at the same time it greatly contributed to increasing the speed of the next 
links which also could be a major part of other drivers’ paths who came from I-635 to 
merge onto US-75. 
 
Figure 7-13: Non-recurrent congestion impact on total network travel time 
 To take a closer look at the results, Table 7-13 shows the SLEM performance on 
the average user level. The total network performance did not significantly change as the 
25, 50, and 75 percent closures were applied. For example, the average UE travel time 
increased from 11.63 minutes initially to be 11.64, 11.66, and 11.71 minutes, respectively. 
The average UE travel distance almost did not change from the initial 6.44 where it 
increased to 6.45 miles when closure rate reached 25 and 50 percent and 6.46 miles under 
75 percent closure rate. As for the average UE travel speed, the initial 33.26 miles/hour 
decreased to 3.25, 3.19, 3.10 miles/hour as the closure rate increased respectively. Under 
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the SO traffic assignment pattern, the change in average travel time was not significant. It 
increased from the initial 10.88 minutes to 10.89, 10.91, and 10.97 minutes for each closure 
rate respectively. The average travel distance was not significantly impacted by the incident 
where it was initially 6.59 miles and increased during these three closure rates to 6.60, 6.60, 
and 6.61 miles respectively. As for the average network speed, the initial 36.37 miles/hour 
reduced to 36.35, 36.30, and 36.17 miles/hour during the three closures respectively. 
Similarly, the average network performance under the SLEM traffic pattern was also not 
significantly impacted by these closures. While the average travel time was initially 11.05 
minutes, it did not change under the 25 percent closure rate, and slightly increased to 11.08 
and 11.14 minutes when closure rates increased to 50 and 75 percent respectively. Also, 
the average travel distance was almost the same under all three closure rates compared to 
the initial 6.65 miles. As for the average travel speed, the initial 36.11 miles/hour slightly 
improved to 36.17 miles/hour under the 25 percent closure, and worsened afterward to 
36.07 and 35.96 miles/hour under the 50 and 75 percent closures. 
 While the average network performance was not significantly impacted by the 
closures, the remote ODs had greater impact. For instance, the average UE travel time 
increased from 25.09 minutes initially to 25.11, 25.15, 25.23 minutes under the 25, 50, and 
75 percent closure rates, respectively. The average UE travel distance did not change from 
the initial 14.47 miles under any of the three closure rates. As for the UE travel speed, the 
initial 34.61 miles/hour decreased to 34.60, 34.52, and 34.40 miles/hour as the closure rate 
increased to 25, 50, and 75 percent respectively. Under the SO traffic assignment, as the 
closure rates increased 25, 50, and 75 percent, the average travel time for the remote ODs 
increased from the initial 22.46 minutes to 22.48, 22.56, and 22.69 respectively. As for the 
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average travel distance, the initial 14.55 miles did not change under the 25 percent closure 
compared to both the 50 and 75 percent closures where the average distance slightly 
increased to 14.56 and 14.57 miles respectively. The average speed was reduced from the 
initial 38.87 miles/hour to 38.83, 38.72, and 38.53 miles/hour as the closure rates increased 
to 25, 50, and 75 percent respectively. Under the SLEM traffic pattern, the average remote 
travel time was initially 23.23 minutes, and as the closure rates increased by 25, 50, and 75 
percent the average travel time increased to 23.26, 23.25, and 23.81 minutes respectively. 
The average distance also increased from 14.55 miles initially, to 14.86, 14.81, and 15.06 
miles respectively. Finally, as the closure rates increased the average travel speed 




Table 7-13: Performance of SLEM under different non-recurrent congestion scenarios 
  Initial  25% Reduction   50% Reduction  75% Reduction 
All ODs  UE  SO  SLEM  UE  SO  SLEM  UE  SO  SLEM  UE  SO  SLEM 
Average Travel Time 
(minutes) 
 11.63  10.88  11.05  11.64  10.89  11.05  11.66  10.91  11.08  11.71  10.97  11.14 
Average Travel 
Distance (miles) 
 6.44  6.59  6.65  6.45  6.60  6.66  6.45  6.60  6.66  6.46  6.61  6.67 
Average Travel Speed 
(miles/h) 
 33.26  36.37  36.11  33.25  36.35  36.17  33.19  36.30  36.07  33.10  36.17  35.96 
UE/SO Difference  6.46%    6.44%    6.43%    6.32%   
SO/SLEM Difference    1.58%    1.47%    1.56%    1.55% 
ODs ≥ 10 Miles Apart                         
Average Travel Time 
(minutes) 
 25.09  22.46  23.23  25.11  22.48  23.26  25.15  22.56  23.25  25.23  22.69  23.81 
Average Travel 
Distance (miles) 
 14.47  14.55  14.55  14.48  14.55  14.86  14.47  14.56  14.81  14.47  14.57  15.06 
Average Travel Speed 
(miles/h) 
 34.61  38.87  38.87  34.60  38.83  38.33  34.52  38.72  38.22  34.40  38.53  37.95 
UE/SO Difference  10.49%    10.47%    10.30%    10.07%   





In the second case, Figure 7-14 shows that updating SLEM’s route guidance 
strategy to capture the effect of the incident decreased travel times to 51,510, 51,650, and 
51,930 hours, respectively compared to 51,570, 51,870, and 56,990 hours reported in the 
first case total travel time. This set of experiments illustrates the importance of generating 
route guidance strategies that are consistent with actual network conditions in order to 
alleviate the congestion associated with an incident such as that assumed in this experiment.   
 
Figure 7-14: Network performance under non-recurrent congestion scenarios 
7-9. Summary 
A set of experiments were conducted in this chapter to evaluate the performance of 
SLEM under different real-world traffic scenarios. A congested US-75 corridor in Dallas, 
TX, was used as a testbed for all experiments; and a 07:00 AM peak hour, based on real-
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to the SO traffic pattern, SLEM’s performance was significant since it was only 1.58 
percent different from the SO. Also, SLEM’s performance was noteworthy in each 
experiment conducted. The first experiment examined the effect of increasing score 
classes’ resolution on the performance of SLEM. The second experiment observed the 
score change over a 24-hour horizon and compared the demand split across the UE, SO, 
and SLEM between two different ODs. Different driver distributions were also examined 
in the third experiment where it tested the performance of SLEM when the risky/safe driver 
population was slightly increased. Experiment 4 examined the scenario where some drivers 
did not comply with the score law, considering four different non-compliance rates ranging 
from perfect compliance up to 25 percent non-compliance. The last experiment considered 
a non-recurrent congestion scenario located at a well-studied location in the network. Out 
of the freeway’s 4-lanes, different congestion severity levels were considered ranging from 













Chapter 8  
DISCUSSION 
8-1. Introduction  
This chapter discusses the results presented in this dissertation. Different remarks 
introduced in the results from the survey and the experiments need to be highlighted in 
order to achieve successful deployment for SLEM. The remainder of this chapter contains 
these sections. Section 8-2 reviews the policy implications of SLEM where some 
recommendations are provided to be considered for successful SLEM deployment. The 
research limitations are then introduced in Section 8-3, followed by the conclusion in 
Section 8-4.  
8-2. Implementation Issues and Policy Implications 
SLEM ensures enforcement through its continuous monitoring of travelers' driving 
performance. For example, if a driver does not follow the recommended route guidance 
and decides to use a route that is not eligible to use, the score of this driver is expected to 
worsen. In addition, the system could apply different weights depending on the severity of 
the detected traffic violations (e.g., red light crossing, tailgating, speeding, etc.). Drivers 
with worse scores could be identified and issued tickets or even arrested.  Furthermore, as 
the system can identify these violating drivers, a police vehicle could be dispatched to 
fine/arrest this driver if his/her record shows severe violations. Finally, SLEM could 
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enhance the overall compliance over time by prioritizing incentives over punishment to 
violators to help them improve their driving performance.  
Besides driving performance, the score could extend to incorporate other factors, 
such as the overall health of the vehicles and the level of emission of the vehicles as an 
incentive for drivers to maintain their vehicles to meet the minimum legal requirements, as 
well as to accelerate the adoption of low/zero emission vehicles. Other incentives offered 
for drivers to accelerate their scores could include not only traffic law compliance, but also 
other driving behavior change, such as a reduction in average miles traveled during peak 
and off-peak periods, and the number of previous trips the driver made by public transit or 
non-motorized vehicles. For example, maintaining the vehicle, reducing miles traveled 
during the peak period, or reducing dependence on the private car could help a driver 
improve her/his score.  
As discussed earlier, effort focusing on adopting CV technology in law-
enforcement applications is developing at a fast pace.  Several systems capable of tracking 
people and vehicle movements, mainly through smartphone applications, have been 
implemented around the world. An example of those systems is SAHER system in Saudi 
Arabia, which is an automated traffic management system that uses cameras and artificial 
intelligence to detect violations such as speeding, phone usage, and  seat belt usage 
noncompliance, to name a few (MOI, 2019).  These systems have proved to provide 
significant public benefits in safety (Alghnam, et al., 2017), security (Mohamed, 2019) and 
public health (Jiang, et al., 2017).  With the evolution of the CV technology, one can expect 
the development of many applications, like SLEM, to leverage this technology for 
enhancing traffic safety and mobility. There will be a debate on the trade-off between the 
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benefits of these systems and possible privacy invasion associated with their adoption. 
These debates will likely result in new laws that regulate the use of this technology to 
maximize their benefits and reduce the risk of privacy violation. 
Additionally, the SLEM’s route guidance strategy would be implemented mainly 
within major roadways in the network (i.e., freeway and major arterials). Thus, SLEM 
would not direct drivers to use secondary routes which could include sections inside 
residential neighborhoods or critical areas such as hospitals. Nonetheless, if secondary 
routes are used, SLEM would still be capable of capturing violations along such routes 
8-3. Limitations 
Several limitations need to be addressed in this dissertation. First, as discussed in 
Section 3-3, the collected data underrepresents some demographic groups, particularly 
Hispanics, African Americans, and those 60 years of age and over in this study. Obtaining 
a larger data set could cover these groups in the sample and help us obtain a better 
understanding on their perception of SLEM. Second, the driver scores were assumed based 
on the survey scores reported by the participants which might be biased (participants might 
not have revealed their number of violations). Obtaining more reliable data on the drivers’ 
performance distribution could help enhance the quality of the results. Finally, the SLEM 
framework presented in this dissertation considers a single operation period. The system 
needs to be extended to consider the day-to-day dynamics in terms of changes in the drivers' 




This chapter highlights the policy implication and limitations of the survey and 
experiments presented in previous section. Several limitations were highlighted regarding 
the survey study which involved some demographics bias and/or misrepresentation, as well 
as some experimental assumptions which were adopted from the survey results. Also, 
several policy implications were discussed regarding the implementation of SLEM and the 
equity issues it might raise as well as SLEM’s main function in terms of incentivizing the 





Chapter 9  
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
9-1. Introduction  
This dissertation introduces a novel score-based traffic law-enforcement and 
network management system (SLEM). The system assigns a real-time score for each driver 
that reflects their driving performance over time. Different from current systems that issue 
tickets to violating drivers, the proposed system adopts a mechanism to reward high-
performing drivers and penalize low-performing drivers. The mechanism is in the form of 
a route guidance system that restricts low-score drivers from accessing certain roadway 
segments that are strategically selected in the network. High-score drivers are rewarded by 
experiencing less congestion and a higher level of safety on these roadway segments, while 
low-score drivers are directed to use alternative routes. This route guidance strategy is 
designed such that it shifts the traffic flow pattern in the network from the undesirable user 
equilibrium (UE) pattern to the system optimal (SO) pattern. As such, SLEM aims to 
simultaneously achieve two objectives: 1) promote safe driving by incentivizing drivers to 
achieve high scores that enable them to access superior routes in the network and 2) 
alleviate traffic congestion by achieving a more efficient traffic distribution pattern within 
the network.  
To measure public acceptance of SLEM, a nationwide survey study was conducted. 
The results showed about 65 percent of the survey participants supported the 
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implementation of SLEM in the real world. Traffic operation and safety experts supported 
the concept at a rate of about 60 percent. Participants reported that their main reason for 
that support was an expected increase in roadway safety and reduction in traffic congestion. 
On the other hand, participants who did not support the new system indicated that concerns 
about privacy violations were their main reason for not accepting the system. Several 
logistic regression models were developed to examine the main variables that affect public 
acceptance. In general, drivers with higher income and those with children were supportive 
of the new system. In addition, drivers who (a) reported congestion as a commuting 
problem, (b) indicated that they are familiar with the CV technology, or (c) agreed that 
license suspension is an effective punishment were also highly supportive of the new 
system. 
 Furthermore, SLEM was formulated in the form of a bi-level mathematical 
program. The upper-level problem determines the optimal score threshold for each route, 
while the lower-level problem captures the drivers' route choice behavior in response to 
the thresholds determined in the upper-level problem. The objective function minimizes 
total travel time, i.e., the sum of the travel times of all vehicles in the network. 
 To measure its effectiveness, a set of experiments was designed and conducted to 
evaluate the performance of SLEM under different real-world traffic scenarios. A 
congested US-75 corridor in Dallas, TX, was used as a testbed for all experiments, and a 
07:00 AM - 08:00 AM peak hour based on real-world data and 100 score classes was 
considered throughout the experiments. Compared to the SO traffic pattern, SLEM’s 
performance was acceptable since it was only 1.58 percent different from the SO. Also, 
SLEM’s performance was shown to improve the network performance considering all 
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tested scenarios. In the first experiment, increasing score classes’ resolution improved the 
performance of SLEM from 8.68 percent over the SO at 15 classes to only 0.18 percent at 
500 classes. The second experiment showed the score change over a 24-hour horizon where 
at low demand the UE, SO, and SLEM had similar single paths; and where demand 
increased, a multi-path split was captured among these three traffic assignment patterns. 
Different driver distributions were also examined in the third experiment, showing that 
SLEM performed better when the ‘risky’ driver population was slightly increased. The 
fourth experiment examined the scenario where some drivers did not comply with the score 
law. Four different non-compliance rates were considered from 1 percent to 25 percent, 
and SLEM showed an excellent recovery from such disturbances in terms of network 
performance, where the average travel time increased from the initial SO by only 0.29 
minutes (4.43 percent) at the 25 percent non-compliance rate. The last experiment 
considered a non-recurrent congestion located at a well-studied location in the network. 
Among the 4-lanes, different congestion levels of 25 percent, 50 percent, and 75 percent 
were considered by shutting 1, 2, and 3 lanes. The results show the network performance 
under the most severe congestion rate of 75 percent is affected by less than one percent 
travel time delay under SLEM. 
9-2. Further Research Directions 
Different research extensions could be considered for this research.  
First, expanding the modeling framework to consider the day-to-day operation of 
the traffic network is one possible extension. The framework would capture the change in 
the drivers’ behavior from day to day and the corresponding change in the route scores.  
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For real-world day-to-day operation, we envision SLEM to be implemented 
according to the following logic, which is repeated a few hours before the start of the period 
of interest (e.g., the night before a morning rush hour). First, the driving performance data 
collected over a past period (i.e., one day to a week period) is collected and analyzed using 
the deployed telematics system. Second, SLEM analyzes these data and allocates a score 
for each driver depending on her/his performance in this past period. Third, a SLEM route 
guidance strategy is derived using the methodology described in Section 6-2.  Fourth, the 
available routes for each score class are published to allow the drivers to select from the 
eligible routes. Finally, as drivers make their trips, data on their driving performances are 
again collected to be reflected in their scores for the next trips. 
Second, considering the limited resources for this study, the sample size used in the 
acceptance survey was limited to 1418 participants. While this sample provided adequate 
insight on the overall public perception, extending the sample size is expected to provide 
more detailed information on the acceptance of SLEM for different demographics, ages, 
locations, etc. 
Third, in this study, we considered SLEM as the only deployed demand 
management strategy in the network. One could extend the analysis presented in this 
dissertation to examine the performance of SLEM considering the implementation of other 
strategies (e.g., congestion pricing). Determining the synergy and conflict between SLEM 
and other strategies widely adopted in congested urban areas would be another possible 
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The survey used for this study 
Consent 
Consent to Participate in a Web-Based Online Survey   You are invited to participate in a 
survey to provide data for a study focusing on a new traffic management technology. 
This study is conducted by the Transportation Research Laboratory (TRL) at Southern 
Methodist University in Dallas, Texas.  
The purpose of this study is to understand and measure the public’s acceptance of a novel 
traffic management technology and its support of the technology's implementation. This 
survey includes 31 questions and a short video. Completing the survey will take 
approximately nine minutes. We truly value your participation in this survey. 
There are no known risks if you decide to participate. The information you provide will 
be used to understand how commuters respond to the proposed technology. The collected 
data provides useful information and suggestions to the transportation agencies, 
researchers and policy makers. Upon your request, we will be glad to provide you a 
summary of the results from this survey. 
There is no cost to you for taking part in this study and your participation is completely 
voluntary. If you agree to take the survey and for any reason decided to withdraw, you 
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can simply close the browser window. Deciding not to be in the study will not result in 
any penalty. 
This survey is completely anonymous and no private information will be asked. Only two 
people will have access to the data during the collection period. This survey assures your 
privacy and no person will have the ability to identify you. No one will know whether or 
not you participated. 
This survey has been reviewed by the Southern Methodist University’s Institutional 
Review Board (IRB). If you have concerns or questions about this study, please contact 
Dr. Khaled Abdelghany, at (214) 768-4309, khaled@lyle.smu.edu, or Moahd Alghuson, 
at (214) 768-3024, malghuson@smu.edu 
If you have questions about your rights as a participant or feel you have been placed at 
risk, you may contact: 
 
Austin Baldwin, Ph.D., IRB Chair 
  researchcomplaince@smu.edu 
  214-768-2033 
  
 DO YOU CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS SURVEY? 
o Yes, I consent  (1)  




Q1 IN THE LAST THREE YEARS, HAVE YOU CARRIED A VALID DRIVER 
LICENSE IN THE UNITED STATES? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
Q2 HOW LONG HAVE YOU HAD A DRIVER LICENSE? 
o Less than 1 year  (1)  
o 1 - 3 years  (2)  
o 4 - 6 years  (3)  
o 7 - 10 years  (4)  
o 11 - 15 years  (5)  
o 16 - 20 years  (6)  









Q3 ON AVERAGE, HOW MANY DAYS A WEEK DO YOU COMMUTE? 
o Less than one day  (1)  
o One day  (8)  
o Two days  (9)  
o Three days  (10)  
o Four days  (11)  
o Five days  (12)  
o More than five days  (13)  
 
Q4 ON AVERAGE, HOW LONG IS YOUR DAILY COMMUTE? 
o Less than 5 miles  (1)  
o 5 - 9 miles  (2)  
o 10 - 14 miles  (3)  
o 15 - 24 miles  (4)  
o 25 - 39 miles  (5)  
o 40 - 59  miles  (6)  
o 60 - 79  miles  (8)  




Q5 IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS, HOW MANY MAJOR AND MINOR TRAFFIC 
ACCIDENTS HAVE YOU BEEN INVOLVED IN AS A DRIVER?  
o None  
o One 
o Two  
o Three   
o More than three accidents   
 
Q6 IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS, HOW MANY TRAFFIC TICKETS HAVE YOU 
RECEIVED? 
o None  (1)  
o One  (2)  
o Two  (3)  
o Three  (4)  








Q7 HOW DO YOU USUALLY COMMUTE TO WORK/SCHOOL? 
o Drive alone  (1)  
o Carpool  (2)  
o Public transportation  (3)  
o Other  (4)  
 
Q8 DO YOU CURRENTLY HAVE POINTS ON YOUR DRIVER LICENSE? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
Q9 PLEASE CHOOSE ALL TRAFFIC LAW VIOLATIONS THAT APPLY TO YOU, 
IF ANY. 
▢ Speeding  (2)  
▢ Running a red light  (3)  
▢ Running a stop sign  (4)  
▢ Reckless driving  (5)  
▢ Tailgating  (18)  
▢ Distracted driving  (6)  
▢ Driving without valid documentation  (7)  
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▢ No signaling  (8)  
▢ Crossing solid lines  (9)  
▢ Driving under the influence (DUI)  (10)  
▢ Failure to stop for school bus  (1)  
▢ Not wearing a seat belt  (12)  
▢ Parking in handicapped space  (13)  
▢ Wrong parking  (15)  
▢ Missing child seat  (14)  
▢ Other  (11)  
 
Q10 HOW MUCH DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING 
STATEMENT? 
TRAFFIC CONGESTION IS A COMMUTE PROBLEM I EXPERIENCE.  
o Strongly agree  (6)  
o Somewhat agree  (8)  
o Neutral  (9)  
o Somewhat disagree  (10)  




Q11 IF YOU ARE RECEIVING INCENTIVES TO HELP REDUCE CONGESTION, 
WOULD YOU BE INTERESTED IN CHANGING YOUR COMMUTING ROUTINE? 
o Definitely yes   
o Probably yes   
o Might or might not   
o Probably not   
o Definitely not   
 
Q12WHAT ACTIONS WOULD YOU TAKE TO AVOID TRAFFIC CONGESTION? 
 Extremely likely  Somewhat likely  Neither likely nor unlikely  Somewhat 
unlikely  Extremely unlikely 
Change departure time   o  o  o  o  o  
Change route                  o  o  o  o  o  
Change travel mode     o  o  o  o  o  
Carpool                          o  o  o  o  o  
Telecommuting     o  o  o  o  o  





Q13 WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING INCENTIVES WOULD MOTIVATE YOU TO 
CHANGE YOUR TRAVEL HABITS TO REDUCE TRAFFIC CONGESTION? 
 Strongly agree   Somewhat agree   Neutral   Somewhat disagree   Strongly 
disagree  
Insurance discount   o  o  o  o  o  
Express lane access  o  o  o  o  o  
discounted parking     o  o  o  o  o  
Free/discounted tolls  o  o  o  o  o  
Discounted driver license renewal   o  o  o  o 
 o  
Monetary reward  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Q14 DO YOU THINK DRIVING IS A RIGHT OR A PRIVILEGE? 
o Driving is a right   
o Driving is a privilege    






Q15 DO YOU THINK IT IS GENERALLY A GOOD IDEA TO SUSPEND THE 
DRIVING LICENSES OF CERTAIN DRIVERS? 
o Strongly agree   
o Somewhat agree   
o Neutral    
o Somewhat disagree   
o Strongly disagree   
 
Q16 HAVE YOU HEARD ABOUT CONNECTED VEHICLES TECHNOLOGY? 
o Yes   
o No   
 
Q17 CONNECTED VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY ALLOWS THE RECORDING OF 
REAL-TIME DATA ON VEHICLE MOVEMENT AND DRIVER PERFORMANCE. 
DRIVERS COULD RECEIVE SCORES BASED ON THEIR DRIVING 
PERFORMANCE. CONSIDER A TRAFFIC CONTROL STRATEGY THAT 
PROVIDES DRIVERS ACCESS TO MAJOR HIGHWAYS BASED ON THEIR 
DRIVING PERFORMANCE SCORES. FOR EXAMPLE, LOW-PERFORMING 
DRIVERS COULD BE PROHIBITED FROM USING CERTAIN HIGHWAYS AT 
CERTAIN TIME PERIODS.    FOR MORE INFO, PLEASE WATCH THE 




Q18 PLEASE RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ABOUT THIS 
TECHNOLOGY. 
 Strongly agree   Somewhat agree  Neither agree nor disagree  Somewhat disagree
 Strongly disagree 
IT WILL MAKE MY TRAVEL SAFER  o  o  o 
 o  o  
IT IS FAIR FOR ALL DRIVERS   o  o  o  o 
 o  
IT WILL HELP ME IMPROVE MY DRIVING PERFORMANCE.   o 
 o  o  o  o  
 
 
Q19 IF THIS TECHNOLOGY WERE DEPLOYED TODAY, WHAT WOULD YOUR 
DRIVING SCORE BE? 
o Excellent   
o Very good   
o Good   
o Fair   




Q20 WOULD YOU SUPPORT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THIS TECHNOLOGY? 
o Definitely yes   
o Probably yes   
o Probably not   
o Definitely not   
 
Q21 WHY WOULDN'T YOU SUPPORT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THIS 
TECHNOLOGY? 
▢ Privacy Concern   
▢ Limit of route access   
▢ It is impossible to be deployed   
▢ Other   
 
Q22 WHY WOULD YOU SUPPORT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THIS 
TECHNOLOGY? 
▢ Safety enhancement   
▢ Faster commute   
▢ Fairness (justice) among drivers   
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▢ Other   
 
Q23 WHAT IS YOUR GENDER? 
o Male   
o Female   
o Other   
 
Q24 WHAT IS YOUR AGE GROUP? 
o Under 16 years   
o 16-20 years   
o 21-24 years   
o 25-29 years   
o 30-34 years   
o 35-39 years   
o 40-49 years   
o 50-60 years   





Q25 WHAT IS YOUR RACE/ETHNICITY? 
o White   
o Hispanic or Latino   
o Black or African American    
o Asian   
o American Indian or Alaska native   
o Middle Eastern or North African   
o Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander   
o Other race or ethnicity   
 
Q26 WHAT IS YOUR CURRENT MARITAL STATUS? 
o Single, never married    
o Married or in a domestic partnership   
o Divorced    
o Widowed    






Q27 HOW MANY CHILDREN DO YOU HAVE?  
o Zero, I have no children   
o One child   
o Two children    
o Three children    
o More than three children   
 
Q28 WHAT IS YOUR HIGHEST ACHIEVED LEVEL OF EDUCATION? 
o Did not complete high school    
o High school diploma   
o Some college   
o Bachelor's degree    
o Master's degree   
o Doctoral degree   
 
Q29 WHAT IS YOUR CURRENT EMPLOYMENT STATUS? 
o Employed full time (40 or more hours per week)   
o Employed part time (up to 39 hours per week)   
o Unemployed looking for work   
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o Unemployed not looking for work   
o Retired   
o Student   
o Disabled    
o Other    
 
Q30 WHAT IS YOUR HOUSEHOLD INCOME? 
o Less than $10,000    
o $10,000 - $19,999   
o $20,000 - $29,999   
o $30,000 - $39,999   
o $40,000 - $49,999   
o $50,000 - $59,999   
o $60,000 - $69,999   
o $70,000 - $79,999   
o $80,000 - $89,999    
o $90,000 - $99,999   
o $100,000 - $149,999   




Q31 DO YOU LIVE AND/OR WORK IN AN URBAN AREA? 
o Yes   
o No   
 






















95% CI z value P-Value 
Driving experience   
(reference =  less than 4 years) 
    
 
4 - 10 years -0.71 0.49 (-1.23 , -
0.21) 
-2.72 0.01 
11 - 20 years -0.84 0.43 (-1.39 , -
0.32) 
-3.11 0.00 
More than 20 years -0.74 0.48 (-1.3 , -0.2) -2.63 0.01 
Weekly commuting [days] 0.07 1.07 (0.01 , 0.14) 2.13 0.03 
Number of tickets [last 5 years] 0.17 1.19 (-0.01 , 
0.36) 
1.85 0.06 
Points on DL  (reference =  no)      
Yes 0.37 1.44 (-0.08 , 
0.83) 
1.58 0.11 
Congestion is a Commute Problem 
(reference= strongly disagree) 
     
Somewhat disagree 0.44 1.55 (-0.12 , 1) 1.55 0.12 
Neutral 0.74 2.09 (0.15 , 1.33) 2.46 0.01 
Somewhat agree 0.63 1.89 (0.17 , 1.1) 2.69 0.01 
Strongly agree 0.39 1.47 (-0.08 , 
0.85) 
1.62 0.11 
Willingness to change commuting routine  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely 0.28 1.33 (-0.84 , 
1.44) 
0.49 0.62 
Neutral 0.12 1.13 (-0.9 , 1.19) 0.24 0.81 
Somewhat likely 0.64 1.89 (-0.39 , 1.7) 1.21 0.23 
Extremely likely 1.02 2.77 (-0.01 , 
2.09) 
1.92 0.05 
Change travel time  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely 0 1 (-0.7 , 0.69) 0 1 
Neutral 0.88 2.41 (0.06 , 1.71) 2.11 0.03 
Somewhat likely 0.38 1.46 (-0.27 , 
1.01) 
1.16 0.25 




(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely 0.6 1.83 (-0.35 , 
1.56) 
1.24 0.21 
Neutral -0.14 0.87 (-1.11 , 
0.83) 
-0.28 0.78 
Somewhat likely 0.16 1.18 (-0.69 , 
1.01) 
0.38 0.7 
Extremely likely -0.14 0.87 (-1 , 0.72) -0.31 0.76 
Carpool  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely 0.21 1.24 (-0.15 , 
0.58) 
1.14 0.25 
Neutral 0.82 2.27 (0.38 , 1.27) 3.66 0.00 
Somewhat likely 0.36 1.44 (-0.02 , 
0.74) 
1.88 0.06 
Extremely likely 0.19 1.21 (-0.31 , 0.7) 0.75 0.45 
Free \ Discounted parking  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely 0.85 2.34 (0.04 , 1.68) 2.05 0.04 
Neutral 0.96 2.62 (0.3 , 1.65) 2.82 0.00 
Somewhat likely 0.86 2.36 (0.2 , 1.53) 2.54 0.01 
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Extremely likely 0.96 2.61 (0.29 , 1.65) 2.79 0.01 
Free \ Discounted tolls  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely -1.02 0.36 (-1.91 , -
0.13) 
-2.24 0.03 
Neutral -0.73 0.48 (-1.5 , 0.01) -1.9 0.06 
Somewhat likely -0.22 0.8 (-0.98 , 
0.51) 
-0.59 0.56 
Extremely likely -0.24 0.78 (-1.02 , 
0.51) 
-0.62 0.53 
DL suspension as punishment 
(reference=strongly disagree) 
     
Somewhat disagree 0.64 1.9 (-0.82 , 
2.13) 
0.86 0.39 
Neutral 0.98 2.66 (-0.32 , 
2.32) 
1.46 0.14 
Somewhat agree 1.04 2.84 (-0.16 , 2.3) 1.67 0.09 
Strongly agree 1.42 4.13 (0.22 , 2.67) 2.29 0.02 
Connected vehicles familiarity  
(reference =  no) 
     
Yes 0.3 1.35 (0 , 0.6) 1.97 0.05 
Expected Score  (reference=Excellent)      
Poor -3.16 0.04 (-6.26 , -
0.83) 
-2.53 0.01 
Fair -1.58 0.21 (-2.36 , -
0.81) 
-4.01 0.00 
Good  -1.18 0.31 (-1.56 , -0.8) -6.12 0.00 
Very good -0.73 0.48 (-1.05 , -
0.42) 
-4.58 0.00 
Marital Status (reference=Divorced)      
Married -0.09 0.91 (-0.69 , 
0.49) 
-0.31 0.76 
Separated 0.96 2.61 (-0.44 , 2.6) 1.27 0.2 
Single -0.48 0.62 (-1.12 , 
0.14) 
-1.5 0.13 
Widowed 0.69 2 (-0.75 , 
2.37) 
0.89 0.37 
Number of children [years] 0.11 1.11 (-0.03 , 
0.25) 
1.54 0.12 
Household income (reference = < $50,000)      
$50,000 - $99,999 0.25 1.28 (-0.04 , 
0.54) 
1.68 0.09 
$100,000 - $150,000 0.58 1.79 (0.16 , 1.01) 2.7 0.01 
> $150,000 0.74 2.09 (0.28 , 1.21) 3.09 0.00 
Outcome levels      
Support | Do not Support      
McFadden's R2 0.18     
Nagelkerke R2 0.26     
Log-likelihood -770.27     
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 1644.55     














95% CI z value P-Value 
Driving experience   
(reference =  less than 4 years) 
    
 
4 - 10 years -0.69 0.5 (-1.24, -0.16) -2.52 0.01 
11 - 20 years -0.86 0.42 (-1.48 , -0.26) -2.75 0.01 
More than 20 years -0.86 0.42 (-1.59 , -0.15) -2.34 0.02 
Weekly commuting [days] 0.01 1.01 (-0.07 , 0.1) 0.34 0.73 
Commute Distance  
(reference =  Less than 5 miles  ) 
     
5 - 9 miles -0.21 0.81 (-0.63 , 0.2) -1.01 0.31 
10 - 14 miles  0.11 1.12 (-0.31 , 0.53) 0.52 0.6 
15 - 24 miles   0.26 1.3 (-0.17 , 0.7) 1.19 0.24 
25 - 39 miles   0.13 1.14 (-0.39 , 0.66) 0.5 0.62 
40 - 59  miles   -0.18 0.83 (-0.86 , 0.51) -0.52 0.61 
60 - 79  miles   -0.17 0.84 (-1.24 , 0.91) -0.32 0.75 
More than 80 miles   0.97 2.64 (-0.29 , 2.56) 1.37 0.17 
Number of accidents [last 5 years] 0.03 1.03 (-0.16 , 0.23) 0.32 0.75 
Number of tickets [last 5 years] 0.19 1.2 (-0.01 , 0.39) 1.83 0.07 
Points on DL  (reference =  no)      
Yes 0.41 1.51 (-0.05 , 0.9) 1.71 0.09 
Congestion is a Commute Problem 
(reference= strongly disagree) 
     
Somewhat disagree 0.48 1.62 (-0.1 , 1.07) 1.62 0.1 
Neutral 0.77 2.17 (0.15 , 1.41) 2.42 0.02 
Somewhat agree 0.67 1.95 (0.16 , 1.17) 2.6 0.01 
Strongly agree 0.36 1.43 (-0.16 , 0.87) 1.37 0.17 
Willingness to change commuting routine  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely 0.33 1.4 (-0.85 , 1.56) 0.55 0.58 
Neutral 0.27 1.31 (-0.84 , 1.42) 0.47 0.64 
Somewhat likely 0.67 1.95 (-0.44 , 1.82) 1.17 0.24 
Extremely likely 1.01 2.76 (-0.1 , 2.18) 1.76 0.08 
Change travel time  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely 0.14 1.15 (-0.58 , 0.85) 0.38 0.71 
Neutral 1.01 2.74 (0.17 , 1.85) 2.35 0.02 
Somewhat likely 0.49 1.64 (-0.16 , 1.14) 1.49 0.14 
Extremely likely 0.38 1.46 (-0.29 , 1.04) 1.11 0.27 
Change mode 
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely -0.04 0.96 (-0.48 , 0.4) -0.16 0.87 
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Neutral -0.11 0.89 (-0.59 , 0.37) -0.46 0.65 
Somewhat likely -0.09 0.92 (-0.55 , 0.37) -0.37 0.71 
Extremely likely -0.3 0.74 (-0.88 , 0.28) -1.01 0.31 
Carpool  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely 0.35 1.41 (-0.07 , 0.76) 1.64 0.1 
Neutral 0.89 2.43 (0.41 , 1.38) 3.6 0 
Somewhat likely 0.42 1.51 (-0.02 , 0.85) 1.87 0.06 
Extremely likely 0.3 1.35 (-0.28 , 0.88) 1.01 0.31 
Telecommuting 
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely -0.34 0.71 (-0.85 , 0.16) -1.33 0.18 
Neutral -0.03 0.97 (-0.52 , 0.45) -0.14 0.89 
Somewhat likely -0.07 0.93 (-0.54 , 0.39) -0.31 0.76 
Extremely likely -0.36 0.7 (-0.8 , 0.08) -1.59 0.11 
Do nothing 
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely -0.11 0.9 (-0.56 , 0.35) -0.45 0.65 
Neutral -0.22 0.8 (-0.61 , 0.17) -1.11 0.27 
Somewhat likely -0.47 0.63 (-0.92 , -0.02) -2.04 0.04 
Extremely likely 0 1 (-0.59 , 0.59) -0.01 0.99 
Discounted Insurance  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely 0.04 1.04 (-1.28 , 1.36) 0.06 0.95 
Neutral 0.22 1.25 (-1.01 , 1.44) 0.35 0.72 
Somewhat likely 0.03 1.03 (-1.15 , 1.21) 0.06 0.95 
Extremely likely 0.23 1.26 (-0.95 , 1.41) 0.39 0.7 
Express Lane Access 
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely 0.41 1.51 (-0.5 , 1.34) 0.88 0.38 
Neutral 0.41 1.51 (-0.45 , 1.29) 0.93 0.35 
Somewhat likely 0.53 1.71 (-0.31 , 1.38) 1.24 0.21 
Extremely likely 0.69 1.99 (-0.18 , 1.56) 1.56 0.12 
Free \ Discounted parking  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely 0.68 1.98 (-0.19 , 1.57) 1.53 0.13 
Neutral 0.7 2.01 (-0.02 , 1.43) 1.89 0.06 
Somewhat likely 0.69 1.98 (-0.03 , 1.41) 1.86 0.06 
Extremely likely 0.71 2.02 (-0.03 , 1.45) 1.87 0.06 
Free \ Discounted tolls  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely -0.98 0.38 (-1.96 , -0.02) -1.99 0.05 
Neutral -0.87 0.42 (-1.71 , -0.05) -2.06 0.04 
Somewhat likely -0.37 0.69 (-1.2 , 0.44) -0.87 0.38 
Extremely likely -0.49 0.61 (-1.36 , 0.34) -1.14 0.25 
Free \ Discounted DL renewal  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely 0.05 1.05 (-0.74 , 0.83) 0.12 0.91 
Neutral 0.43 1.54 (-0.3 , 1.16) 1.17 0.24 
Somewhat likely 0.5 1.66 (-0.21 , 1.21) 1.39 0.16 
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Extremely likely 0.32 1.38 (-0.41 , 1.04) 0.88 0.38 
Driving right or Privilage 
(reference= not sure) 
     
      Right 0.28 1.32 (-0.31 , 0.85) 0.93 0.35 
Previlage 0.19 1.21 (-0.44 , 0.81) 0.58 0.56 
DL suspension as punishment 
(reference=strongly disagree) 
     
Somewhat disagree 0.92 2.51 (-0.62 , 2.5) 1.16 0.25 
Neutral 1.18 3.25 (-0.21 , 2.62) 1.65 0.1 
Somewhat agree 1.14 3.13 (-0.16 , 2.5) 1.7 0.09 
Strongly agree 1.54 4.67 (0.25 , 2.89) 2.3 0.02 
Connected vehicles familiarity  
(reference =  no) 
     
Yes 0.24 1.27 (-0.08 , 0.56) 1.48 0.14 
Expected Score  (reference=Excellent)      
Poor -1.52 0.22 (-2.33 , -0.71) -3.7 0 
Fair -1.15 0.32 (-1.55 , -0.76) -5.74 0 
Good  -3.36 0.03 (-6.5 , -0.96) -2.62 0.01 
Very good -0.72 0.49 (-1.05 , -0.4) -4.41 0 
Gender (reference=Male)      
Age (reference=16-24 years)      
25-39       
40-59      
≥ 60      
Marital Status (reference=Divorced)      
Married -0.04 0.96 (-0.67 , 0.56) -0.14 0.89 
Separated 0.84 2.31 (-0.61 , 2.51) 1.08 0.28 
Single -0.4 0.67 (-1.06 , 0.25) -1.19 0.24 
Widowed 0.9 2.45 (-0.62 , 2.66) 1.09 0.27 
Number of children [years] 0.12 1.13 (-0.03 , 0.27) 1.6 0.11 
Education  
(reference= Did not complete high school  ) 
     
High school diploma   
 
0.28 1.33 (-2.91 , 2.82) 0.21 0.83 
Some college   -0.28 0.76 (-3.45 , 2.21) -0.21 0.83 
Bachelor's degree    -0.19 0.83 (-3.37 , 2.3) -0.15 0.88 
Master's degree   -0.03 0.97 (-3.21 , 2.47) -0.02 0.98 
Doctoral degree   0.12 1.12 (-3.09 , 2.66) 0.09 0.93 
Employment (reference=Disabled)      
Full-time 0.2 1.22 (-1.3 , 1.61) 0.28 0.78 
Part-time -0.06 0.94 (-1.55 , 1.35) -0.08 0.94 
Other -0.42 0.66 (-2.06 , 1.16) -0.51 0.61 
Retired  0.05 1.05 (-1.65 , 1.68) 0.06 0.96 
Student 0.14 1.15 (-1.41 , 1.61) 0.19 0.85 
Unemployed (Not looking for job) -0.81 0.45 (-2.49 , 0.81) -0.97 0.33 
Unemployed (looking for job) -0.21 0.81 (-1.77 , 1.26) -0.28 0.78 
Household income (reference = < $50,000)      
$50,000 - $99,999 0.21 1.23 (-0.1 , 0.52) 1.32 0.19 
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$100,000 - $150,000 0.51 1.67 (0.07 , 0.97) 2.23 0.03 
> $150,000 0.58 1.78 (0.07 , 1.1) 2.18 0.03 
Urbanity (reference=Yes) -0.08 0.93 (-0.37 , 0.21) -0.51 0.61 
Outcome levels      


























95% CI z value P-Value 
Commute Distance  
(reference =  Less than 5 miles  ) 
     
5 - 9 miles -0.06 0.94 (-0.44 , 0.33) -0.29 0.771 
10 - 14 miles  0.2 1.22 (-0.19 , 0.59) 0.99 0.32 
15 - 24 miles   0.39 1.48 (-0.01 , 0.79) 1.93 0.054 
25 - 39 miles   0.25 1.28 (-0.23 , 0.74) 1 0.319 
40 - 59  miles   -0.06 0.94 (-0.7 , 0.6) -0.18 0.858 
60 - 79  miles   -0.18 0.84 (-1.19 , 0.87) -0.34 0.737 
More than 80 miles   1.1 3.01 (-0.13 , 2.67) 1.59 0.112 
Points on DL  (reference =  no)      
Yes 0.55 1.73 (0.11 , 1) 2.42 0.015 
Willingness to change commuting routine  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely 0.62 1.86 (-0.53 , 1.81) 1.05 0.293 
Neutral 0.51 1.66 (-0.56 , 1.61) 0.92 0.355 
Somewhat likely 0.92 2.51 (-0.15 , 2.03) 1.67 0.094 
Extremely likely 1.21 3.34 (0.13 , 2.32) 2.18 0.029 
Change travel time  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely 0.14 1.15 (-0.56 , 0.83) 0.4 0.691 
Neutral 1.02 2.78 (0.21 , 1.84) 2.47 0.014 
Somewhat likely 0.48 1.62 (-0.16 , 1.11) 1.5 0.134 
Extremely likely 0.32 1.37 (-0.34 , 0.96) 0.96 0.336 
Change mode 
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely -0.05 0.95 (-0.47 , 0.37) -0.23 0.822 
Neutral -0.12 0.88 (-0.59 , 0.34) -0.52 0.605 
Somewhat likely -0.1 0.9 (-0.55 , 0.34) -0.45 0.653 
Extremely likely -0.33 0.72 (-0.89 , 0.24) -1.14 0.256 
Carpool  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely 0.26 1.3 (-0.13 , 0.66) 1.3 0.194 
Neutral 0.89 2.43 (0.42 , 1.36) 3.72 0 
Somewhat likely 0.39 1.47 (-0.03 , 0.8) 1.82 0.069 
Extremely likely 0.18 1.2 (-0.37 , 0.74) 0.64 0.524 
Do nothing 
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely -0.04 0.96 (-0.48 , 0.41) -0.16 0.873 
Neutral -0.19 0.83 (-0.57 , 0.18) -0.99 0.322 
Somewhat likely -0.42 0.66 (-0.85 , 0.01) -1.9 0.057 
Extremely likely -0.01 0.99 (-0.57 , 0.56) -0.04 0.967 
Discounted Insurance  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
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Somewhat unlikely -0.03 0.97 (-1.31 , 1.24) -0.05 0.958 
Neutral 0.09 1.1 (-1.09 , 1.27) 0.15 0.878 
Somewhat likely -0.16 0.85 (-1.3 , 0.97) -0.28 0.777 
Extremely likely 0.08 1.08 (-1.05 , 1.21) 0.14 0.888 
Express Lane Access 
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely 0.47 1.61 (-0.41 , 1.38) 1.04 0.297 
Neutral 0.5 1.64 (-0.35 , 1.35) 1.15 0.251 
Somewhat likely 0.59 1.8 (-0.23 , 1.42) 1.4 0.16 
Extremely likely 0.72 2.06 (-0.11 , 1.57) 1.68 0.092 
Free \ Discounted parking  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely 0.69 2 (-0.15 , 1.55) 1.6 0.109 
Neutral 0.78 2.19 (0.08 , 1.49) 2.18 0.029 
Somewhat likely 0.77 2.16 (0.08 , 1.48) 2.16 0.031 
Extremely likely 0.83 2.28 (0.11 , 1.55) 2.26 0.024 
Free \ Discounted tolls  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely -0.95 0.39 (-1.89 , -0.02) -1.99 0.046 
Neutral -0.86 0.42 (-1.67 , -0.07) -2.11 0.035 
Somewhat likely -0.34 0.71 (-1.15 , 0.44) -0.85 0.395 
Extremely likely -0.47 0.62 (-1.3 , 0.33) -1.13 0.258 
Free \ Discounted DL renewal  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely -0.01 0.99 (-0.78 , 0.76) -0.02 0.987 
Neutral 0.4 1.49 (-0.32 , 1.11) 1.1 0.271 
Somewhat likely 0.45 1.56 (-0.26 , 1.14) 1.25 0.21 
Extremely likely      
DL suspension as punishment 
(reference=strongly disagree) 
     
Somewhat disagree 0.81 2.25 (-0.67 , 2.34) 1.06 0.288 
Neutral 1.12 3.07 (-0.2 , 2.5) 1.64 0.101 
Somewhat agree 1.04 2.84 (-0.18 , 2.33) 1.64 0.1 
Strongly agree 1.41 4.09 (0.2 , 2.69) 2.24 0.025 
Connected vehicles familiarity  
(reference =  no) 
     
Yes 0.22 1.25 (-0.08 , 0.53) 1.45 0.146 
Expected Score  (reference=Excellent)      
Poor -3.17 0.04 (-6.28 , -0.85) -2.53 0.011 
Fair -1.32 0.27 (-2.1 , -0.55) -3.35 0.001 
Good  -1.07 0.34 (-1.45 , -0.69) -5.5 0 
Very good -0.7 0.5 (-1.02 , -0.39) -4.36 0 
Marital Status (reference=Divorced)      
Married 0.06 1.06 (-0.55 , 0.64) 0.18 0.856 
Separated 0.88 2.4 (-0.55 , 2.54) 1.14 0.253 
Single -0.29 0.75 (-0.92 , 0.33) -0.91 0.364 
Widowed 0.96 2.62 (-0.51 , 2.67) 1.21 0.225 
Number of children [years] 0.08 1.09 (-0.05 , 0.22) 1.17 0.24 
Education  
(reference= Did not complete high school) 
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High school diploma   
 
0.12 1.13 (-3.04 , 2.6) 0.09 0.928 
Some college   -0.41 0.66 (-3.54 , 2.03) -0.32 0.747 
Bachelor's degree    -0.4 0.67 (-3.53 , 2.05) -0.31 0.755 
Master's degree   -0.21 0.81 (-3.34 , 2.25) -0.16 0.872 
Doctoral degree   -0.11 0.9 (-3.27 , 2.39) -0.08 0.933 
Employment (reference=Disabled)      
Full-time 0.27 1.31 (-1.17 , 1.62) 0.39 0.695 
Part-time 0.02 1.02 (-1.43 , 1.38) 0.03 0.976 
Other -0.34 0.71 (-1.93 , 1.19) -0.43 0.664 
Retired  0.02 1.02 (-1.54 , 1.51) 0.03 0.978 
Student 0.44 1.56 (-1.04 , 1.84) 0.62 0.538 
Unemployed (Not looking for job) -0.6 0.55 (-2.21 , 0.94) -0.75 0.451 
Unemployed (looking for job) -0.07 0.93 (-1.58 , 1.35) -0.1 0.918 
Household income (reference = < $50,000)      
$50,000 - $99,999 0.18 1.2 (-0.12 , 0.49) 1.18 0.236 
$100,000 - $150,000 0.52 1.69 (0.09 , 0.96) 2.34 0.019 
> $150,000 0.59 1.81 (0.1 , 1.1) 2.32 0.02 
Outcome levels      





















95% CI z value P-Value 
Driving experience   
(reference =  less than 4 years) 
     
4 - 10 years -0.71 0.49 (-1.23 , -0.21) -2.72 0.01 
11 - 20 years -0.84 0.43 (-1.39 , -0.32) -3.11 0 
More than 20 years -0.74 0.48 (-1.3 , -0.2) -2.63 0.01 
Weekly commuting [days] 0.07 1.07 (0.01 , 0.14) 2.13 0.03 
Number of tickets [last 5 years] 0.17 1.19 (-0.01 , 0.36) 1.85 0.06 
Points on DL  (reference =  no)      
Yes 0.37 1.44 (-0.08 , 0.83) 1.58 0.11 
Congestion is a Commute Problem 
(reference= strongly disagree) 
     
Somewhat disagree 0.44 1.55 (-0.12 , 1) 1.55 0.12 
Neutral 0.74 2.09 (0.15 , 1.33) 2.46 0.01 
Somewhat agree 0.63 1.89 (0.17 , 1.1) 2.69 0.01 
Strongly agree 0.39 1.47 (-0.08 , 0.85) 1.62 0.11 
Willingness to change commuting routine  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely 0.28 1.33 (-0.84 , 1.44) 0.49 0.62 
Neutral 0.12 1.13 (-0.9 , 1.19) 0.24 0.81 
Somewhat likely 0.64 1.89 (-0.39 , 1.7) 1.21 0.23 
Extremely likely 1.02 2.77 (-0.01 , 2.09) 1.92 0.05 
Change travel time  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely 0 1 (-0.7 , 0.69) 0 1 
Neutral 0.88 2.41 (0.06 , 1.71) 2.11 0.03 
Somewhat likely 0.38 1.46 (-0.27 , 1.01) 1.16 0.25 
Extremely likely 0.37 1.45 (-0.29 , 1.02) 1.11 0.27 
Change route 
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely 0.6 1.83 (-0.35 , 1.56) 1.24 0.21 
Neutral -0.14 0.87 (-1.11 , 0.83) -0.28 0.78 
Somewhat likely 0.16 1.18 (-0.69 , 1.01) 0.38 0.7 
Extremely likely -0.14 0.87 (-1 , 0.72) -0.31 0.76 
Carpool  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely 0.21 1.24 (-0.15 , 0.58) 1.14 0.25 
Neutral 0.82 2.27 (0.38 , 1.27) 3.66 0 
Somewhat likely 0.36 1.44 (-0.02 , 0.74) 1.88 0.06 
Extremely likely 0.19 1.21 (-0.31 , 0.7) 0.75 0.45 
Free \ Discounted parking  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely 0.85 2.34 (0.04 , 1.68) 2.05 0.04 
Neutral 0.96 2.62 (0.3 , 1.65) 2.82 0 
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Somewhat likely 0.86 2.36 (0.2 , 1.53) 2.54 0.01 
Extremely likely 0.96 2.61 (0.29 , 1.65) 2.79 0.01 
Free \ Discounted tolls  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely -1.02 0.36 (-1.91 , -0.13) -2.24 0.03 
Neutral -0.73 0.48 (-1.5 , 0.01) -1.9 0.06 
Somewhat likely -0.22 0.8 (-0.98 , 0.51) -0.59 0.56 
Extremely likely -0.24 0.78 (-1.02 , 0.51) -0.62 0.53 
Free \ Discounted DL renewal  
(reference =  extremely unlikely) 
     
Somewhat unlikely 0.64 1.9 (-0.82 , 2.13) 0.86 0.39 
Neutral 0.98 2.66 (-0.32 , 2.32) 1.46 0.14 
Somewhat likely 1.04 2.84 (-0.16 , 2.3) 1.67 0.09 
Extremely likely 1.42 4.13 (0.22 , 2.67) 2.29 0.02 
DL suspension as punishment 
(reference=strongly disagree) 
     
Somewhat disagree 0.3 1.35 (0 , 0.6) 1.97 0.05 
Neutral      
Somewhat agree -3.16 0.04 (-6.26 , -0.83) -2.53 0.01 
Strongly agree -1.58 0.21 (-2.36 , -0.81) -4.01 0 
Connected vehicles familiarity  
(reference =  no) 
-1.18 0.31 (-1.56 , -0.8) -6.12 0 
Yes -0.73 0.48 (-1.05 , -0.42) -4.58 0 
Marital Status (reference=Divorced)      
Married -0.09 0.91 (-0.69 , 0.49) -0.31 0.76 
Separated 0.96 2.61 (-0.44 , 2.6) 1.27 0.2 
Single -0.48 0.62 (-1.12 , 0.14) -1.5 0.13 
Widowed 0.69 2 (-0.75 , 2.37) 0.89 0.37 
Number of children [years] 0.11 1.11 (-0.03 , 0.25) 1.54 0.12 
Household income (reference = < $50,000)      
$50,000 - $99,999 0.25 1.28 (-0.04 , 0.54) 1.68 0.09 
$100,000 - $150,000 0.58 1.79 (0.16 , 1.01) 2.7 0.01 
> $150,000 0.74 2.09 (0.28 , 1.21) 3.09 0 
Outcome levels      
Support | Do not Support      
 
 
